Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves three separate lawsuits filed by individuals, organizations, and states to prevent the enforcement of President Trump's Executive Order No. 14160. This order specifies conditions under which a person born in the United States is not considered a citizen. The plaintiffs argue that the order violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause and the Nationality Act of 1940. District Courts in each case issued universal injunctions, preventing the order's enforcement against anyone, not just the plaintiffs. The Government sought to limit these injunctions to the plaintiffs, arguing that the courts lacked the authority to issue such broad relief.The District Courts concluded that the Executive Order was likely unlawful and issued universal preliminary injunctions. The Courts of Appeals denied the Government's requests to stay these injunctions. The Government then filed emergency applications with the Supreme Court, seeking partial stays to limit the injunctions to the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority granted to federal courts by Congress. The Court granted the Government's applications for partial stays, limiting the injunctions to the extent necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue. The Court emphasized that federal courts' equitable authority is confined to traditional remedies available at the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and universal injunctions do not have a historical precedent. The Court directed the lower courts to determine whether narrower injunctions would be appropriate. View "Trump v. CASA, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and its universal-service contribution scheme, which requires telecommunications carriers to contribute to a fund that subsidizes communications services for underserved communities. The FCC uses a formula to determine the contribution amount, and the Universal Service Administrative Company, a private entity, assists in managing the fund and projecting financial needs.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found the contribution scheme unconstitutional due to a "double-layered delegation" of authority. The court expressed skepticism about Congress's delegation of power to the FCC and the FCC's delegation to the Administrator, suggesting that the combination of these delegations violated the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Court held that the universal-service contribution scheme does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. It found that Congress provided sufficient guidance to the FCC through the Communications Act of 1934 and its amendments, which set clear policies and boundaries for the FCC's actions. The Court also determined that the FCC retained decision-making authority and that the Administrator's role was advisory, not a delegation of governmental power. The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's combination theory, stating that the separate delegations did not compound to create a constitutional violation. View "FCC v. Consumers' Research" on Justia Law

In 1984, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) created the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force to make evidence-based recommendations on preventive healthcare services. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 required most health insurers to cover services rated "A" or "B" by the Task Force without cost sharing. Plaintiffs, including Braidwood Management, objected to these requirements and argued that Task Force members are principal officers who must be appointed by the President with Senate consent, not by the Secretary of HHS.The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas agreed with the plaintiffs, ruling that Task Force members are principal officers because they have no superior who supervises and directs them. The court enjoined the government from enforcing the insurance coverage mandates based on Task Force recommendations issued after 2010. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Task Force members are principal officers because they cannot be independent and free from political pressure while being supervised by a political appointee.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision, holding that Task Force members are inferior officers. The Court reasoned that the Secretary of HHS has the authority to remove Task Force members at will and to review and block their recommendations before they take effect. This supervision and direction by the Secretary, a principal officer, means that Task Force members are inferior officers. Therefore, their appointment by the Secretary of HHS is consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc." on Justia Law

During the 2022-2023 school year, the Montgomery County Board of Education introduced LGBTQ+-inclusive storybooks into the public school curriculum for kindergarten through fifth grade. Initially, the Board allowed parents to opt their children out of this instruction, consistent with its guidelines for respecting religious diversity. However, the Board later rescinded this opt-out policy, citing disruptions and potential social stigma for students who opted out. A group of parents from diverse religious backgrounds, who believe the curriculum undermines their religious teachings on sexuality and gender, filed a lawsuit seeking to reinstate the opt-out option.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the parents' request for a preliminary injunction, dismissing their reliance on Wisconsin v. Yoder and characterizing their claim as an objection to school indoctrination. The court held that the curriculum did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding insufficient evidence that the storybooks coerced students to change their views or act contrary to their faith.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision, holding that the parents are entitled to a preliminary injunction. The Court found that the Board's policies substantially interfere with the religious development of the children and impose a burden on religious exercise similar to that in Yoder. The Court concluded that the parents are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim, suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that an injunction is in the public interest. The Board must notify parents in advance when the books will be used and allow their children to be excused from that instruction. View "Mahmoud v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In 2023, Texas enacted H.B. 1181, which requires commercial websites publishing sexually explicit content to verify that visitors are 18 or older. The law aims to prevent minors from accessing such content, with violations resulting in injunctions and civil penalties. Representatives of the pornography industry challenged the law, claiming it was unconstitutional under the First Amendment as it hindered adults' access to protected speech.The District Court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the law was subject to strict scrutiny and that Texas had not shown it was narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means to achieve its goal. The court suggested that encouraging parents to use content-filtering software would be a less restrictive alternative.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction, holding that the law was a regulation of the distribution of materials obscene to minors and only incidentally affected adults' privacy. The court applied rational-basis review, concluding that the age-verification requirement was rationally related to the government's interest in preventing minors' access to pornography.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that H.B. 1181 triggers intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens adults' protected speech. The Court found that the law advances important governmental interests in shielding children from sexual content and is adequately tailored to that interest. The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's judgment, concluding that H.B. 1181 is a constitutionally permissible exercise of Texas's authority to prevent minors from accessing sexually explicit content. View "Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton" on Justia Law

In 1998, Ruben Gutierrez was charged with capital murder in Texas for his involvement in the killing of Escolastica Harrison. The prosecution argued that Gutierrez used one of two screwdrivers to stab Harrison. The jury convicted him, and he was sentenced to death after the jury found that he either caused Harrison's death, intended to kill her, or anticipated that a human life would be taken. Gutierrez has sought DNA testing of evidence for nearly 15 years, claiming it would prove he was not present at the crime scene. Texas courts denied his requests, stating that even if his DNA was not found, it would not prove his innocence of the underlying crime.Gutierrez filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the district attorney, arguing that Texas's DNA testing procedures violated his due process rights. The District Court agreed and granted declaratory relief. However, the Fifth Circuit vacated this judgment, holding that Gutierrez lacked standing because a declaratory judgment would not likely result in the prosecutor allowing DNA testing.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Gutierrez has standing to bring his §1983 claim. The Court reasoned that a state-created right to postconviction procedures can create rights to other procedures essential to realizing that right. The Court found that a declaratory judgment in Gutierrez's favor would redress his injury by removing the prosecutor's reliance on Article 64 as a reason for denying DNA testing. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Gutierrez v. Saenz" on Justia Law

In 2018, South Carolina excluded Planned Parenthood from its Medicaid program, citing state law prohibiting public funds for abortion. Planned Parenthood and patient Julie Edwards sued, claiming the exclusion violated the Medicaid any-qualified-provider provision, which allows Medicaid beneficiaries to obtain services from any qualified provider. Edwards preferred Planned Parenthood for gynecological care but needed Medicaid coverage. They filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to enforce rights under the federal Medicaid statutes.The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and enjoined the exclusion. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded the case in light of Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion Cty. v. Talevski, which addressed whether another spending-power statute created §1983-enforceable rights. On remand, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its decision.The Supreme Court of the United States held that Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not clearly and unambiguously confer individual rights enforceable under §1983. The Court emphasized that spending-power statutes rarely create enforceable rights and that the any-qualified-provider provision lacks the clear rights-creating language necessary to support a §1983 action. The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic" on Justia Law

Pierre Riley, a Jamaican citizen, was ordered removed from the United States by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. Riley sought relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be killed by a drug kingpin if returned to Jamaica. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal under the CAT. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacated the IJ’s order, allowing the removal order to be enforced.Riley filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit within 30 days of the BIA’s decision but long after the DHS issued the final administrative review order (FARO). The Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the 30-day filing deadline for judicial review of a final order of removal is jurisdictional and that the final order of removal was the FARO, not the BIA’s decision.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that BIA orders denying deferral of removal in withholding-only proceedings are not final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(1). The Court also held that the 30-day filing deadline under §1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. Consequently, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Riley v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In 2009, Tony Hewitt, Corey Duffey, and Jarvis Ross were convicted of multiple counts of bank robbery and conspiracy, along with corresponding §924(c) offenses for using a firearm during a crime of violence. Each received a mandatory 5-year sentence for the first §924(c) count and 25-year mandatory sentences for each additional count, resulting in sentences exceeding 325 years. After successfully challenging some convictions, the Fifth Circuit vacated their sentences, and they were resentenced to between 285 and 305 years. Following the First Step Act of 2018, which reduced mandatory minimum penalties for first-time §924(c) offenders, the District Court vacated more convictions and resentenced them under the pre-Act scheme, resulting in sentences of 130 years or more.The Fifth Circuit denied the joint request by petitioners and the Government to apply the First Step Act’s more lenient penalties, holding that §403(b) applies only to defendants who had not been sentenced as of the Act’s enactment. Since the petitioners had been sentenced twice before the Act, the court concluded they were ineligible for the Act’s benefits.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, holding that under §403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence “has been imposed” only if it remains valid and has not been vacated. Therefore, the Act’s more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous §924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act’s enactment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Hewitt v. United States" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved California regulations under the Clean Air Act that require automakers to produce more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles to reduce emissions. Several fuel producers, including those of gasoline and ethanol, sued the EPA, arguing that the EPA lacked the authority to approve these regulations as they target global climate change rather than local air quality issues. The fuel producers claimed that the regulations would significantly reduce the demand for liquid fuels, causing them monetary injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and held that the fuel producers lacked Article III standing. The court found that the fuel producers failed to demonstrate that automakers would likely respond to the invalidation of the regulations by producing fewer electric vehicles and more gasoline-powered vehicles, thus failing to establish redressability.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the fuel producers have Article III standing to challenge the EPA’s approval of the California regulations. The Court found that the fuel producers demonstrated injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The Court reasoned that the regulations likely cause monetary injury to the fuel producers by reducing the demand for gasoline and other liquid fuels. The Court also found that invalidating the regulations would likely redress the injury by increasing the sales of gasoline-powered vehicles and, consequently, the demand for liquid fuels. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law