Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Davila, under indictment on tax fraud charges, wrote to the district court, expressing dissatisfaction with his court-appointed attorney, whom, he claimed, simply advised him to plead guilty. Davila requested new counsel. A magistrate held an in camera hearing with Davila and his attorney, but no representative of the prosecution, and told Davila that he would not get another court-appointed attorney and that his best course, given the strength of the prosecution’s case, was to plead guilty. More than three months later, Davila pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge in exchange for dismissal of 33 other charges. He stated under oath that he was not forced or pressured to enter the plea and did not mention the hearing. Before sentencing, Davila moved to vacate his plea and dismiss the indictment, asserting that he had entered the plea to force the prosecution to acknowledge errors in the indictment. The district judge denied the motion, finding the plea knowing and voluntary. Davila did not mention the in camera hearing. The Eleventh Circuit held that the magistrate’s violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1), prohibiting court participation in plea discussions, required automatic vacatur. The Supreme Court vacated, noting that both Rule 11 and Rule 52(a), governing trial court error in general, allow for harmless error. Vacatur of the plea is not in order if the record shows no prejudice to Davila’s decision to plead guilty. Rule 11(c)(1) was adopted as a prophylactic measure, not one impelled by the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional requirement, so its violation does not belong in the highly exceptional category of structural errors (denial of counsel of choice or denial of a public trial) that trigger automatic reversal because they undermine the fairness of the entire criminal proceeding. The Court noted that three months elapsed between the in camera meeting and Davila’s appearance before the district judge who examined and accepted his guilty plea after an "exemplary" Rule 11 colloquy. View "United States v. Davila" on Justia Law

Peugh was convicted of bank fraud for conduct that occurred in 1999-2000. Under the 1998 Sentencing Guidelines, his sentencing range was 30 to 37 months, but the 2009 Guidelines yielded a range of 70 to 87 months. The district court rejected an ex post facto claim and sentenced Peugh to 70 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that sentencing a defendant to a longer term, under Guidelines promulgated after the commission of the criminal acts, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court rejected the government’s argument that the Sentencing Guidelines lack sufficient legal effect to have the status of “law” within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The existence of discretion does not displace the constitutional protections.View "Peugh v. United States" on Justia Law

The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), enacted to stabilize prices for agricultural commodities, regulate “handlers,” defined as “processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling” of covered agricultural commodities, 7 U.S.C. 608c(1). The California Raisin Marketing Order, promulgated under the AMAA, established a Raisin Administrative Committee, which recommends annual reserve pools of raisins not to be sold on the open domestic market and requires handlers to pay assessments to help cover administrative costs. The petitioners, raisin producers, refused to surrender requisite portions of raisins to the reserve. The USDA began administrative proceedings. An ALJ found that petitioners were handlers and had violated the AMAA and the Order, and rejected a takings defense. The district court entered summary judgment for the USDA. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to decide the takings claim. Petitioners argued that they were producers, not subject to the AMAA or the Order, but the USDA and the district court concluded that they were handlers. Fines and penalties were levied on them in that capacity. Their takings claim, therefore, was necessarily raised in that capacity. The Ninth Circuit confused a statutory argument that they were producers with a constitutional argument that, if they were handlers, their fine violated the Fifth Amendment. The claim was ripe. The petitioners were subject to a final agency order; because the AMAA provides a comprehensive remedial scheme that withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over a handler’s takings claim, there is no alternative remedy. View "Horne v. Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations implementing the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) require that employers’ group health plans furnish preventive care and screenings for women without cost sharing requirements, 42 U.S.C. 300gg–13(a)(4). Nonexempt employers must provide coverage for 20 FDA-approved contraceptive methods, including four that may have the effect of preventing a fertilized egg from developing. Religious employers, such as churches, are exempt from the contraceptive mandate. HHS has effectively exempted religious nonprofit organizations; an insurer must exclude contraceptive coverage from such an employer’s plan and provide participants with separate payments for contraceptive services. Closely held for-profit corporations sought an injunction under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibits the government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion even by a rule of general applicability unless it demonstrates that imposing the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb–1(a), (b). As amended by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), RFRA covers “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” The Third Circuit held that a for-profit corporation could not “engage in religious exercise” under RFRA and that the mandate imposed no requirements on corporate owners in their personal capacity. The Tenth Circuit held that the businesses are “persons” under RFRA; that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened their religious exercise; and that HHS had not demonstrated that the mandate was the “least restrictive means” of furthering a compelling governmental interest.The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the businesses, holding that RFRA applies to regulations that govern the activities of closely held for-profit corporations. The Court declined to “leave merchants with a difficult choice” of giving up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgoing the benefits of operating as corporations. Nothing in RFRA suggests intent to depart from the Dictionary Act definition of “person,” which includes corporations, 1 U.S.C.1; no definition of “person” includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but excludes for-profit corporations. “Any suggestion that for-profit corporations are incapable of exercising religion because their purpose is simply to make money flies in the face of modern corporate law.” The Court rejected arguments based on the difficulty of ascertaining the “beliefs” of large, publicly traded corporations and that the mandate itself requires only insurance coverage. If the plaintiff companies refuse to provide contraceptive coverage, they face severe economic consequences; the government failed to show that the contraceptive mandate is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods. The government could assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives or could extend the accommodation already established for religious nonprofit organizations. The Court noted that its decision concerns only the contraceptive mandate, not all insurance-coverage mandates, e.g., for vaccinations or blood transfusions. View "Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Massachusetts amended its Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act to make it a crime to knowingly stand on a “public way or sidewalk” within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any “reproductive health care facility,” defined as “a place, other than within or upon the grounds of a hospital, where abortions are offered or performed.” Mass. Gen. Laws, 266, 120E½. Exemptions cover “employees or agents of such facility acting within the scope of their employment.” Another provision proscribes knowing obstruction of access to an abortion clinic. Abortion opponents who engage in “sidewalk counseling” sought an injunction, claiming that the amendment displaced them from their previous positions and hampered their counseling efforts; attempts to communicate with patients are also thwarted by clinic escorts, who accompany patients to clinic entrances. The district court denied the challenges. The First Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, first noting the involvement of a traditional public forum. The Court employed “time, place, and manner” analysis, stating that the Act is neither content nor viewpoint based and need not be analyzed under strict scrutiny. Although it establishes buffer zones only at abortion clinics, violations depend not “on what they say,” but on where they say it. The Act is justified without reference to the content of speech; its purposes include protecting public safety, patient access to health care, and unobstructed use of public sidewalks and streets. There was a record of crowding, obstruction, and even violence outside Massachusetts abortion clinics but not at other facilities. The exemption for employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment was not an attempt to favor one viewpoint. Even if some escorts have expressed views on abortion inside the zones, there was no evidence that such speech was authorized by any clinic. The Act, however, burdens substantially more speech than necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. It deprives objectors of their primary methods of communicating with patients: close, personal conversations and distribution of literature. While the Act allows “protest” outside buffer zones, these objectors are not protestors; they seek to engage in personal, caring, consensual conversations with women about alternatives. Another section of the Act already prohibits deliberate obstruction of clinic entrances. Massachusetts could also enact legislation similar to the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. 248(a), which imposes sanctions for obstructing, intimidating, or interfering with persons obtaining or providing reproductive health services. Obstruction of driveways can be addressed by traffic ordinances. Crowding was a problem only at the Boston clinic, and only on Saturday mornings; the police are capable of ordering people to temporarily disperse and of singling out lawbreakers. View "McCullen v. Coakley" on Justia Law

The nominations of three members of the National Labor Relations Board were pending in the Senate when it passed a December 17, 2011, resolution providing for a series of “pro forma session[s],” with “no business ... transacted,” every Tuesday and Friday through January 20, 2012. The President appointed the three members between the January 3 and January 6 pro forma sessions, invoking the Recess Appointments Clause, which gives the President the power “to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate,” Art. II, section 2, cl. 3. The D.C. Circuit held that the appointments fell outside the scope of the Clause. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Clause reflects the tension between the President’s continuous need for “the assistance of subordinates,” and the Senate’s early practice of meeting for a single brief session each year and should be interpreted as granting the President power to make appointments during a recess, but not offering authority routinely to avoid the need for Senate confirmation. Putting “significant weight” on historical practice, the Court found that the Clause applies to both intersession and intra-session recesses of substantial length. A three-day recess would be too short. In light of historical practice, a recess of more than three but less than 10 days is presumptively too short. The phrase “vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate” applies both to vacancies that come into existence during a recess and to vacancies that initially occur before a recess but continue during the recess. Although the Senate’s own determination of when it is in session should be given great weight, deference is not absolute. When the Senate is without the capacity to act, under its own rules, it is not in session even if it so declares. Under these standards, the Senate was in session during the pro forma sessions at issue. It said it was in session, and, under Senate rules, it retained the power to con-duct business. Because the Senate was in session, the President made the recess appointments at issue during a three-day recess, which is too short a time to fall within the scope of the Clause, so the President lacked the authority to make the appointments. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning" on Justia Law

Riley was stopped for a traffic violation, which led to his arrest on weapons charges. An officer searching Riley incident to the arrest seized a cell phone from Riley’s pants pocket, accessed information on the phone, and noticed repeated use of a term associated with a street gang. At the police station two hours later, a detective specializing in gangs further examined the phone’s digital contents. Based in part on photographs found, the state charged Riley in connection with a shooting and sought an enhanced sentence based on gang membership. The trial court denied a motion to suppress. His conviction was affirmed. Wurie was arrested after police observed him participate in an apparent drug sale. At the station, the officers seized a cell phone from Wurie’s person and noticed that the phone was receiving calls from a source identified as “my house” on its screen. The officers opened the phone, accessed its call log, and traced that number to what they suspected was Wurie’s apartment. They secured a warrant and found drugs, a firearm and ammunition, and cash in the ensuing search. Wurie was charged with drug and firearm offenses. The district court denied a motion to suppress. Wurie was convicted. The First Circuit reversed and vacated the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed as to Riley and affirmed as to Wurie. The police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested. The exception for searches incident to arrest does not apply; such searches must be limited to the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, where it is justified by the interests in officer safety and in preventing evidence destruction. A search of digital information on a cell phone implicates substantially greater individual privacy interests than a brief physical search; data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate an escape. To the extent that a search of cell phone data might warn officers of an impending danger,, such a concern is better addressed under case-specific exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances. There is little indication that either remote wiping or encryption is prevalent or that the opportunity to perform a search incident to arrest would be an effective solution. View "Riley v. California" on Justia Law

Lane, Director of CITY, a program for underprivileged youth operated by Central Alabama Community College (CACC), discovered that Schmitz, a state representative on CITY’s payroll, had not been reporting for work. Lane terminated her employment. Federal authorities later indicted Schmitz on charges of mail fraud and theft concerning a program receiving federal funds. Lane testified, under subpoena, regarding the events that led to Schmitz’s termination. Schmitz was convicted. Meanwhile, CITY experienced significant budget shortfalls. CACC’s president, Franks, terminated Lane and 28 others, citing those shortfalls. Franks rescinded all but two (Lane and another) of the terminations days later. Lane sued Franks in his individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation for testifying against Schmitz. The district court granted Franks summary judgment, finding the individual-capacity claims were barred by qualified immunity and the official-capacity claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Lane acted pursuant to his official duties when he investigated and terminated Schmitz. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed in part, first holding that Lane’s sworn testimony outside the scope of his ordinary job duties was protected by the First Amendment. Lane’s testimony was speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. The critical question is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties. Corruption in a public program and misuse of state funds involve matters of significant public concern; the form and context of the speech, sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding, fortify that conclusion. There is no government interest that favors Franks: there was no evidence that Lane’s testimony was false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed confidential information. Franks is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual capacity. Based on existing Eleventh Circuit precedent, Franks reasonably could have believed that a government employer could fire an employee because of testimony given outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities. View "Lane v. Franks" on Justia Law

A former congressman filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission alleging that SBA violated an Ohio law that criminalizes some false statements made during a political campaign. SBA had stated that his vote for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was a vote in favor of “taxpayer funded abortion.” After he lost his re-election bid the complaint was dismissed. SBA pursued a separate challenge on First Amendment grounds. COAST also challenged the law, arguing that it had planned to disseminate a similar message but refrained because of the suit against SBA. The district court consolidated the suits and dismissed them as nonjusticiable, concluding that neither suit presented a sufficiently concrete injury to establish standing or ripeness. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the plaintiffs alleged a sufficiently imminent injury under Article III. An “injury in fact” must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Challenging a law before enforcement requires alleging “an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution.” The plaintiffs alleged a credible threat of enforcement. Their intended future conduct is arguably proscribed by the statute. The statute sweeps broadly; the Elections Commission already found probable cause to believe that SBA violated the law when it made statements similar to those they plan to make in the future. SBA’s insistence that its previous statements were true did not preclude finding probable cause. The threat of future enforcement is substantial. There is a history of past enforcement; a complaint may be filed by “any person,” not just a prosecutor or agency. Commission proceedings impose a burden on electoral speech. The target of a complaint may be forced to divert significant time and resources in the crucial days before an election. Those proceedings are backed by the additional threat of criminal prosecution. The Court found the “prudential factors” of fitness and hardship “easily satisfied.” View "Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus" on Justia Law

Bond sought revenge for her husband’s affair by spreading toxic chemicals on Haynes’s car, mailbox, and door knob, in hopes that Haynes would develop a rash. Haynes suffered a minor chemical burn that she treated by rinsing with water. Federal prosecutors charged Bond with violating the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, which forbids any person knowingly to possess or use "any chemical weapon,” 18 U.S.C. 229(a)(1). A “chemical weapon” is “[a]toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter.” A “toxic chemical” is “any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals … regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.” “[P]urposes not prohibited by this chapter” is defined as“[a]ny peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity,” and other specific purposes. Bond pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal. On remand, the Third Circuit rejected her Tenth Amendment argument and an argument that section 229 does not reach her conduct. The Supreme Court reversed. Section 229 does not reach Bond’s simple assault. Seeing “no need to interpret the scope of the international Chemical Weapons Convention,” the Court stated that Bond was prosecuted under a federal statute, which, unlike the treaty, must be read consistent with the principles of federalism. There is no indication that Congress intended to reach purely local crimes; an ordinary speaker would not describe Bond’s feud-driven act of spreading irritating chemicals as involving a “chemical weapon.” The chemicals at issue here bear little resemblance to those whose prohibition was the object of an international Convention. Pennsylvania’s laws are sufficient to prosecute assaults like Bond’s, and the “global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard.“ View "Bond v. United States" on Justia Law