Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

ESN, an African-American-owned television-network operator, sought to have cable television conglomerate Comcast carry its channels. Comcast refused, citing lack of demand, bandwidth constraints, and a preference for different programming. ESN alleged that Comcast violated 42 U.S.C. 1981, which guarantees “[a]ll persons . . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, holding that ESN needed only to plead facts plausibly showing that race played “some role” in the decision-making process.The Supreme Court vacated. A section 1981 plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff’s race was a but-for cause of its injury; that burden remains constant over the life of the lawsuit. The statute’s text suggests but-for causation and does not suggest that the test should be different in the face of a motion to dismiss. When the “motivating factor” test was added to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress also amended section 1981 without mentioning “motivating factors.” The burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas provides no support for the reading ESN seeks. The court of appeals should determine how ESN’s amended complaint fares under the proper standard. View "Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African-American Owned Media" on Justia Law

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) makes it unlawful to hire an alien knowing that he is unauthorized to work in the U.S., 8 U.S.C. 1324a(a)(1), (h)(3). Employers must use an I-9 form to “attest” that they have “verified” that any new employee “is not an unauthorized alien” by examining approved documents. IRCA requires all employees to complete an I–9, attest that they are authorized to work, and provide specific personal information. It is a federal crime for an employee to provide false information on an I–9 or to use fraudulent documents to show work authorization, 18 U.S.C. 1028, 1546; it is not a federal crime for an alien to work without authorization. State laws criminalizing such conduct are preempted. The I–9 forms and appended documentation and the employment verification system may only be used for enforcement of specified federal laws.Kansas makes it a crime to commit “identity theft” or engage in fraud to obtain a benefit. Unauthorized aliens were convicted for fraudulently using another person’s Social Security number on tax withholding forms that they submitted upon obtaining employment. They had used the same Social Security numbers on their I–9 forms. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed, concluding that IRCA prohibits a state from using any information contained within an I–9 as the basis for a state law identity theft prosecution of an alien who uses another’s Social Security information in an I–9.The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the theory that no information placed on an I–9 could ever be used by any entity or person for any reason, other than the listed federal statutes. The sole function of the federal employment verification system is to establish that an employee is not barred from working in this country. The tax-withholding documents play no part in that process. Submitting withholding documents helped the defendants get jobs, but did not assist them in showing that they were authorized to work. The Kansas laws do not fall into a field that is implicitly reserved exclusively for federal regulation. Federal law does not create a unified, comprehensive system regarding the information that a state may require employees to provide. It is possible to comply with both IRCA and the Kansas statutes; the Kansas prosecutions did not frustrate any federal interests. View "Kansas v. Garcia" on Justia Law

In 1979, the Superintendent of Catholic Schools of the Archdiocese of San Juan created a trust to administer a pension plan for Catholic school employees. In 2016, active and retired school employees filed suit, alleging that the Trust had terminated the plan, eliminating the employees’ pension benefits. They named as defendants the “Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church of Puerto Rico” (Church), which they claimed was a legal entity with supervisory authority over all Catholic institutions in Puerto Rico, the Archdiocese, the Superintendent, three schools, and the Trust.Following a remand, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court reinstated orders requiring payment. The court held that the Treaty of Paris recognized the “legal personality” of “the Catholic Church” in Puerto Rico, and that the only defendant with separate legal personality, and the only entity that could be ordered to pay the pensions, was the Church.The U.S. Supreme Court vacated, declining to address issues under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction to issue the payment and seizure orders. After the remand, the Archdiocese removed the case to federal court, arguing that the Trust had filed for bankruptcy and that this litigation was sufficiently related to the bankruptcy to give rise to federal jurisdiction. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Trust’s bankruptcy proceeding before the Court of First Instance issued the relevant payment and seizure orders but the district court did not remand the case to the Court of First Instance until five months later. Once a notice of removal is filed, the state court loses all jurisdiction over the case. The orders were void. View "Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan v. Feliciano" on Justia Law

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm who has at least three convictions for “serious drug offense[s],” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). A state offense ranks as a “serious drug offense” if it “involv[es] manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” Shular pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Shular’s 15-year sentence, ACCA’s mandatory minimum, based on his six prior cocaine-related convictions under Florida law.A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. A “categorical approach” is often used to determine whether an offender’s prior convictions qualify for ACCA enhancement. That approach looks “only to the statutory definitions" of the prior offenses; the court must come up with a “generic” version of a crime (the elements of the offense as commonly understood) and then determine whether the statutory elements of the offense of conviction match those of the generic crime.Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s “serious drug offense” definition does not require a categorical approach but requires only that the state offense involved the conduct specified in the statute. The statutory text and context show that 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) refers to conduct, not offenses. State laws in existence at the time of 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s enactment lacked common nomenclature; the solution to identify offenses by the conduct involved, not by the name of the offenses. View "Shular v. United States" on Justia Law

A jury found McKinney guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. The judge weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced McKinney to death. Nearly 20 years later, the Ninth Circuit held on habeas review that the Arizona courts violated Supreme Court precedent (Eddings), by failing to properly consider as relevant mitigating evidence McKinney’s posttraumatic stress disorder. On return to the Arizona Supreme Court, McKinney argued that he was entitled to a jury resentencing, but the court reweighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as permitted by “Clemons,” and upheld both death sentences.The Supreme Court affirmed. A Clemons reweighing is a permissible remedy for an Eddings error; when an Eddings error is found on collateral review, a state appellate court may conduct a Clemons reweighing on collateral review. Clemons did not depend on any unique effect of aggravators as distinct from mitigators. The Court’s holdings in Ring v. Arizona and Hurst v. Florida, that a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death-eligible, do not mean that a jury is constitutionally required to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or to make the ultimate sentencing decision. While an Arizona trial court, not the jury, made the initial aggravating circumstance finding that made McKinney eligible for the death penalty, his case became final on direct review long before Ring and Hurst, which do not apply retroactively on collateral review, The Arizona Supreme Court’s 2018 decision reweighing the factors did not constitute a reopening of direct review. View "McKinney v. Arizona" on Justia Law

U.S. Border Patrol Agent Mesa, standing on U.S. soil shot and killed Hernández, a 15-year-old Mexican national, who was on Mexican soil, after having run back across the border after entry onto U.S. territory. Mesa contends that Hernández was part of an illegal border crossing attempt. Hernández’s parents claim he was playing a game with his friends that involved running across the culvert. The Department of Justice concluded that Mesa had not violated Customs and Border Patrol policy or training, and declined to bring charges. The government denied Mexico’s request for Mesa to be extradited. Hernández’s parents sought damages under "Bivens," alleging that Mesa violated Hernández’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of "Ziglar," the Fifth Circuit again affirmed.The Supreme Court affirmed. Bivens does not extend to claims based on a cross-border shooting. Its expansion to recognize causes of action not expressly created by Congress is “a disfavored’ judicial activity.” While Hernández’s Bivens claims are based on the same constitutional provisions as claims in cases in which damages remedies have been recognized, the context—a cross-border shooting—is significantly different and involves a “risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches.” The Court noted that foreign relations are “so exclusively entrusted to the political branches . . . as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry” and noted the risk of undermining border security. Congress has repeatedly declined to authorize the award of damages against federal officials for injury inflicted outside U. S. borders. When Congress has provided compensation for such injuries, it has done so by empowering Executive Branch officials to make payments under appropriate circumstances. View "Hernandez v. Mesa" on Justia Law

Under the Census Act, authorized by the Enumeration Clause, the Secretary of Commerce conducts the decennial census “in such form and content as he may determine,” 13 U.S.C. 141(a), aided by the Census Bureau. Census data is used to apportion congressional representatives, allocate federal funds, draw electoral districts, and collect demographic information. All but one survey between 1820 and 2000 asked at least some people about their citizenship or place of birth. In 2010, the citizenship question was moved to the American Community Survey, which is sent annually to a small sample of households.In 2018, Secretary of Commerce Ross announced that he would reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 census at the request of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which sought census data to use in enforcing the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The Secretary indicated that other alternatives had been explored and that he “carefully considered” that reinstating the question could depress the response rate. The plan was challenged under the Enumeration Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Equal Protection Clause. The Commerce Department’s administrative record indicated that the Secretary began exploring reinstatement of a citizenship question shortly after his 2017 confirmation, attempted to elicit requests for citizenship data from other agencies, and eventually persuaded DOJ to make the request.The Supreme Court affirmed in favor of the objectors. While the Secretary may inquire about citizenship on the census questionnaire, his decision is reviewable under the APA, except “to the extent that” the agency action is “committed to agency discretion by law.” The Census Act confers broad authority but does not leave the Secretary's discretion unbounded. The census is not traditionally regarded as “committed to agency discretion.” The Secretary technically complied with the statutes; he explored obtaining the information from other sources, fully informed Congress, and explained his decision. Viewing the evidence as a whole, however, the Court concluded that the decision cannot adequately be explained by DOJ’s request. The Secretary took steps to reinstate the question a week into his tenure, with no concern for VRA enforcement. His staff attempted to elicit requests for citizenship data from other agencies before turning to the VRA rationale. The reasoned explanation requirement of administrative law is meant to ensure that agencies offer genuine justifications for important decisions, reasons that can be scrutinized by courts and the interested public. The Secretary's explanation "was more of a distraction." View "Department of Commerce v. New York" on Justia Law

Mitchell was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated after a preliminary breath test registered a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) triple Wisconsin’s legal limit for driving. Taken to a police station for a more reliable breath test using evidence-grade equipment, Mitchell was too lethargic for a breath test. Taken to a nearby hospital for a blood test, Mitchell was unconscious. His blood was drawn under a state law that presumes that a person incapable of withdrawing implied consent to BAC testing has not done so. Charged with violating drunk-driving laws, Mitchell moved to suppress the blood test results. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the lawfulness of Mitchell’s blood test. The Supreme Court vacated. A plurality concluded that when a driver is unconscious and cannot take a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood test without a warrant. BAC tests are Fourth Amendment searches. A warrant is normally required but the “exigent circumstances” exception allows warrantless searches to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence when there is a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant. The Court previously held that the fleeting nature of blood-alcohol evidence alone did not bring BAC testing within the exigency exception but that unconscious-driver cases involve a heightened urgency. When the driver’s stupor deprives officials of a reasonable opportunity to administer a breath test using evidence-grade equipment, a blood test is essential for achieving the goals of BAC testing. Highway safety is a compelling public interest; legal limits on a driver’s BAC serve that interest. Enforcing BAC limits requires testing that is accurate enough to stand up in court and prompt because alcohol dissipates from the bloodstream. When a drunk-driving suspect is unconscious, health, safety, or law enforcement needs can take priority over a warrant application. A driver’s unconsciousness is itself a medical emergency and a driver so drunk as to lose consciousness is likely to crash, giving officers other urgent tasks. On remand, Mitchell may attempt to show that his case was unusual and that police could not have reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other pressing needs. View "Mitchell v. Wisconsin" on Justia Law

North Carolina plaintiffs claimed that the state’s congressional districting plan discriminated against Democrats. Maryland plaintiffs claimed that their state’s plan discriminated against Republicans. The plaintiffs cited the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, the Elections Clause, and Article I, section 2. The district courts ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court vacated, finding that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts because they lack “judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [them].” Citing the history of partisan gerrymandering, the Court stated that the Constitution assigns electoral districting problems to the state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the Federal Congress, with no suggestion that the federal courts had a role to play. “To hold that legislators cannot take their partisan interests into account when drawing district lines would essentially countermand the Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political entities.” The Constitution does not require proportional representation, and federal courts are neither equipped nor authorized to apportion political power as a matter of fairness. Deciding among the different visions of fairness poses basic questions that are political, not legal. There are no legal standards discernible in the Constitution for making such judgments. The Court distinguished one-person-one-vote and racial gerrymandering cases as susceptible to legal standards. Any assertion that partisan gerrymanders violate the core right of voters to choose their representatives is more likely grounded in the Guarantee Clause, which “guarantee[s] to every State in [the] Union a Republican Form of Government.” That Clause does not provide the basis for a justiciable claim. View "Rucho v. Common Cause" on Justia Law

Tennessee law requires applicants for an initial license to operate a retail liquor store to have resided in Tennessee for the prior two years; an applicant for license renewal must have resided in Tennessee for 10 consecutive years. A corporation cannot obtain a license unless all of its stockholders are residents. The state attorney general opined that the requirements were invalid. The Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC) declined to enforce them and sought a declaratory judgment. The Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court held that the two-year requirement violated the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment. Under the dormant Commerce Clause cases, a state law that discriminates against out-of-state goods or nonresident economic actors can be sustained only on a showing that it is narrowly tailored to “advanc[e] a legitimate local purpose.” Tennessee’s two-year residency requirement favors Tennesseans over nonresidents but, because it applies to the sale of alcohol, must be evaluated in light of section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment: The “transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” Section 2 grants the states latitude with respect to the regulation of alcohol but does not allow states to violate the non-discrimination principle and does not entirely supersede Congress’s power to regulate commerce. States have not historically enjoyed absolute authority to police alcohol within their borders. Tennessee’s objective of ensuring that retailers are subject to process in state courts could easily be achieved by requiring a nonresident to designate an agent to receive process. Tennessee can thoroughly investigate applicants without requiring residency. Nor is the residency requirement essential to oversight. The goal of promoting responsible alcohol consumption could be served by limiting the number of licenses and the amount of alcohol that may be sold to an individual, mandating more extensive training, or monitoring retailer practices. View "Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas" on Justia Law