Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Criminal Law
Gutierrez v. Saenz
In 1998, Ruben Gutierrez was charged with capital murder in Texas for his involvement in the killing of Escolastica Harrison. The prosecution argued that Gutierrez used one of two screwdrivers to stab Harrison. The jury convicted him, and he was sentenced to death after the jury found that he either caused Harrison's death, intended to kill her, or anticipated that a human life would be taken. Gutierrez has sought DNA testing of evidence for nearly 15 years, claiming it would prove he was not present at the crime scene. Texas courts denied his requests, stating that even if his DNA was not found, it would not prove his innocence of the underlying crime.Gutierrez filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the district attorney, arguing that Texas's DNA testing procedures violated his due process rights. The District Court agreed and granted declaratory relief. However, the Fifth Circuit vacated this judgment, holding that Gutierrez lacked standing because a declaratory judgment would not likely result in the prosecutor allowing DNA testing.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Gutierrez has standing to bring his §1983 claim. The Court reasoned that a state-created right to postconviction procedures can create rights to other procedures essential to realizing that right. The Court found that a declaratory judgment in Gutierrez's favor would redress his injury by removing the prosecutor's reliance on Article 64 as a reason for denying DNA testing. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Gutierrez v. Saenz" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Criminal Law
Hewitt v. United States
In 2009, Tony Hewitt, Corey Duffey, and Jarvis Ross were convicted of multiple counts of bank robbery and conspiracy, along with corresponding §924(c) offenses for using a firearm during a crime of violence. Each received a mandatory 5-year sentence for the first §924(c) count and 25-year mandatory sentences for each additional count, resulting in sentences exceeding 325 years. After successfully challenging some convictions, the Fifth Circuit vacated their sentences, and they were resentenced to between 285 and 305 years. Following the First Step Act of 2018, which reduced mandatory minimum penalties for first-time §924(c) offenders, the District Court vacated more convictions and resentenced them under the pre-Act scheme, resulting in sentences of 130 years or more.The Fifth Circuit denied the joint request by petitioners and the Government to apply the First Step Act’s more lenient penalties, holding that §403(b) applies only to defendants who had not been sentenced as of the Act’s enactment. Since the petitioners had been sentenced twice before the Act, the court concluded they were ineligible for the Act’s benefits.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, holding that under §403(b) of the First Step Act, a sentence “has been imposed” only if it remains valid and has not been vacated. Therefore, the Act’s more lenient penalties apply to defendants whose previous §924(c) sentences have been vacated and who need to be resentenced following the Act’s enactment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Hewitt v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Esteras v. United States
Edgardo Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin and was sentenced to 12 months in prison followed by a 6-year term of supervised release. After completing his prison term, Esteras was arrested for allegedly threatening to kill the mother of his children and firing shots into her vehicle. Although the charges were dismissed, the District Court held a revocation hearing and found that Esteras had violated the conditions of his supervised release. The court revoked his supervised release, ordered 24 months of reimprisonment, and imposed an additional three years of supervised release.Esteras's counsel objected, arguing that the District Court had impermissibly considered the factor in Section 3553(a)(2)(A). The District Court acknowledged that part of its decision was based on the need to promote respect for the law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, reasoning that Section 3583(e) does not explicitly prohibit considering Section 3553(a)(2)(A) and that excluding it would be unworkable.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and disagreed with the Sixth Circuit. The Court held that Congress's decision to exclude Section 3553(a)(2)(A) from the list of factors in Section 3583(e) implies that courts may not consider it when deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised release. The Court emphasized that supervised release is intended to fulfill rehabilitative ends and provide postconfinement assistance, not to serve as additional punishment for the original offense. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Esteras v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Rivers v. Guerrero
Danny Rivers was convicted in Texas state court of continuous sexual abuse of a child and related charges. After failing to obtain relief through direct appeal and state habeas proceedings, Rivers filed his first federal habeas petition in August 2017, which was denied by the District Court in September 2018. The Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in July 2020. While his appeal was pending, Rivers discovered new evidence in his trial counsel’s client file and filed a second federal habeas petition based on this evidence.The District Court classified Rivers's second petition as a "second or successive" habeas application under 28 U.S.C. §2244(b) and transferred it to the Fifth Circuit for authorization. Rivers appealed the transfer order, arguing that his second petition should not be considered "second or successive" because his first petition was still on appeal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the pending appeal did not exempt Rivers from the requirements for successive petitions under §2244.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that once a district court enters its judgment on a first-filed habeas petition, any subsequent filing qualifies as a "second or successive" application subject to the requirements of §2244(b). The Court emphasized that the existence of a final judgment, not the status of an appeal, determines whether a filing is considered second or successive. The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision, rejecting Rivers's argument that his second filing should be treated as an amendment to his initial petition. View "Rivers v. Guerrero" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos
The Government of Mexico filed a lawsuit against seven American gun manufacturers, alleging that the companies aided and abetted unlawful gun sales that routed firearms to Mexican drug cartels. Mexico claimed that the manufacturers failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent trafficking of their guns into Mexico, resulting in harm from the weapons' misuse. The complaint included allegations that the manufacturers knowingly supplied firearms to retail dealers who sold them illegally to Mexican traffickers, failed to impose controls on their distribution networks, and made design and marketing decisions to stimulate demand among cartel members.The U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint, but the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the decision. The First Circuit found that Mexico had plausibly alleged that the defendants aided and abetted illegal firearms sales, thus satisfying the predicate exception under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Mexico's complaint did not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers' unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers. The Court concluded that the allegations did not meet the requirements for aiding and abetting liability, as they did not show that the manufacturers took affirmative acts to facilitate the illegal sales or intended to promote the criminal activities. Consequently, PLCAA barred the lawsuit, and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos" on Justia Law
Kousisis v. United States
Stamatios Kousisis and Alpha Painting and Construction Co. were awarded two contracts by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) for painting projects in Philadelphia. Federal regulations required subcontracting a portion of the contract to a disadvantaged business enterprise. Kousisis falsely represented that Alpha would obtain paint supplies from Markias, Inc., a prequalified disadvantaged business. However, Markias functioned only as a pass-through entity, funneling checks and invoices to and from Alpha’s actual suppliers, violating the requirement that disadvantaged businesses perform a commercially useful function. Despite this, Alpha completed the projects to PennDOT’s satisfaction and earned over $20 million in gross profit.The Government charged Alpha and Kousisis with wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, based on the fraudulent-inducement theory. After a jury convicted them, they moved for acquittal, arguing that PennDOT received the full economic benefit of its bargain, so the Government could not prove they schemed to defraud PennDOT of money or property. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected this argument, affirming the convictions and deepening the division over the validity of a federal fraud conviction when the defendant did not seek to cause the victim net pecuniary loss.The Supreme Court of the United States held that a defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss. The Court explained that the text of the wire fraud statute does not mention economic loss and that the common law did not establish a general rule requiring economic loss in all fraud cases. The Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s decision, concluding that the fraudulent-inducement theory is consistent with both the text of the statute and the Court’s precedent. View "Kousisis v. United States" on Justia Law
Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn
Douglas Horn, a commercial truck driver, purchased and consumed a CBD tincture called "Dixie X," marketed as THC-free by Medical Marijuana, Inc. After a random drug test by his employer detected THC in his system, Horn was fired for refusing to participate in a substance abuse program. Horn subsequently sued Medical Marijuana under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), claiming that the company's false advertising led to his job loss.The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Medical Marijuana, reasoning that Horn's job loss was a consequence of a personal injury (ingesting THC), and thus not recoverable under RICO, which only allows recovery for business or property injuries. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that Horn's job loss constituted an injury to his business under RICO, rejecting the "antecedent-personal-injury bar" that precludes recovery for business or property losses derived from personal injuries.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case to determine whether civil RICO categorically bars recovery for business or property losses that derive from a personal injury. The Court held that under civil RICO, a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury. The Court emphasized that the statute's language allows recovery for business or property harms without excluding those that result from personal injuries. The judgment of the Second Circuit was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn" on Justia Law
Delligatti v. United States
Salvatore Delligatti, an associate of the Genovese crime family, was convicted of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §924(c). He had recruited gang members to kill a suspected police informant and provided them with a loaded revolver. Delligatti was charged with attempted murder under the violent-crimes-in-aid-of-racketeering (VICAR) statute, which required proof of attempted second-degree murder under New York law. He argued that a VICAR offense predicated on New York second-degree murder is not a crime of violence because homicide under New York law can be committed by omission.The District Court denied Delligatti’s motion to dismiss the §924(c) charge, holding that VICAR attempted murder is a crime of violence. A jury convicted Delligatti on all counts, and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, relying on the precedent set in United States v. Scott, which held that the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force, even when the harm is caused by omission.The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision. The Court held that the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the use of physical force against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A). The Court reasoned that it is impossible to deliberately cause physical harm without the use of physical force, extending the logic of United States v. Castleman to §924(c). The Court concluded that New York second-degree murder, including by omission, qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c)’s elements clause. View "Delligatti v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, White Collar Crime
Thompson v. United States
Patrick Thompson took out three loans totaling $219,000 from a bank. After the bank failed, the FDIC took over the collection of the loans. Thompson disputed the $269,120.58 balance shown on his invoice, claiming he had only borrowed $110,000. He made similar statements in subsequent calls with FDIC contractors. Thompson was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §1014, which prohibits making false statements to influence the FDIC’s actions on a loan. A jury found him guilty, and he moved for acquittal, arguing his statements were not false since he had indeed borrowed $110,000, even though he later borrowed more.The District Court denied Thompson’s motion, stating that the Seventh Circuit does not require literal falsity for a §1014 conviction and that misleading statements could suffice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing its precedent that §1014 criminalizes misleading representations. The court found Thompson’s statements misleading because they implied he owed no more than $110,000, despite his total debt being $219,000.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that §1014 does not criminalize statements that are misleading but not false. The Court emphasized that the statute uses the word “false,” which means “not true,” and does not include “misleading.” The Court noted that many other statutes explicitly prohibit both false and misleading statements, indicating that Congress knew how to include misleading statements when it intended to do so. The Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case to determine whether a reasonable jury could find that Thompson’s statements were false. View "Thompson v. United States" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Glossip v. Oklahoma
In 1997, Justin Sneed murdered Barry Van Treese at an Oklahoma hotel managed by Richard Glossip. Sneed claimed Glossip orchestrated the murder to steal Van Treese's money. Glossip denied involvement but was convicted and sentenced to death based on Sneed's testimony. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) overturned the initial conviction due to ineffective defense counsel but upheld a second conviction despite inconsistencies in Sneed's testimony and new evidence suggesting prosecutorial misconduct.The OCCA initially reversed Glossip's conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel but affirmed his second conviction, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support Sneed's testimony. Glossip's subsequent habeas petitions were unsuccessful. An independent investigation commissioned by Oklahoma legislators raised doubts about the conviction, revealing prosecutorial misconduct, including the destruction of evidence and false portrayal of Sneed. The State disclosed previously withheld documents, including evidence of Sneed's bipolar disorder and false testimony about his lithium prescription.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case, focusing on whether the prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony under Napue v. Illinois. The Court found that the prosecution knowingly allowed Sneed to falsely testify about his lithium prescription and failed to correct it. This false testimony was material, as Sneed's credibility was crucial to Glossip's conviction. The Court held that the prosecution's failure to correct the false testimony violated Glossip's due process rights, warranting a new trial. The judgment of the OCCA was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Glossip v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law