Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A licensed mental health counselor in Colorado, who provides talk therapy to clients—including minors—challenged a state law that prohibits licensed counselors from engaging in “conversion therapy” with minors. The law defines conversion therapy broadly to include any practice or treatment that attempts to change an individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity, including efforts to alter behaviors, expressions, or attractions. However, the law permits counselors to support clients exploring their identity or undergoing gender transition. The counselor’s practice involves helping clients pursue their own stated goals, which may include support for changes in sexual orientation or gender identity, but she only utilizes talk therapy and does not engage in any physical interventions.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado first reviewed the case. That court, and later the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, concluded that the counselor had standing to bring a pre-enforcement, as-applied First Amendment challenge to the law. Both courts interpreted the law as prohibiting her from using speech to help clients change their sexual orientation or gender identity. Nevertheless, both courts denied her request for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that the law regulates professional conduct, not speech, and any effect on speech is merely incidental. Applying rational-basis review, they found the law constitutionally permissible.The Supreme Court of the United States granted review to resolve a circuit split. The Supreme Court held that, as applied to the counselor’s talk therapy, the Colorado law regulates speech based on viewpoint, not merely conduct, and that the lower courts erred by applying only rational-basis scrutiny. The Supreme Court ruled that the law is subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment and reversed the Tenth Circuit’s decision, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Chiles v. Salazar" on Justia Law

During the inauguration of Vermont’s governor, a group of protesters, including Shela Linton, staged a sit-in at the state capitol to advocate for universal healthcare. When the building closed, police instructed the protesters to leave or face arrest for trespassing. Some complied, while others, including Linton, refused. Sergeant Jacob Zorn approached Linton, who remained seated and passively resisted. After multiple warnings, Zorn used a rear wristlock to lift Linton to her feet, causing her to exclaim in pain. Linton alleged that this action resulted in physical and psychological injuries.Linton filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming Zorn’s use of force violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont granted summary judgment to Zorn, holding he was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that his actions constituted excessive force in these circumstances. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, relying on its earlier decision in Amnesty America v. West Hartford, reasoning that the use of a rear wristlock on a passively resisting protester was clearly established as excessive force. The Second Circuit remanded the case for a jury trial.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Zorn was entitled to qualified immunity. The Court determined that Amnesty America did not clearly establish, with the requisite specificity, that Zorn’s conduct—using a wristlock after repeated warnings—violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court emphasized that qualified immunity protects officials unless prior precedent places the constitutional question beyond debate and found that no case had clearly held such conduct unlawful in similar circumstances. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the judgment of the Second Circuit. View "Zorn v. Linton" on Justia Law

Gabriel Olivier, a street preacher in Mississippi, was convicted in 2021 for violating a city ordinance that restricted expressive activities near a public amphitheater. The ordinance required individuals engaging in protests or demonstrations during event times to remain within a designated protest area. Olivier found the area too remote to reach his audience and, after returning to a more visible location, was arrested. He later pleaded no contest in municipal court, received a fine, probation, and a suspended jail sentence, and did not appeal his conviction.Following his conviction, Olivier filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the City and its police chief, claiming the ordinance violated the First Amendment. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent future enforcement of the ordinance, but not to overturn his prior conviction or seek damages. The City argued, based on Heck v. Humphrey, that his suit was barred because success would imply the invalidity of his conviction. The District Court agreed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that a §1983 suit implying a prior conviction’s invalidity is not allowed, regardless of the relief sought.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and unanimously held that Heck v. Humphrey does not bar a §1983 suit seeking only prospective relief, such as an injunction against future enforcement of a law, even if the plaintiff was previously convicted under that law. The Court reasoned that Olivier’s suit did not challenge his prior conviction or seek damages for it, but merely sought to avoid future prosecutions. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Olivier v. City of Brandon" on Justia Law

Parents and teachers in California challenged state policies that require schools to keep information about students’ gender transitioning confidential from parents unless the students consent. The parents objected to being excluded from knowledge and decisions regarding their children’s gender presentation at school, especially when those actions conflicted with their religious beliefs or their desire to participate in their children’s mental health care. Several parents described situations in which they were not informed about their children’s gender identity at school until after significant mental health crises occurred. Teachers objected to being compelled to use students’ preferred names and pronouns contrary to the wishes of parents and their own beliefs.The case was initiated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, where two teachers first challenged district policies. As litigation unfolded, the case expanded to include state officials as defendants and parents as additional plaintiffs. The District Court certified parent and teacher classes, granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, and entered a permanent injunction that prohibited schools from withholding information from parents and required adherence to parental directions on names and pronouns. The District Court also ordered state-created instructional materials to include notice of the rights protected by the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a stay of the injunction pending appeal, expressing procedural concerns about class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and skepticism regarding the merits of the constitutional claims.The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the Ninth Circuit’s stay as to the parent plaintiffs, concluding that the parents seeking religious exemptions are likely to succeed on their Free Exercise and Due Process claims. The Court found the parents face irreparable harm and that equities favor them. The procedural objections raised by the Ninth Circuit were deemed unlikely to prevail. The application to vacate was otherwise denied. View "Mirabelli v. Bonta" on Justia Law

During his murder trial, the defendant chose to testify in his own defense, claiming self-defense in the fatal stabbing. Partway through his testimony, the trial was interrupted by a 24-hour overnight recess. Before the break, the trial judge instructed the defendant’s attorneys not to “manage” or shape his ongoing testimony during the recess but clarified that the defendant was not barred from speaking with his lawyers about other matters, such as sentencing or trial strategy. After the recess, the defendant resumed testifying and was later convicted of murder.Upon appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the trial judge’s conferral order. The appellate court found that the order was constitutionally permissible because it only restricted discussions specifically about managing the defendant’s ongoing testimony, not all attorney-client consultations. The appellate court emphasized that the order did not prevent the defendant from consulting his attorneys on other protected matters, such as plea negotiations or trial strategy, and was therefore a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion.The Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether a qualified order limiting discussion of a defendant’s ongoing testimony during a midtestimony overnight recess violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Supreme Court held that such a qualified order is constitutional, so long as it prohibits only discussion of testimony for its own sake and does not prevent consultation on other protected topics, including trial strategy, plea discussions, or evidentiary issues. The Court distinguished this qualified order from a total ban on attorney-client discussions and affirmed that the order properly balanced the defendant’s right to counsel against the integrity of unaltered trial testimony. The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was affirmed. View "Villarreal v. Texas" on Justia Law

President Trump, after taking office, declared national emergencies over two foreign threats: the influx of illegal drugs from Canada, Mexico, and China, and persistent trade deficits affecting U.S. manufacturing and supply chains. Invoking authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he imposed tariffs—25% on most Canadian and Mexican imports, 10% on most Chinese imports for drug trafficking, and at least 10% on all imports for trade deficit concerns, with higher rates for dozens of nations and frequent modifications.Two sets of plaintiffs challenged these tariffs. In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Learning Resources plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction, as the court found IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The Government's motion to transfer to the United States Court of International Trade (CIT) was denied. In V.O.S. Selections, plaintiffs prevailed in the CIT, which granted summary judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed, holding that IEEPA’s authority to “regulate… importation” did not authorize such tariffs, as their scope, amount, and duration were unbounded.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the consolidated appeals. It held that IEEPA does not grant the President authority to impose tariffs, reasoning that the statute’s language—particularly “regulate… importation”—does not include the distinct power to tax or raise revenue through tariffs, a core congressional function. The Court emphasized the absence of explicit authorization and the constitutional structure reserving tariff powers to Congress. The Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s judgment in the V.O.S. Selections case and vacated the District Court’s judgment in Learning Resources, remanding with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in Maryland state court for the attempted murder of his girlfriend, who was shot in her apartment. The prosecution presented evidence including a homemade device that appeared to be a silencer and DNA evidence tying the defendant to that device. Witnesses testified about the defendant’s involvement in preparing the device and his motive, which stemmed from the girlfriend’s pregnancy and her threat to seek child support. Additional evidence linked the defendant to the type of firearm used in the shooting. The jury found the defendant guilty as an accessory before the fact, and he was sentenced to life in prison.After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, the defendant sought postconviction relief in Maryland state court, arguing that the prosecution failed to disclose a forensic report about a laptop, which could have impeached a key witness’s testimony regarding the defendant’s online activity. The state postconviction court granted a new trial, but the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the undisclosed evidence was not material because the other evidence linking the defendant to the crime was strong enough that there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome. The Maryland Court of Appeals denied review.The defendant then sought federal habeas relief. The United States District Court granted his petition, and a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the state court had not properly applied the correct standard for materiality under Brady v. Maryland. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the state appellate court correctly applied the materiality standard and that, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal courts must defer to reasonable state court decisions. The Supreme Court found that a fairminded jurist could conclude the withheld evidence was not material, and therefore federal habeas relief was not warranted. View "Klein v. Martin" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted of a federal crime and, after the enactment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), was sentenced to pay $7,567.25 in restitution to his victim, even though his criminal conduct occurred before the MVRA became law. Years later, the petitioner challenged the continued obligation to pay restitution, arguing that applying the MVRA retroactively to his conduct violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.The United States District Court initially sentenced the petitioner under the MVRA. When the petitioner challenged the restitution order, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found against him, ruling that restitution under the MVRA is not criminal punishment and thus not subject to the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Eighth Circuit’s decision rested on its interpretation that MVRA restitution was a civil remedy rather than a criminal penalty.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and reversed the Eighth Circuit’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that restitution imposed under the MVRA constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court explained that the statutory text and structure, as well as its placement in the criminal code and its role as a penalty imposed at sentencing, demonstrate that restitution under the MVRA is penal in nature. The Court further noted that only criminal defendants can be ordered to pay restitution, it is imposed in criminal proceedings, and the government, not the victim, is the adverse party. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its ruling, allowing the Eighth Circuit to consider other arguments raised by the government. View "Ellingburg v. United States" on Justia Law

After receiving a report from his ex-girlfriend that he was threatening suicide and may have shot himself, law enforcement officers in Montana responded to William Case’s home. The officers were aware of Case’s mental health and substance abuse history, as well as prior threats of suicide and confrontations with police. Upon arrival, they received further details about the phone call from Case’s ex-girlfriend, observed an empty handgun holster, a notepad resembling a suicide note, and noted Case’s lack of response to their attempts at contact. Believing Case might be injured or at risk of imminent harm, the officers entered the home without a warrant to render emergency aid. During their search, Case emerged from a closet holding an object that appeared to be a gun, prompting an officer to shoot and injure him. A handgun was found near where Case had been standing.Case was charged with assaulting a police officer and moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless entry, arguing a Fourth Amendment violation. The trial court denied the motion, finding the entry justified by emergency circumstances. A Montana jury convicted Case. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the conviction, applying its “community caretaker doctrine” and concluding that police may enter a home for a welfare check if “objective, specific and articulable facts” lead an experienced officer to suspect peril. The court rejected the argument that probable cause was required for such an entry, distinguishing emergency aid situations from criminal investigations.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case to clarify the legal standard for warrantless home entry to render emergency aid. The Court held that officers may enter a home without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. It declined to require probable cause in this context and affirmed the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court, finding the officers’ entry reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. View "Case v. Montana" on Justia Law

Illinois law provides that election officials must count mail-in ballots postmarked or certified no later than election day, as long as those ballots are received within two weeks after election day. Congressman Michael Bost and two other political candidates filed suit against the Illinois State Board of Elections and its executive director, asserting that counting ballots received after election day violates federal statutes that set a single election day for federal offices. The plaintiffs alleged that the challenged law would require them to expend additional campaign resources, potentially harm their reputations, and deprive them of a fair electoral process. Congressman Bost, in particular, claimed he would need to extend campaign activities and monitoring efforts for two additional weeks, incurring costs and risking a reduction in his margin of victory.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the injuries alleged—such as increased campaign costs and potential reputational harm—were speculative or voluntarily incurred. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that Congressman Bost had won his prior election with a significant margin and found the plaintiffs’ injuries to be neither concrete nor particularized enough to support standing.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Congressman Bost, as a candidate for office, does have standing to challenge the rules governing vote counting in his election. The Court reasoned that candidates possess a concrete and particularized interest in the integrity and legality of the electoral process, which is distinct from the generalized interest of voters. The judgment of the Seventh Circuit was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Bost v. Illinois Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law