Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Wooden was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) mandates a 15-year minimum penalty for section 922(g) offenders with at least three prior convictions for specified felonies “committed on occasions different from one another.” Wooden had 10 burglary convictions arising from a single episode in 1997, during which Wooden unlawfully entered a one-building storage facility and stole items from 10 different storage units. The application of ACCA’s penalty enhancement to Wooden’s 922(g) sentence resulted in a sentence of almost 16 years. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court reversed. Wooden’s 10 burglary offenses did not occur on different “occasions” and count as only one prior conviction under ACCA. An ordinary person using language in its normal way would describe Wooden’s entries into the storage units as happening on a single occasion. An occasion may encompass multiple, temporally distinct activities. The government’s contrary view could make someone a career offender in the space of a minute. Whether criminal activities occurred on one occasion or different occasions may depend on several circumstances, including timing, location, and the character and relationship of the offenses. Congress’s amendment of ACCA to add the single occasion requirement was based on its belief that a person who robbed a restaurant and did nothing else, is not a career offender. Wooden’s burglary of a single storage facility does not suggest the “special danger” posed by an “armed career criminal.” View "Wooden v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2013, brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan planted and detonated homemade bombs near the Boston Marathon’s finish line, killing three and wounding hundreds. The brothers fled, murdering a campus police officer, carjacking a student, and fighting a street battle with police during which Dzhokhar inadvertently killed Tamerlan.Dzhokhar was indicted for 30 crimes, including 17 capital offenses. In a 100-question screening form that included several questions regarding whether media coverage had biased prospective jurors, the district court declined to include a question that asked each prospective juror to list the facts he had learned about the case from the media and other sources. Dzhokhar was convicted on all counts. At sentencing, Dzhokhar argued that Tamerlan had masterminded the bombing and pressured Dzhokhar to participate. The court denied Dzhokhar's request to introduce allegations that, years earlier, Tamerlan had participated in a triple homicide in Waltham. The jury imposed the death penalty. The First Circuit vacated Dzhokhar’s capital sentences.The Supreme Court reversed. The district court did not abuse its broad discretion; the jury question at issue wrongly emphasized what a juror knew before coming to court, rather than potential bias. The court used the 100-question juror form to cull prospective jurors, then subjected those remaining to three weeks of individualized voir dire that probed for bias. The court instructed the jurors that their decisions must be based only on the evidence presented at trial.At the sentencing phase of a capital trial, “information may be presented as to any matter relevant to the sentence, including any mitigating or aggravating factor,” 18 U.S.C. 3593(c). A district court may exclude information “if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.” The excluded evidence would not have allowed the jury to assess Tamerlan’s alleged role in the Waltham murders and had the potential to confuse the jury. Section 3593(c) does not violate the Eighth Amendment but establishes a regime that affords a capital defendant every reasonable opportunity to present relevant mitigation evidence. The inclusion of the Waltham-murders evidence risked producing a confusing mini-trial in which the only witnesses were dead. View "United States v. Tsarnaev" on Justia Law

A stray 9-millimeter bullet killed a child after a Bronx street fight. Eyewitnesses described the shooter as wearing a blue shirt or sweater. Police officers determined Gilliam was involved and that Morris was at the scene. A search of Morris’ apartment revealed a 9-millimeter cartridge and .357-caliber bullets. Gilliam initially identified Morris as the shooter but subsequently said that Hemphill was the shooter. Morris was charged with murder and possession of a 9-millimeter handgun. The prosecution agreed to dismiss the murder charges if Morris pleaded guilty to possession of a .357 revolver. Years later, Hemphill was indicted for the murder; his DNA matched a blue sweater found in Morris’ apartment shortly after the murder. Hemphill elicited testimony that police had recovered 9-millimeter ammunition from Morris’ apartment, pointing to Morris as the culprit. Morris was not available to testify. The court allowed the prosecution to introduce parts of Morris’ plea allocation transcript to rebut Hemphill’s theory, reasoning that although Morris’ out-of-court statements had not been subjected to cross-examination, Hemphill’s arguments had “opened the door” and admission of the statements was reasonably necessary to correct a misleading impression. Hemphill was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed. Admission of the plea allocution transcript violated Hemphill’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. While the Sixth Amendment permits reasonable procedural rules concerning the exercise of a defendant’s confrontation right, the “door-opening principle” is a substantive principle that dictates what material is relevant and admissible. It was not for the trial judge to determine whether Hemphill’s theory that Morris was the shooter was unreliable, incredible, or otherwise misleading in light of the state’s proffered, unconfronted plea evidence, nor whether this evidence was reasonably necessary to correct that misleading impression. View "Hemphill v. New York" on Justia Law

In 1996, Reeves and some friends went “looking for some robberies ” but their car broke down. Johnson offered to tow their vehicle. After they arrived, Reeves shot Johnson and directed the others to get his money. Reeves bragged that the murder would earn him a gang tattoo; at a party, Reeves mocked pumping a shotgun and the way that Johnson died. Alabama charged Reeves with murder. His appointed attorneys explored possible intellectual disability. They obtained Reeves’ educational, medical, and correctional records and funding to hire a neuropsychologist (Dr.Goff). Reeves was within the “borderline” range of intelligence but had been denied special education services. A psychologist evaluated Reeves and opined that he was not intellectually disabled. Reeves’ attorneys apparently elected to pursue other mitigation strategies. The jury recommended a death sentence.Reeves unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief, alleging that he was intellectually disabled or that counsel should have hired Dr. Goff to develop mitigation. Dr. Goff testified that Reeves was intellectually disabled. The state’s expert administered his own evaluation and concluded that Reeves was not intellectually disabled, noting that Reeves had a leadership role in a drug-dealing group. Although his lawyers were available, Reeves did not call them to testify. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that Reeves's lawyers were constitutionally deficient for not developing evidence of intellectual disability and that this failure might have changed the outcome of the trial. The Supreme Court reversed. The Alabama court did not violate clearly established federal law in rejecting Reeves’ claim. Counsel’s strategic decisions are entitled to a “strong presumption” of reasonableness. The analysis is “doubly deferential” when a state court has decided that counsel performed adequately. Despite Reeves’ allegations about his lawyers, he offered no evidence from them. Counsel’s efforts to collect Reeves’ records and obtain funding hardly indicates neglect and disinterest. The Alabama court conducted a case-specific analysis and reasonably concluded that the incomplete evidentiary record doomed Reeves’ belated efforts to second-guess his attorneys. The Eleventh Circuit recharacterized its analysis as a “categorical rule” that any prisoner will always lose if he fails to question trial counsel regarding his reasoning. View "Dunn v. Reeves" on Justia Law

Officers arrested Gilbert for trespassing, took him to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, and placed him in a holding cell. An officer saw Gilbert tie a piece of clothing around the cell bars and put it around his neck, in an apparent suicide attempt. Three officers entered Gilbert’s cell, eventually brought Gilbert to a kneeling position over a concrete bench, and handcuffed his arms behind his back. Gilbert kicked the officers and hit his head on the bench. They shackled his legs. Six officers moved Gilbert to a prone position, face down on the floor. Three officers held Gilbert down at the shoulders, biceps, and legs; at least one placed pressure on Gilbert’s back and torso. Gilbert tried to raise his chest, saying, “‘It hurts. Stop.’” After 15 minutes of struggling, Gilbert’s breathing became abnormal; he stopped moving. The officers rolled Gilbert onto his back and found no pulse; they performed chest compressions and rescue breathing. An ambulance transported Gilbert to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead. In an “excessive force” suit, the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers.The Supreme Court vacated. The excessive force inquiry requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort by the officer to limit the amount of force; the severity of the underlying security problem; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Here, the court either failed to analyze or found insignificant, details such as that Gilbert was already handcuffed and shackled when placed in the prone position, that officers kept him in that position for 15 minutes, and that St. Louis instructs its officers that pressing down on the back of a prone subject can cause suffocation. The lower court’s opinion could be read to treat Gilbert’s “ongoing resistance” as controlling as a matter of law. Such a per se rule would contravene the careful, context-specific analysis required by precedent. View "Lombardo v. St. Louis" on Justia Law

Lange drove by a California highway patrol officer, playing loud music and honking his horn. The officer followed Lange and soon turned on his overhead lights to signal Lange to pull over. Rather than stopping, Lange drove a short distance to his driveway and entered his attached garage. Without obtaining a warrant, the officer followed Lange into the garage, questioned him, and, after observing signs of intoxication, put him through field sobriety tests. Charged with misdemeanor DUI, Lange moved to suppress the evidence obtained after the officer entered his garage. California courts rejected his Fourth Amendment arguments.The Supreme Court vacated. Under the Fourth Amendment, the pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home. Precedent favors a case-by-case assessment of exigency when deciding whether a suspected misdemeanant’s flight justifies a warrantless home entry. Such exigencies may exist when an officer must act to prevent imminent injury, the destruction of evidence, or a suspect’s escape. Misdemeanors may be minor. When a minor offense (and no flight) is involved, police officers do not usually face the kind of emergency that can justify a warrantless home entry. Adding a suspect’s flight does not change the situation enough to justify a categorical rule. When the totality of circumstances (including the flight itself) show an emergency—a need to act before it is possible to get a warrant—the police may act without waiting. Common law afforded the home strong protection from government intrusion and did not include a categorical rule allowing warrantless home entry when a suspected misdemeanant flees. View "Lange v. California" on Justia Law

The 1986 mandatory-minimum penalties for possession with intent to distribute cocaine were based on drug quantity: a five-year mandatory minimum was triggered by either five grams of crack cocaine or 500 grams of powder cocaine; a 10-year mandatory minimum was triggered by either 50 grams of crack or five kilograms of powder. In 2008, Terry pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of crack. The district court determined that his offense involved about four grams of crack and sentenced Terry, as a career offender, to 188 months' imprisonment. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 subsequently increased the crack quantity thresholds from five grams to 28 for the five-year mandatory minimum and to 280 grams for the 10-year mandatory minimum. The change became retroactive in the 2018 First Step Act.The Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Terry’s motion for resentencing. An offender is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act only if convicted of a crack offense that triggered a mandatory minimum sentence. The Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for offenses that triggered mandatory minimum penalties because a person charged with the same conduct today no longer would face the same statutory penalties that they would have faced before 2010; the Act did not modify the statutory penalties for Terry’s offense. Before 2010, a person charged with Terry’s offense—knowing or intentional possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of a schedule I or II drug—was subject to statutory penalties of imprisonment of 0-to-20 years. After 2010, a person charged with this conduct is subject to the same statutory penalties. View "Terry v. United States" on Justia Law

In its 2019 “Rehaif” decision, the Supreme Court clarified that for 18 U.S.C. 922(g) firearms-possession offenses, the prosecution must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. Before Rehaif, the petitioners were convicted under section 922(g)(1). The Eleventh Circuit rejected Greer's request for a new trial based on the court’s failure to instruct the jury that Greer had to know he was a felon to be found guilty. The Fourth Circuit agreed that Gary's guilty plea must be vacated because the court failed to advise him that, if he went to trial, a jury would have to find that he knew he was a felon.The Supreme Court affirmed Greer's conviction and reversed as to Gary. A Rehaif error is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant makes a sufficient argument that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not know he was a felon. A defendant who has “an opportunity to object” to an alleged error and fails to do so forfeits the claim of error. If a defendant later raises the forfeited claim, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)’s plain-error standard applies. Rehaif errors occurred during the underlying proceedings and the errors were plain but Greer must show that, if the court had correctly instructed the jury, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would have been acquitted; Gary must show that, if the court had correctly advised him, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would not have pled guilty. They have not carried that burden. Both had multiple prior felony convictions. The Court rejected arguments that Rehaif errors are “structural” and require automatic vacatur. View "Greer v. United States" on Justia Law

Borden pleaded guilty as a felon-in-possession. The prosecution sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for persons found guilty of illegally possessing a firearm who have three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony.” An offense qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA’s elements clause if it necessarily involves “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). One of Borden’s three predicate convictions was for reckless aggravated assault in violation of Tennessee law. Borden argued that this offense was not a violent felony under ACCA’s elements clause because a mental state of recklessness suffices for conviction and only purposeful or knowing conduct satisfies the requirement of the use of force “against the person of another.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed his enhanced sentence.The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, with four Justices concluding that a criminal offense with a mens rea of recklessness does not qualify as a “violent felony” under ACCA’s elements clause. The Justices found that the narrow “category of violent, active crimes” is best understood to involve a purposeful or knowing mental state—a deliberate choice of wreaking harm on another, rather than mere indifference to risk. Classifying reckless crimes as “violent felonies” would also conflict with ACCA’s purpose of addressing the special danger created when a particular type of offender, a violent criminal, possesses a gun. The “against” clause is not window dressing: It is the “critical” text for deciding the level of mens rea needed. View "Borden v. United States" on Justia Law

Former Georgia police sergeant Van Buren used his credentials on a patrol-car computer to access a law enforcement database to retrieve license plate information in exchange for money. His conduct violated a department policy against obtaining database information for non-law-enforcement purposes. The Eleventh Circuit upheld Van Buren's conviction for a felony violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA), which covers anyone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,” 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2), defined to mean “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”The Supreme Court reversed. An individual “exceeds authorized access” when he accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains information located in particular areas of the computer (files, folders, databases) that are off-limits to him. Van Buren “access[ed] a computer with authorization” and “obtain[ed] . . . information in the computer.” The phrase “is not entitled so to obtain” refers to information one is not allowed to obtain by using a computer that he is authorized to access.“Without authorization” protects computers themselves from outside hackers; the “exceeds authorized access” clause protects certain information within computers from "inside hackers." One either can or cannot access a computer system, and one either can or cannot access certain areas within the system. The Act’s precursor to the “exceeds authorized access” language covered any person who, “having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend.” Congress removed any reference to “purpose” in the CFAA. On the government’s reading, an employee who sends a personal e-mail or reads the news using a work computer may have violated the CFAA. View "Van Buren v. United States" on Justia Law