Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

The Pregnancy Discrimination Act specifies that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,” 42 U.S.C 2000e(k), and that employers must treat “women affected by pregnancy . . . the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” Young, a UPS driver, became pregnant; her doctor advised that she should not lift more than 20 pounds. UPS required drivers to lift up to 70 pounds. UPS told Young that she could not work while under a lifting restriction. Young filed a disparate-treatment claim of discrimination, identifying UPS policies that accommodated workers who were injured on the job, were covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act, or had lost Department of Transportation certifications. UPS argued that, since Young did not fall within those categories, it had not discriminated on the basis of pregnancy, but had treated her as it treated all “other” relevant “persons.” The district court granted UPS summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated. Disparate treatment law normally allows an employer to implement policies that are not intended to harm members of a protected class if the employer has a nondiscriminatory, nonpretextual reason. A pregnant worker can make a prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that she sought and was denied accommodation and that the employer did accommodate others “similar in their ability or inability to work.” The employer may then try to establish “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons, other than that it is more expensive or less convenient to accommodate pregnant women. If the employer offers a reason, the plaintiff may show that it is pretextual. The plaintiff may survive a motion for summary judgment by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden. The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact as to “significant burden” with evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers. Young created a genuine dispute as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment to some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from hers. View "Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc." on Justia Law