Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A California Highway Patrol officer stopped a pickup truck that matched the description of a vehicle that a 911 caller had recently reported as having run her off the road. As officers approached the truck, they smelled marijuana. They searched the truck’s bed, found 30 pounds of marijuana, and arrested defendants, who moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The motion was denied. They pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana. The California Court of Appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops when an officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of ... criminal activity.” Reasonable suspicion considers “the totality of the circumstances,” and depends “upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” The totality of the circumstances indicated that the officer had reasonable suspicion that the truck’s driver was intoxicated. The 911 call bore adequate indicia of reliability for the officer to credit the caller’s account. The caller claimed an eyewitness basis of knowledge. The apparently short time between the reported incident and the 911 call suggests that the caller had little time to fabricate the report. A reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using the 911 system. The tip created reasonable suspicion of drunk driving. Reasonable suspicion “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” The officer’s failure to observe additional suspicious conduct during the short period that he followed the truck did not dispel the reason able suspicion of drunk driving. View "Navarette v. California" on Justia Law

Rosemond participated in a drug deal in which either he or one of his associates fired a gun. Because the shooter’s identity was disputed, the government charged Rosemond with violating 18 U.S.C. 924(c) by using or carrying a gun in connection with a drug trafficking crime, or, in the alternative, aiding and abetting that offense under 18 U.S.C. 2. The judge instructed the jury that Rosemond was guilty of aiding and abetting the section924(c) offense if he “knew his cohort used a firearm in the drug trafficking crime” and “knowingly and actively participated in the drug trafficking crime.” The instruction deviated from Rosemond’s proposed instruction that the jury must find that he acted intentionally “to facilitate or encourage” the firearm’s use. Rosemond was convicted. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated. The prosecution establishes that a defendant aided and abetted a 924(c) violation by proving that the defendant actively participated in the underlying drug trafficking or violent crime with advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun during commission of the crime. In addition to active conduct extending to some part of the crime, aiding and abetting requires intent extending to the whole crime. An active participant in a drug transaction has the intent needed to aid and abet a 924(c) violation when he knows that a confederate will carry a gun. This must be advance knowledge. The jury instructions were erroneous in failing to require that Rosemond knew in advance that an associate would be armed, with sufficient time to withdraw. The case was remanded for consideration of whether any error was harmless. View "Rosemond v. United States" on Justia Law

After a bystander stated that Fernandez had committed a violent robbery minutes before police responded, the police saw Fernandez run into an apartment building. They heard screams coming from an apartment and knocked on the door, which was answered by Roxanne, who was battered and bleeding. When the officers asked her to step out of the apartment so that they could conduct a protective sweep, Fernandez came to the door and objected. Suspecting that he had assaulted Roxanne, the officers removed him and placed him under arrest. He was then identified as the perpetrator in the earlier robbery and taken to the police station. An officer returned to the apartment and, after obtaining Roxanne’s oral and written consent, searched and found items linking Fernandez to the robbery. The trial court denied a motion to suppress that evidence and he was convicted. The California Court of Appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. Consent searches are permissible warrantless searches and are clearly reasonable when the consent comes from the sole occupant of the premises. When multiple occupants are involved, the rule extends to the search of the premises or effects of an absent, non-consenting occupant if “the consent of one who possesses common authority over [the] premises or effects” is obtained. When a physically present inhabitant refuses to consent, that refusal is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant. In this case, the police had reasonable grounds for removal of Fernandez, so he was in the same position as an occupant absent for any other reason. He had been absent for some time when Roxanne consented to the search and the fact that he objected to the presence of the police when he first came to the door did not render the search unconstitutional. View "Fernandez v. California" on Justia Law

After a grand jury indicted the Kaleys for reselling stolen medical devices and laundering the proceeds, the government obtained a restraining order against their assets under 21 U.S.C. 853(e)(1), to “preserve the availability of [forfeitable] property” while criminal proceedings are pending. An order is available if probable cause exists to think that a defendant has committed an offense permitting forfeiture and the disputed assets are traceable or sufficiently related to the crime. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order, to use disputed assets for their legal fees. The district court allowed them to challenge traceability to the crimes but not the facts supporting the underlying indictment. The Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. In challenging a section 853(e)(1) pre-trial seizure, an indicted defendant is not entitled to contest the grand jury determination of probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crimes. A probable cause finding sufficient to initiate prosecution for a serious crime is conclusive and, generally, a challenge to the reliability or competence of evidence supporting that finding will not be heard. A grand jury’s probable cause finding may effect a pre-trial restraint on a person’s liberty or property. Because the government’s interest in freezing potentially forfeitable assets without an adversarial hearing about the probable cause underlying criminal charges and the Kaleys’ interest in retaining counsel of their own choosing are both substantial, the issue boils down to the “probable value, if any,” of a judicial hearing in uncovering mistaken grand jury probable cause findings. The legal standard is merely probable cause, however, and the grand jury has already made that finding; a full-dress hearing will provide little benefit. View "Kaley v. United States" on Justia Law

Long-time drug user Banka died after a binge that included use of heroin purchased from Burrage. Burrage pleaded not guilty to charges that he had unlawfully distributed heroin and that “death ... resulted from the use of th[at] substance,” which carries a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C). Medical experts testified that Banka might have died even if he had not taken the heroin. The court instructed the jury that the prosecution had to prove only that heroin was a contributing cause of death. The jury convicted Burrage, and the court sentenced him to 20 years. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Where use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of death or serious bodily injury, the penalty enhancement does not apply unless such use is a “but-for” cause of the death or injury. The Court declined to address cases in which multiple sufficient causes independently, but concurrently, produce death, because there was no evidence that Banka’s heroin use was an independently sufficient cause of his death. Congress could have written the statute to refer to a “substantial” or “contributing” factor in producing death, but instead used language that imports but-for causality. View "Burrage v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1985, a manager was shot to death during a robbery of his restaurant. In the following months, a second manager was murdered and another survived similar robberies. In each restaurant, the robber fired two .38 caliber bullets; all six bullets were recovered. The survivor, Smotherman, described his assailant and picked Hinton’s picture out of a photographic array. The police arrested Hinton and recovered from his house a .38 caliber revolver belonging to his mother, who shared the house. The Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences concluded that the six bullets had all been fired from the Hinton revolver. Hinton was charged with two counts of murder. He was not charged with the Smotherman robbery. The prosecution strategy was to link Hinton to the Smotherman robbery by eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence about the bullets and to persuade the jury that, given the similarity of the crimes, Hinton must have committed the murders. Hinton presented witnesses in support of his alibi that he was at work at the time of the Smotherman robbery. The six bullets and the revolver were the only physical evidence. Hinton’s attorney obtained a grant of $1,000 to hire an expert to challenge that evidence and did not request more funding, nor correct the judge’s mistaken belief that a $1,000 limit applied. Under that mistaken belief, Hinton’s attorney found only one person who was willing to testify: Payne. Hinton’s attorney believed that Payne did not have the necessary expertise. The prosecutor discredited Payne. The jury convicted Hinton; the court imposed a death sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings, Hinton alleged ineffective assistance and produced three highly credible experts, who testified that they could not conclude that any of the bullets had been fired from the Hinton revolver. The state did not submit rebuttal evidence. Following a remand by the state’s highest court, the trial court held that Payne was qualified to testify as a firearms and toolmark expert under the then-applicable standard. The Alabama Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that Hinton’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance under its “Strickland” test. It was unreasonable to fail to seek additional funds to hire an expert where that failure was based not on any strategic choice but on a mistaken belief that available funding was limited. View "Hinton v. Alabama" on Justia Law

After Cheever was charged with capital murder, the Kansas Supreme Court found the state death penalty scheme unconstitutional. State prosecutors dismissed their charges to allow federal authorities to prosecute Cheever, who filed notice of intent to introduce expert evidence that methamphetamine intoxication negated his ability to form specific intent. The district court ordered Cheever to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. The federal case was eventually dismissed. In the meantime, the Supreme Court found the Kansas death penalty scheme constitutional. The state brought a second prosecution. Cheever raised a voluntary intoxication defense, offering expert testimony regarding his methamphetamine use. The prosecution sought to present testimony from the expert who had examined Cheever by the federal court order. Defense counsel argued that since Cheever had not agreed to the examination, introduction of the testimony would violate the Fifth Amendment. The trial court allowed the testimony. The jury found Cheever guilty and imposed a death sentence. The Kansas Supreme Court vacated the conviction. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated and remanded. If a defense expert who has examined the defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite mental state, the prosecution may present psychiatric evidence in rebuttal. The rule is not limited to situations where the evaluation was requested jointly by the defense and the prosecution, nor does it matter whether state law referred to extreme emotional disturbance as an affirmative defense. The Court rejected an argument that Cheever did not waive his Fifth Amendment privilege because voluntary intoxication is not a mental disease or defect under state law. Mental status, rather than “Mental disease or defect” is the salient issue. When a criminal defendant chooses to testify, the Fifth Amendment does not allow him to refuse to answer related cross-examination questions. Excluding the testimony would have undermined the core truth-seeking function of trial. View "Kansas v. Cheever" on Justia Law

Officer Stanton and his partner responded to a call about a disturbance involving a person with a baseball bat. Stanton was familiar with the LaMesa neighborhood, known for gang violence. The officers, wearing uniforms and driving a marked police vehicle, approached the location and noticed men walking in the street. Seeing the police car, two men turned into an apartment complex. Patrick crossed the street about 25 yards in front of Stanton’s car and ran toward a residence. Stanton did not see a baseball bat, but considered Patrick’s behavior suspicious and decided to investigate. Stanton exited his car, called out “police,” and ordered Patrick to stop. Patrick did not stop, but “looked directly at Stanton,” and went through the gate of the six-foot wooden fence enclosing Sims’ front yard. Stanton believed that Patrick had committed a jailable misdemeanor by disobeying his order, “fear[ed] for [his] safety” and made the “split-second decision” to kick open the gate. Sims was behind the gate when it flew open, striking and injuring Sims. Sims sued, 42 U. S. C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to Stanton. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Stanton’s warrantless entry was unconstitutional because Sims had the same expectation of privacy in her curtilage as in her home itself, there was no immediate danger, and Patrick had committed only a minor offense; under clearly established law Stanton’s pursuit of Patrick did not justify warrantless entry and Stanton was not entitled to qualified immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that courts nationwide are divided on whether an officer with probable cause to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a home without a warrant while in hot pursuit of that suspect. The Ninth Circuit read “too broadly” Supreme Court precedent that did not involve hot pursuit. The Court did not determine whether Stanton’s entry was constitutional; Stanton may have been mistaken in believing his actions were justified, but was not “plainly incompetent.” View "Stanton v. Sims" on Justia Law

Titlow and Rogers were charged with the murder of Rogers’s husband. After explaining to Titlow that the evidence could support a first-degree murder conviction, Titlow’s attorney negotiated a manslaughter plea in exchange for testimony against Rogers. Three days before trial, Titlow retained a new attorney, Toca, who demanded a lower sentence in exchange for the plea and testimony. The prosecutor rejected the proposal. Titlow withdrew the plea. Rogers was acquitted. Titlow was convicted of second-degree murder. On direct appeal, Titlow argued that Toca provided ineffective assistance by advising plea withdrawal without determining the strength of the evidence. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that Toca’s actions were reasonable, given his client’s claims of innocence. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the factual predicate for the state court’s decision, that the plea withdrawal was based on Titlow’s assertion of innocence, unreasonable, given Toca’s explanation at the withdrawal hearing that the plea offer was higher than the Michigan guidelines sentencing range. The Supreme Court reversed, applying the “doubly deferential” standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The record supports a factual finding that Toca advised withdrawal of the guilty plea only after Titlow’s proclamation of innocence. Titlow passed a polygraph test, discussed the case with a jailer who advised against pleading guilty if Titlow was innocent, and hired Toca days before the trial at which Titlow was to self-incriminate. The facts strongly suggest that Titlow had second thoughts about confessing and proclaimed her innocence. The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that Toca was ineffective because the record contained no evidence that he gave constitutionally adequate advice is contrary to the principle that counsel should be “strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance.” That Toca failed to retrieve the file from former counsel before withdrawing the plea cannot overcome that presumption. Titlow admitted in open court that former counsel had explained that the evidence would support a first-degree murder conviction. Toca justifiably relied on this to conclude that Titlow understood the strength of the prosecution’s case. View "Burt v. Titlow" on Justia Law

The Comptroller is sole trustee and chooses investments for the employee pension fund of the state of New York and its local governments. The Comptroller’s general counsel recommended against investing in a fund managed by FA; the general counsel then received anonymous e-mails demanding that he recommend the investment and threatening to disclose information about the general counsel’s alleged affair. Some of the e-mails were traced to the home computer of Sekhar, a managing partner of FA, who was convicted of attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). The Act defines “extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” The jury specified that the property at issue was the general counsel’s recommendation to approve the investment. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Attempting to compel a person to recommend that his employer approve an investment does not constitute “the obtaining of property from another” under the Hobbs Act. Congress generally intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses. Extortion historically required the obtaining of items of value, typically cash, from the victim. The Act’s text requires not only deprivation, but the acquisition of property; the property, therefore, must be transferable. No fluent English-speaker would say that “petitioner obtained and exercised the general counsel’s right to make a recommendation,” any more than he would say that a person “obtained and exercised another’s right to free speech.” View "Sekhar v. United States" on Justia Law