Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Under Arizona’s Constitution, voters may, by ballot initiative, adopt laws and constitutional amendments and may approve or disapprove measures passed by the legislature. Proposition 106 (2000), an initiative aimed preventing gerrymandering, amended Arizona’s Constitution, removing redistricting authority from the legislature and vesting it in an independent commission. After the 2010 census, the commission adopted redistricting maps for congressional and state legislative districts. The Arizona Legislature challenged the map for congressional districts, arguing violation of the Elections Clause of the U. S. Constitution, which provides:The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations. The district court held that the Arizona Legislature had standing to sue, but rejected its complaint on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Elections Clause and 2 U.S.C. 2a(c) permit the use of a commission to adopt congressional districts. Redistricting is a legislative function to be performed in accordance with state prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include referendum and the Governor’s veto. It is characteristic of the federal system that states retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes free from incursion by the federal government. The Framers may not have imagined the modern initiative process in which the people’s legislative power is coextensive with the state legislature’s authority, but the invention of the initiative was consistent with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the font of governmental power. Banning use of initiative to direct a state’s method of apportioning congressional districts would cast doubt on other time, place, and manner regulations governing federal elections that states have adopted by initiative without involvement by “the Legislature.” View "Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n" on Justia Law

After Oklahoma adopted lethal injection as its method of execution, it used a three-drug protocol of sodium thiopental (a barbiturate) to induce a state of unconsciousness; a paralytic agent to inhibit all muscular-skeletal movements; and potassium chloride to induce cardiac arrest. In 2008 the Supreme Court held that that protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Anti-death-penalty advocates pressured pharmaceutical companies to prevent sodium thiopental and another barbiturate (pentobarbital) from being used in executions. Oklahoma substituted a 500-milligram dose of midazolam, a sedative. Oklahoma death-row inmates filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that a 500-milligram dose of midazolam will not render them unable to feel pain associated with administration of the second and third drugs. The Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed rejection of their request for a preliminary injunction. The prisoners failed to establish that any risk of harm was substantial when compared to a known and available alternative method of execution. The Eighth Amendment requires a prisoner to plead and prove a known and available alternative. The state’s expert presented persuasive testimony that a 500-milligram dose of midazolam would make it virtually certain that an inmate will not feel pain associated with the second and third drugs; the prisoners’ experts acknowledged that they had no contrary scientific proof. It is not dispositive that midazolam is not recommended or approved for use as the sole anesthetic during painful surgery. The Court upheld a conclusion that the safeguards adopted by Oklahoma to ensure proper administration of midazolam minimize any risk that the drug will not operate as intended. View "Glossip v. Gross" on Justia Law

After Johnson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), the prosecution sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, which imposes an increased prison term upon a defendant with three prior convictions for a “violent felony,” a term defined by section 924(e)(2)(B)’s residual clause to include any felony that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The government argued that Johnson’s prior conviction for unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun met this definition. The district court agreed and imposed a 15-year sentence under ACCA. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, rejecting prior holdings in which the Court had spoken to the clause. Imposing an increased sentence under ACCA’s residual clause violates due process because that clause is unconstitutionally vague. Courts use the “categorical approach” when deciding whether an offense is a violent felony, looking “only to the fact that the defendant has been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior convictions.” Deciding whether the residual clause covers a crime requires a court to picture “the ordinary case,” and to judge whether that abstraction presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. The clause creates uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime and about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony. Holding the clause void for vagueness does not put other laws that use terms such as “substantial risk” in doubt, because those laws generally require gauging the riskiness of an individual’s conduct on a particular occasion, not the riskiness of an idealized ordinary case. View "Johnson v. United States" on Justia Law

Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man and one woman. Plaintiffs challenged the laws as violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The district courts ruled in their favor. The Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed. The Supreme Court reversed. The Fourteenth Amendment requires a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state. The Court noted other changes in the institution of marriage: the decline of arranged marriages, invalidation of bans on interracial marriage and use of contraception, and abandonment of the law of coverture. The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. Marriage is a centerpiece of social order and fundamental under the Constitution; it draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education. The marriage laws at issue harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples; burden the liberty of same-sex couples; and abridge central precepts of equality. There may be an initial inclination to await further legislation, litigation, and debate, but referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns; studies and other writings; and extensive litigation have led to an enhanced understanding of the issue. While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. The First Amendment ensures that religions, those who adhere to religious doctrines, and others have protection as they seek to teach the principles that are central to their lives and faiths. View "Obergefell v. Hodges" on Justia Law

The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate orders to maintain stable markets for agricultural products. The marketing order for raisins established a Raisin Administrative Committee, which requires that growers set aside a percentage of their crop, free of charge. The government sells the reserve raisins in noncompetitive markets, donates them, or disposes of them by any means consistent with the purposes of the program. If any profits are left over after subtracting administration expenses, the net proceeds are distributed back to the growers. In 2002–2003, growers were required to set aside 47 percent of their raisin crop; in 2003–2004, 30 percent. The Hornes refused to set aside any raisins on the ground that the reserve requirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property for public use without just compensation. The government fined them the fair market value of the raisins, with additional civil penalties. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that the requirement was not a Fifth Amendment taking. The Supreme Court reversed. The Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay just compensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes real property. The reserve requirement is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are transferred. Any net proceeds the growers receive from the sale of the reserve raisins goes to the amount of compensation, but does not mean the raisins have not been taken. This taking cannot be characterized as part of a voluntary exchange for a valuable government benefit. The ability to sell produce in interstate commerce, while subject to reasonable government regulation, is not a “benefit” that the government may withhold unless growers waive constitutional protections. The Court noted that just compensation can be measured by the market value the government already calculated when it fined the Hornes. View "Horne v. Dep't of Agriculture" on Justia Law

The city of Los Angeles requires hotel operators to record and keep specific information about their guests on the premises for a 90-day period, “available to any officer of the Los Angeles Police Department for inspection . . . at a time and in a manner that minimizes any interference with the operation of the business.” Violation is a criminal misdemeanor. In a facial challenge to the ordinance on Fourth Amendment grounds, the district court upheld the ordinance, finding that hotel operators lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in their records. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed. Fourth Amendment facial challenges to statutes are not categorically barred nor especially disfavored. When addressing a facial challenge to a statute authorizing warrantless searches, the proper focus is on searches that the law actually authorizes and not those that could proceed irrespective of the statute, e.g., where exigent circumstances, a warrant, or consent to search exist. To be constitutional, the subject of an administrative search must have an opportunity for precompliance review before a neutral decision-maker. Assuming the administrative search exception applies, the ordinance is facially invalid because it fails to afford hotel operators any opportunity for such review. This opportunity can be provided without imposing onerous burdens on law enforcement. The Court did not question the requirement that hotel operators keep records nor allowing police access to those records where a hotel operator consents, where the officer has a proper administrative warrant, or where some other exception to the warrant requirement applies. Nothing inherent in the operation of hotels poses a clear and significant risk to the public welfare to justify classifying the industry as closely regulated; even if hotels were closely regulated, the ordinance would fail to satisfy the additional criteria for searches of closely regulated industries. View "Los Angeles v. Patel" on Justia Law

While Kingsley was awaiting trial in county jail, officers forcibly removed him from his cell when he refused to comply with instructions. Kingsley filed a complaint claiming that two of the officers used excessive force. The court instructed the jury that Kingsley was required to prove that the officers “recklessly disregarded [Kingsley’s] safety” and “acted with reckless disregard of [his] rights.” The jury found in the officers’ favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding a subjective inquiry into the officers’ state of mind, i.e., whether the officers actually intended to violate, or recklessly disregarded, Kingsley’s rights. The Supreme Court vacated. Under 42 U.S.C. 1983, a pretrial detainee need only show that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable to prevail on an excessive force claim. The determination must be made from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, and must account for the “legitimate interests [stemming from the] need to manage the facility,” appropriately deferring to “policies and practices that in th[e] judgment” of jail officials “are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” An objective standard is workable. It is consistent with the pattern jury instructions used in several Circuits, and many facilities train officers to interact with detainees as if the officers’ conduct is subject to objective reasonableness. Use of an objective standard adequately protects an officer who acts in good faith, by acknowledging that judging the reasonableness of the force used from the perspective and with the knowledge of that officer is an appropriate part of the analysis. Applying the proper standard, the jury instruction was erroneous. View "Kingsley v. Hendrickson" on Justia Law

Clark sent his girlfriend to engage in prostitution while he cared for her 3-year-old son L.P. and 18-month-old daughter A.T. When L.P.’s preschool teachers noticed marks on his body, he identified Clark as his abuser. At Clark’s trial, the state introduced L.P.’s statements to his teachers as evidence of Clark’s guilt, but L.P. did not testify. The trial court denied Clark’s motion to exclude the statements under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed reversal of his conviction on Confrontation Clause grounds. The Supreme Court reversed. The Confrontation Clause generally prohibits the introduction of “testimonial” statements by a nontestifying witness, unless the witness is “unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” A statement qualifies as testimonial if the “primary purpose” of the conversation was to “creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. Considering all relevant circumstances, L.P.’s statements were not testimonial; they were not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence for Clark’s prosecution. They occurred in the context of an ongoing emergency involving suspected child abuse. L.P.’s teachers asked questions aimed at identifying and ending a threat. L.P. never hinted that he intended his statements to be used by the police or prosecutors; the conversation was informal and spontaneous. Statements by very young children rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause. Mandatory reporting obligations do not convert a conversation between a concerned teacher and her student into a law enforcement mission aimed at gathering evidence for prosecution. Whether a statement is testimonial is not determined by examining whether a jury would view the statement as the equivalent of in-court testimony, but by whether a statement was given with the “primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” View "Ohio v. Clark" on Justia Law

During jury selection in Ayala’s murder trial, Ayala, who is Hispanic, objected that seven of the prosecution’s peremptory challenges were impermissibly race-based under Batson v. Kentucky. The judge permitted the prosecution to disclose its reasons for the strikes outside the presence of the defense and concluded that there were valid, race-neutral reasons for the strikes. Ayala was convicted and sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court concluded that it was harmless error, under state law, to exclude Ayala from the hearings, and that, if a federal error occurred, it too was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A divided Ninth Circuit panel granted Ayala habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The Supreme Court reversed. Any federal constitutional error that may have occurred by excluding Ayala’s attorney from part of the Batson hearing was harmless. The California Supreme Court’s decision was an “adjudication on the merits” of Ayala’s claim; a federal court cannot grant Ayala relief unless the state court’s rejection of his claim was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Any federal constitutional error was harmless with respect to all seven prospective jurors. Each of the reasons for using a challenge was amply supported by the record and there is no basis for finding that the absence of defense counsel affected the trial judge’s evaluation of the strikes. The trial judge heard counsel’s arguments and concluded that the record supplied a legitimate basis for the prosecution’s concern. That defense counsel did not have the opportunity to repeat that argument does not create grave doubt about whether the trial court would have decided the issue differently. View "Davis v. Ayala" on Justia Law

Brumfield was convicted of murder in a Louisiana court and sentenced to death before the Supreme Court held, in Atkins v. Virginia, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of the intellectually disabled. The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequent determined that an evidentiary hearing is required when a defendant provides objective factors sufficient to raise a “a reasonable ground’” to believe that he has an intellectual disability, defined as “(1) subaverage intelligence, as measured by objective standardized IQ tests; (2) significant impairment in several areas of adaptive skills; and (3) manifestations of this neuro-psychological disorder in the developmental stage.” Brumfield amended his pending state post-conviction petition to raise an Atkins claim. Seeking an evidentiary hearing, he pointed to evidence introduced at sentencing that he had an IQ of 75, had a fourth-grade reading level, had been prescribed numerous medications and treated at psychiatric hospitals as a child, had been identified as having a learning disability, and had been placed in special education classes. The trial court dismissed without holding a hearing or granting funds to conduct additional investigation. Brumfield sought federal habeas relief. The district court granted relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), (2). The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. The factual determinations underlying the state trial court’s decision—that Brumfield’s IQ score was inconsistent with a diagnosis of intellectual disability and that he presented no evidence of adaptive impairment—were unreasonable under section 2254(d)(2). The fact that the record contains some contrary evidence cannot be said to foreclose all reasonable doubt as to his intellectual disability. The trial court should have taken into account that the evidence was introduced before Brumfield’s intellectual disability was at issue. View "Brumfield v. Cain" on Justia Law