Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

McFadden was charged with violation of the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act, which identifies substances substantially similar to those listed on the federal controlled substances schedules, 21 U.S.C. 802(32)(A), and instructs courts to treat those analogues as schedule I controlled substances if they are intended for human consumption, Arguing that he did not know the “bath salts” he was distributing were regulated as analogues, McFadden unsuccessfully sought an instruction that would have prevented the jury from finding him guilty unless it found that he knew the substance had chemical structures and effects on the central nervous system substantially similar to those of controlled substances. The Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction, holding that the Analogue Act’s intent element required only proof that McFadden intended the substance to be consumed by humans. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Section 841(a)(1) requires the prosecution to establish that the defendant knew he was dealing with a substance regulated under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) or Analogue Act. The CSA’s mental-state requirement applies when the controlled substance is, in fact, an analogue; the prosecution must prove that a defendant knew that the substance was “a controlled substance,” even in prosecutions dealing with analogues. The key fact that brings a substance within the scope of the Act is that the substance is “controlled.” That can be established by evidence that a defendant knew that the substance is controlled under the CSA or Analogue Act, regardless of whether he knew the substance’s identity, or by evidence that the defendant knew the specific analogue he was distributing, even if he did not know its legal status as an analogue. A defendant with knowledge of the features defining a controlled substance analogue under section 802(32)(A), knows all of the facts that make his conduct illegal. View "McFadden v. United States" on Justia Law

Mellouli, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense under Kansas law, the possession of drug paraphernalia “to . . . store [or] conceal . . . a controlled substance,” consisting of a sock in which he had placed four unidentified orange tablets. An Immigration Judge ordered him deported under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which authorizes the deportation of an alien “convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (defined in section 802 of Title 21).” Section 802 limits “controlled substance” to a “drug or other substance” included in federal schedules. Kansas defines “controlled substance” according to its own schedules, without reference to Section 802, and included substances not on the federal lists. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Eighth Circuit denied a petition for review. The Supreme Court reversed. Mellouli’s Kansas conviction for concealing unnamed pills in his sock did not trigger removal. Under the categorical approach, a state conviction triggers removal only if, by definition, the underlying crime falls within a category of removable offenses defined by federal law. The BIA’s reasoning, that there is no need to show that the type of controlled substance involved in a paraphernalia conviction is one defined in section 802, leads to the anomalous result of treating less grave paraphernalia possession misdemeanors more harshly than drug possession and distribution offenses. The Court rejected the government’s argument that aliens who commit any drug crime in states whose drug schedules substantially overlap the federal schedules are deportable, because the state statutes are laws “relating to” federally controlled substances. To trigger removal under 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the government must connect an element of the alien’s conviction to a drug defined in section 802. View "Mellouli v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Elonis used the Web site Facebook to post lyrics containing graphically violent language and imagery concerning his wife, co-workers, children, and law enforcement, interspersed with disclaimers that the lyrics were “fictitious” and that Elonis was exercising his First Amendment rights. His boss fired him. His wife obtained an order of protection. Elonis’s former employer contacted the FBI. The agency monitored Elonis’s Facebook activity and charged him under 18 U.S.C. 875(c), which makes it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce “any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.” Elonis requested a jury instruction that the government was required to prove that he intended to communicate a “true threat.” The district court told the jury that Elonis could be found guilty if a reasonable person would foresee that his statements would be interpreted as a threat. Elonis was convicted. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The instruction, requiring only negligence with respect to communication of a threat, is not sufficient to support conviction under Section 875(c). Mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent does not eliminate that requirement. Wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal. This does not mean that a defendant must know that his conduct is illegal, but a defendant must have knowledge of “the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense.” In some cases, a general requirement that a defendant act knowingly is sufficient, but where such a requirement would not protect an innocent actor, the statute must be read to require specific intent. The crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct under Section 875(c) is the threatening nature of the communication, so the mental state requirement must apply to the fact that the communication contains a threat. The requirement is satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat. The Court did not address whether a mental state of recklessness would also suffice or First Amendment issues. View "Elonis v. United States" on Justia Law

Barkes was arrested in 2004, for violating probation, and taken to a Wilmington Delaware Correctional Institution. During intake, a nurse who worked for the contractor providing healthcare at the Institution conducted a suicide screening, based on a model form developed by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care in 1997. Barkes disclosed that he had a history of psychiatric treatment and was on medication and that he had attempted suicide in 2003, but stated that he was not currently thinking about killing himself. Because only two risk factors were apparent, the nurse gave Barkes a “routine” referral to mental health services and did not initiate special suicide prevention measures. Barkes was placed in a cell by himself. He called his wife and told her that he was going to kill himself; she did not inform the Institution of this call. The next morning, correctional officers observed Barkes behaving normally at 10:45, 10:50, and 11:00 a.m. At 11:35 a.m., an officer discovered that Barkes had hanged himself with a sheet. His wife sued officials, alleging violation of Barkes’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, by failing to supervise and monitor the private contractor. The Third Circuit held that it was clearly established that an incarcerated individual had an Eighth Amendment “right to the proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols” and that there were material factual disputes. There was evidence that the screening process did not comply with NCCHC’s latest standards, as required by contract. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, finding that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity. No Supreme Court precedent establishes a right to proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention protocols; appellate authority in 2004 suggested that such a right did not exist. Even if the Institution’s suicide screening and prevention measures had the alleged shortcomings, no precedent would have made clear to the officials that they were overseeing a system that violated the Constitution. View "Taylor v. Barkes" on Justia Law

A federal litigant who is too poor to pay court fees may proceed in forma pauperis and commence a civil action without prepaying fees or paying certain expenses, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a), but a “three strikes” provision prevents a court from granting in forma pauperis status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated . . . , brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” A state prisoner filed three federal lawsuits that were dismissed on grounds enumerated in section 1915(g). While the third dismissal was pending on appeal, he filed four additional federal lawsuits, moving to proceed in forma pauperis in each. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit and a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. A prior dismissal on statutorily enumerated grounds is a strike, even if the dismissal is the subject of an ongoing appeal. Section 1915 describes dismissal as an action by a single court, not as a sequence of events involving multiple courts. The Court noted that a judgment normally takes effect, and its preclusive effect is immediate, despite a pending appeall. The “three strikes” provision was “designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good.” To refuse to count a prior dismissal because of a pending appeal would produce a leaky filter. View "Coleman v. Tollefson" on Justia Law

After being charged with the felony offense of distributing marijuana, Henderson was required, as a condition of bail, to turn over firearms that he lawfully owned. Henderson pleaded guilty, and, as a felon, was prohibited under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) from possessing any firearms. Henderson asked the FBI, which had custody of his firearms, to transfer them to his friend. The agency refused. The district court reasoned that Henderson’s requested transfer would give him constructive possession of the firearms. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The unanimous Supreme Court vacated: A court-ordered transfer of a felon’s lawfully owned firearms from government custody to a third party is not barred by section 922(g) if the court is satisfied that the recipient will not give the felon control over the firearms, so that he could either use them or direct their use. The government’s view conflated possession, which section 922(g) prohibits, with an owner’s right to alienate his property, which it does not. The Court stated that a felon may select a firearms dealer or third party to sell his guns; a court, with proper assurances from the recipient, may also grant a felon’s request to transfer his guns to a person who expects to maintain custody of them. View "Henderson v. United States" on Justia Law

Struble, a K–9 officer, stopped Rodriguez for driving on a highway shoulder, a violation of Nebraska law. Struble attended to everything relating to the stop, including checking the driver’s licenses of Rodriguez and his passenger and issuing a warning. He then sought permission to walk his dog around the vehicle. Rodriguez refused. Struble detained him until another officer arrived, then retrieved his dog, who alerted to the presence of drugs. The ensuing search revealed methamphetamine. Seven or eight minutes elapsed from the time Struble issued the warning until the dog alerted. Rodriguez was indicted. He moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that Struble had prolonged the stop without reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion. Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, characterizing the delay as a “de minimis intrusion” on personal liberty. The Supreme Court vacated. Absent reasonable suspicion, extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff constitutes an unreasonable seizure. A routine traffic stop is like a brief “Terry” stop; its tolerable duration is determined by the “mission.” Authority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are, or reasonably should be, completed. Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the traffic mission. An officer who completes all traffic-related tasks expeditiously does not earn extra time to pursue unrelated criminal investigations; the question is not whether the dog sniff occurs before issuance of a ticket, but whether conducting the sniff adds time to the stop. The district court determination that detention for the dog sniff was not independently supported by individualized suspicion was not reviewed by the Eighth Circuit. View "Rodriguez v. United States" on Justia Law

Grady was convicted in North Carolina of a second degree sexual offense in 1997 and of taking indecent liberties with a child in 2006. After he served his sentence, the state held a hearing to determine whether he should be subjected to satellite-based monitoring (SBM) as a recidivist sex offender, N. C. Gen. Stat. 14–208.40(a)(1), 14– 208.40B. Grady argued that the program, under which he would be forced to wear tracking devices at all times, would violate his Fourth Amendment rights. State courts rejected his arguments. The Supreme Court, per curiam, vacated, holding that the state conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person’s body, without consent, for the purpose of tracking that individual’s movements. Although the North Carolina monitoring program is civil in nature, the government’s purpose in collecting information does not control whether the method of collection constitutes a search. The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches. The case was remanded to allow North Carolina courts to examine whether the monitoring program is reasonable, when properly viewed as a search. View "Grady v. North Carolina" on Justia Law

Donald, Liggins, Moore, Saine, and Zaya decided to rob a drug dealer (Makki). Donald, Moore, and Liggins drove to Makki’s home. Moore and Donald entered. Liggins waited in the car. McGinnis, a drug runner, was present, and dropped to the floor. He heard a scuffle and gunshots. After Moore and Donald left, he found Makki, dying. Moore and Donald returned to the car. Donald stated that he had stolen $320 and that Moore had accidentally shot him. Donald later went to a hospital for the wound. Weeks later, the state charged Donald with first-degree felony murder and two counts of armed robbery. Liggins and Zaya pleaded guilty. Donald was tried with Moore and Saine. His defense was that he was present, but did not participate. The court admitted a chart chronicling phone calls from the day of the crime among Moore, Saine, and Zaya. Donald’s attorney did not object, saying: “it does not affect me.’” When the trial resumed after a recess, Donald’s counsel was not in the courtroom. Ten minutes later, the lawyer returned. The judge informed him that “we only were discussing the telephone chart.” The attorney replied, “I had no dog in the race and no interest in that.” Donald was convicted. Michigan courts rejected his claim that his attorney’s absence during the phone call testimony denied him effective assistance of counsel. The federal district court granted habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, based on the Supreme Court’s “Cronic” holding that courts may presume unconstitutional prejudice if a defendant “is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.” The Supreme Court, per curiam, reversed. The state court’s decision could not be “contrary to” any Supreme Court holding; no holding addresses counsel’s absence during testimony that is irrelevant within the defendant’s own theory of the case. A fair-minded jurist could conclude that a presumption of prejudice is not warranted by counsel’s short absence during testimony about other defendants, irrelevant to the defendant’s theory. View "Woods v. Donald" on Justia Law

While inspecting a commercial fishing vessel in the Gulf of Mexico, a federal agent found that the catch contained undersized red grouper, in violation of conservation regulations, and instructed the captain, Yates, to keep the undersized fish segregated from the rest of the catch until the ship returned to port. After the officer departed, Yates told the crew to throw the undersized fish overboard. Yates was convicted of destroying, concealing, and covering up undersized fish to impede a federal investigation under 18 U. S. C. 519, which applies when a person “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” a federal investigation. Yates argued that section 1519 originated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, to protect investors, and that its reference to “tangible object” includes objects used to store information, such as computer hard drives. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “tangible object” refers to one used to record or preserve information. Section 1519’s position within Title 18, Chapter 73 and its title, “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy,” signal that it was not intended to serve as a cross-the-board ban on the destruction of physical evidence. The words immediately surrounding “tangible object,” “falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record [or] document,” also indicate the contextual meaning of that term. Even if traditional tools of statutory construction leave any doubt about the meaning of the term, it would be appropriate to invoke the rule of lenity. View "Yates v. United States" on Justia Law