Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Construction Law
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In 2007, a Louisiana jury found Edwards guilty of armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping. Louisiana law then permitted non-unanimous jury verdicts if at least 10 of the 12 jurors found the defendant guilty; 11 of 12 Edwards jurors returned a guilty verdict as to some crimes, and 10 of 12 jurors returned a guilty verdict as to others. After Edwards’s conviction became final, Edwards filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The district court rejected his argument that the non-unanimous jury verdict violated his constitutional rights as foreclosed by “Apodaca.” The Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.While Edwards’s petition for a writ of certiorari was pending, the Supreme Court repudiated Apodoca and held (“Ramos”) that a state jury must be unanimous to convict a criminal defendant of a serious offense.The Supreme Court affirmed with respect to Edwards. The Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. New rules of criminal procedure apply to cases on direct review, even if the defendant’s trial has already concluded but, historically, did not apply retroactively on federal collateral review unless a new rule constituted a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure. The Supreme Court has never found that any new procedural rule actually satisfies the “watershed” exception and acknowledged that the exception is “moribund.” Continuing to articulate a theoretical exception that never actually applies "offers false hope to defendants, distorts the law, misleads judges, and wastes" resources. View "Edwards v. Vannoy" on Justia Law

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The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm who has three prior convictions “for a violent felony,” including “burglary, arson, or extortion,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e). To determine whether a prior conviction is a listed crime, courts apply the “categorical approach,” asking whether the elements of the offense sufficiently match the elements of the generic (commonly understood) version of the enumerated crime. When a statute defines multiple crimes by listing multiple, alternative elements, a sentencing court must discern which of the alternative elements was integral to the defendant’s conviction, by employing the “modified categorical approach” and examining a limited class of documents from the record of a prior conviction. Mathis pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had five prior Iowa burglary convictions. Under the generic offense, burglary requires unlawful entry into a “building or other structure.” The Iowa statute (702.12) reaches “any building, structure, [or] land, water, or air vehicle.” The district court applied the modified categorical approach, found that Mathis had burgled structures, and imposed an enhanced sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Iowa statute’s list of places did not establish alternative elements, but rather alternative means of fulfilling a single locational element. The Supreme Court reversed. Because the elements of Iowa’s law are broader than those of generic burglary, Mathis’s prior convictions cannot give rise to ACCA’s sentence enhancement. The “underlying brute facts or means” by which the defendant commits his crime make no difference; even if the defendant’s conduct fits the generic definition, the mismatch of elements saves him from an ACCA sentence. Construing ACCA to allow a sentencing judge to go further would raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns because only a jury, not a judge, may find facts that increase the maximum penalty. A statute’s listing of disjunctive means does not mitigate the possible unfairness of basing an increased penalty on something not legally necessary to the prior conviction. View "Mathis v. United States" on Justia Law