Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Several parents, some acting on behalf of their children, challenged a presidential executive order issued in January 2025. The order declared that children born in the United States to parents who were unlawfully or temporarily present would not be considered “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, and therefore would not be entitled to citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiffs argued that this order violated both the Constitution and the INA, as it denied citizenship to children based solely on the immigration status of their parents at the time of birth.The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire reviewed the case and agreed with the plaintiffs. It provisionally certified a nationwide class of children affected by the order and issued a preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of the executive order. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari before judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The Supreme Court held that children born in the United States to parents who are unlawfully or temporarily present are “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, and are entitled to citizenship at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause. The Court based its holding on the historical understanding of citizenship rooted in the English common law, the repudiation of Dred Scott v. Sandford, and the precedent established in United States v. Wong Kim Ark. The Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court, upholding birthright citizenship for these children. View "Trump v. Barbara" on Justia Law

A group of candidates and political party committees, including then-Senate candidate JD Vance and various Republican campaign committees, challenged federal limits on coordinated campaign expenditures by political parties under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). These limits restrict the amount a party can spend in direct coordination with a candidate’s campaign. Plaintiffs argued that the restrictions violate the First Amendment, especially given modern developments in campaign finance law and enforcement tools such as earmarking and disclosure requirements. JD Vance maintained standing to challenge the law, as he had an active Statement of Candidacy and a campaign committee, despite later becoming Vice President.The case was first reviewed by the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which upheld FECA’s coordinated-expenditure limits. The Sixth Circuit relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s 2001 precedent, Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II), which had previously sustained these limits against First Amendment challenges. However, several Sixth Circuit judges questioned whether Colorado II remained good law in light of more recent Supreme Court decisions, including McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission and Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate.The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and ultimately reversed the Sixth Circuit. The Court held that FECA’s limits on political-party coordinated expenditures violate the First Amendment. Applying rigorous scrutiny, the Court determined that the limits are not necessary, narrowly tailored, or proportionate to the government’s interest in preventing circumvention of candidate contribution limits, especially given the effectiveness of existing earmarking rules and disclosure laws. The Court explicitly overruled Colorado II, concluding that subsequent precedents have rendered it obsolete. The judgment of the Sixth Circuit was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

A state law in West Virginia prohibited male students, as determined by biological sex, from participating on female sports teams. A student who is a biological male but identifies as female and has taken puberty blockers and hormones sought to participate on the girls’ cross-country and track-and-field teams and brought suit against West Virginia officials, alleging violations of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. Similarly, Idaho passed a law barring male students from female sports teams; a transgender woman who is a biological male but identifies as female and had taken hormones challenged Idaho’s law after trying out for collegiate women’s sports. Both states justified their laws by referencing inherent physical differences between the sexes and concerns for safety and competitive fairness in women’s sports.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment for the state, finding no violation of Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the ruling on the Title IX claim and remanded for further factual findings on the Equal Protection claim. Meanwhile, in Idaho, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute; the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision, finding a likely violation of the Equal Protection Clause.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed both appellate court decisions. It held that Title IX permits schools to maintain separate men’s and women’s sports teams determined by biological sex and does not require exceptions for transgender athletes, regardless of puberty blockers or hormone use. The Court further held that the Equal Protection Clause does not bar states from limiting female sports teams to biological females, finding the sex-based classification substantially related to important government interests in safety and competitive fairness. The cases were remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "West Virginia v. B. P. J." on Justia Law

In August 2025, the President attempted to remove a sitting member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Lisa Cook, citing allegations of mortgage fraud that predated her tenure. This was the first time in the Federal Reserve’s history that a Governor was purportedly fired. Cook, whose term was scheduled to run until 2038, received a letter from the President stating that her integrity was in question due to potential misconduct, and that her immediate removal was necessary. Cook filed suit, arguing both that the alleged misconduct did not constitute “cause” for removal under the governing statute, and that she had not been given the required process—namely, notice and an opportunity to respond—before her termination.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction preventing Cook’s removal, finding she was likely to succeed on her claims that the purported “cause” did not satisfy the statutory standard, and that she had not received constitutionally or statutorily required pre-termination process. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit declined to stay the injunction, with a concurrence emphasizing the due process issue. The Government then sought a stay from the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the United States denied the Government’s application for a stay. The Court held that the President’s power to remove Federal Reserve Governors is subject to judicial review and that “cause” for removal must be substantial and related to the Governor’s official duties, reflecting the Federal Reserve’s need for independence. Most importantly, the Court ruled that Governors are entitled by statute to notice and an opportunity to respond before removal. Because Cook was not afforded these protections, her removal could not stand pending further litigation. The Court declined to address broader constitutional questions, deciding the case on statutory grounds. View "Trump v. Cook" on Justia Law

After President Trump began his second term in 2025, he dismissed two Democratic commissioners from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya, citing that their continued service conflicted with his administration’s priorities. He did not allege any statutory cause for their removal, instead asserting authority under Article II of the Constitution. Slaughter sued, arguing her removal was unlawful under the relevant statute, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Constitution. Bedoya’s claims were dismissed as moot after he resigned, leaving only Slaughter’s case at issue.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in Slaughter’s favor, finding that President Trump’s action was ultra vires because the relevant statute allows removal of FTC commissioners only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” The court relied on the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which had recognized such statutory protections for FTC commissioners. The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting interference with Slaughter’s ability to perform her duties. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the government’s motion for a stay pending appeal, finding that Humphrey’s Executor controlled the issue.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed. It held that the FTC’s statutory provision limiting removal of commissioners to “for cause” is unconstitutional because it impermissibly restricts the President’s authority to remove executive officers. The Court overruled Humphrey’s Executor to the extent it permitted such statutory insulation for executive officers, reaffirming that officers exercising executive power must be removable by the President at will to preserve the Constitution’s separation of powers. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Trump v. Slaughter" on Justia Law

A man robbed a credit union in Midlothian, Virginia in May 2019. Police learned from witnesses and surveillance that the robber appeared to use a cell phone but could not identify him. To find leads, the officers applied for a geofence warrant, compelling Google to provide anonymized location data for all cell phones within a 150-meter radius of the credit union around the time of the crime. The warrant described a three-step process: first, Google would produce anonymized data for all devices within the geofence for an hour; second, police would narrow the list and receive additional location data for those devices; third, police would further narrow the list and obtain identifying information. Ultimately, Google provided the identities of three users, including the petitioner, whose movements matched those of the robber.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found the geofence warrant “plainly violates the rights enshrined in [the Fourth] Amendment” but denied the motion to suppress the evidence, applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but on the ground that no Fourth Amendment search had occurred because the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Location History data given to Google. On rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in a one-sentence opinion, dividing evenly on the search question.The Supreme Court of the United States held that police conduct a Fourth Amendment search when they acquire an individual’s cell-phone Location History data from Google, because a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in such information. The Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of particularity and probable cause at each stage of the search process. View "Chatrie v. United States" on Justia Law

Mississippi allows certain residents, including college students away from home and senior citizens, to vote in federal elections by absentee ballot. These absentee ballots must be postmarked on or before election day and received by the registrar no more than five business days after the election. In 2024, several Republican-affiliated organizations and individuals, as well as the Libertarian Party of Mississippi, sued the Mississippi Secretary of State and other election officials. They argued that federal election-day statutes require both the casting and receipt of ballots to occur by election day, thereby preempting Mississippi’s law that permits counting absentee ballots received after election day.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi consolidated the cases and granted summary judgment in favor of Mississippi, finding no conflict between federal statute and state law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the federal election-day statutes preempt Mississippi’s law, and required ballots to be received by election day. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc, prompting the defendants to seek review by the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the United States held that the federal election-day statutes do not prevent Mississippi from counting absentee ballots postmarked by election day but received up to five days later. The Court clarified that the federal statutes set the deadline for when votes must be cast, not when they must be received, and that state law governs ballot receipt deadlines. The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, emphasizing that the statutes do not preempt Mississippi’s practice of counting properly postmarked but late-arriving absentee ballots. View "Watson v. Republican National Committee" on Justia Law

In 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection faced a surge of individuals seeking admission at ports along the U.S.-Mexico border, often exceeding the capacity for safe processing. To manage this, the Department of Homeland Security instituted a “metering” policy that limited the number of people allowed to cross each day, with CBP officials stationed on the U.S. side of the border to prevent entry beyond daily capacity. The policy’s enforcement meant that some asylum seekers remained in Mexico, unable to present themselves for inspection or apply for asylum immediately.A group of asylum seekers and the advocacy organization Al Otro Lado filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, challenging the legality of metering. The District Court certified a class and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, declaring the government’s denial of inspection and asylum processing to those “in the process of arriving in the United States” to be unlawful. After the government rescinded the metering policy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that an individual standing in Mexico who encounters a U.S. official at the border “arrives in the United States” for purposes of inspection and asylum eligibility.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision. It held that under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an alien “arrives in the United States” only upon physically crossing the border. The statutory language does not entitle someone standing in Mexico to inspection or to apply for asylum, nor does it require U.S. officials to inspect such individuals. The Court concluded that the statutory provisions at issue do not have extraterritorial effect and that the metering policy, as applied, was not unlawful under the INA. The judgment was reversed and remanded. View "Mullin v. Al Otro Lado" on Justia Law

Several Syrian and Haitian nationals challenged the United States Secretary of Homeland Security’s decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for Syria and Haiti. TPS provides humanitarian relief for foreign nationals who cannot safely return to their countries. Syria’s TPS status, granted in 2012 due to civil war, was set for termination in 2025 following changes in the country’s government and improved conditions. Haiti’s TPS status, in place since a 2010 earthquake, was also scheduled for termination in 2026, with the government citing improved conditions and foreign policy considerations.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Syrian plaintiffs sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the court granted interim relief, postponing termination. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the government’s request for a stay. Separately, Haitian plaintiffs in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia brought APA and constitutional equal protection claims, alleging racial motivation behind the termination. That court also granted interim relief, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit declined to issue a stay. The government petitioned for a stay and certiorari before judgment, after which the Supreme Court consolidated the cases for review.The Supreme Court of the United States held that the TPS statute bars judicial review of any non-constitutional claims related to the designation, extension, or termination of TPS for a foreign state. The Court also concluded that the equal protection claim brought by the Haitian plaintiffs was unlikely to succeed, finding insufficient evidence that race was a motivating factor in the termination decision. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the interim relief granted by both district courts and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "Mullin v. Doe" on Justia Law

Monsanto Company manufactures Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has repeatedly evaluated glyphosate and concluded it is not likely to cause cancer, and as a result, EPA has not required a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. John Durnell used Roundup for about 20 years and developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. He sued Monsanto in Missouri state court, asserting a failure-to-warn claim, arguing that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup’s label.A jury in the Missouri trial court found in Durnell’s favor on the failure-to-warn claim and awarded him more than $1 million in damages. Monsanto argued that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) expressly preempted the state-law failure-to-warn claim because it would require labeling different from what the EPA mandates. The Missouri trial court rejected this argument, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that Missouri’s failure-to-warn requirements were consistent with FIFRA’s misbranding provisions.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case. It held that FIFRA expressly preempts Durnell’s state-law failure-to-warn claim. The Court reasoned that EPA’s approval of Roundup’s label—without a cancer warning—constitutes a federal labeling requirement. Because FIFRA’s preemption clause prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements “in addition to or different from” federal requirements, Missouri’s requirement for a cancer warning is preempted. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Monsanto v. Durnell" on Justia Law