Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Higher Education Act governs federal financial aid, 20 U.S.C. 1070(a), and authorizes the Secretary of Education to cancel or reduce loans held by some public servants and borrowers who have died, become permanently and totally disabled, are bankrupt, or whose schools falsely certify them, close down, or fail to pay lenders. Under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act (HEROES Act), the Secretary “may waive or modify" any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the loan programs as the Secretary deems "necessary in connection with a war or other military operation or national emergency.” As the COVID–19 pandemic was ending, the Secretary invoked the HEROES Act to issue “waivers and modifications” reducing or eliminating most borrowers' federal student debt. States challenged the plan. The Eighth Circuit issued a nationwide preliminary injunction.The Supreme Court found that the plan exceeded the Secretary’s authority, first holding that at least Missouri had standing. The plan would cost the state's nonprofit government corporation about $44 million a year in fees.The HEROES Act allows the Secretary to “waive or modify” existing statutory or regulatory provisions but does not allow the Secretary to rewrite the Education Act to the extent of canceling $430 billion of student loan principal. The Secretary may make modest adjustments to existing provisions, not transform them. The Act includes narrowly-delineated situations that qualify a borrower for loan discharge; the Secretary has extended such discharge to nearly every borrower. The plan constitutes “effectively" a "whole new regime.” The question is not whether something should be done; it is who has the authority to do it. The basic and consequential tradeoffs inherent in mass debt cancellation are ones that Congress would likely have intended for itself. View "Biden v. Nebraska" on Justia Law

In the Harvard College admissions process, “race is a determinative tip for” a significant percentage “of all admitted African American and Hispanic applicants.” University of North Carolina (UNC) also considers the applicant’s race. SFFA challenged both systems.The Supreme Court held that both programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first held that SFFA complies with the standing requirements for organizational plaintiffs as a voluntary membership organization with identifiable members who support its mission and whom SFFA represents in good faith.Tracing the history of Fourteenth Amendment precedent, the Court acknowledged its "role in that ignoble history,” and subsequent efforts to eliminate racial discrimination. The core purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to eliminate all governmentally-imposed discrimination based on race. Any exceptions must survive strict scrutiny. which asks whether the racial classification is used to advance compelling governmental interests and whether the use of race is narrowly tailored--necessary to achieve that interest. Previous holdings permitted race-based college admissions only in compliance with strict scrutiny and acknowledged that, eventually, they must end.The admissions programs at issue are not sufficiently measurable to permit strict scrutiny. The identified "compelling" interests include training future leaders, acquiring new knowledge based on diverse outlooks, promoting a robust marketplace of ideas, and preparing engaged and productive citizens. The question of whether a particular mix of minority students produces those results is standardless. The systems fail to articulate a meaningful connection between the means they employ and those goals; they use racial categories that are overbroad, arbitrary or undefined, or underinclusive.The systems also use race as a “negative” and employ stereotypes. College admissions are zero-sum. A benefit provided to some applicants is necessarily at the expense of others. The systems employ “the offensive and demeaning assumption" that students of a particular race think alike. The systems lack a “logical endpoint. View "Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College" on Justia Law

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400, includes administrative procedures for resolving disputes concerning a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) for a child with a disability. “Nothing in [IDEA] shall be construed to restrict” the ability of individuals to seek “remedies” under “other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities,” section 1415(l), “except that before the filing of a civil action under such [other federal] laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted.” Those subsections establish the right to a “due process hearing” followed by an “appeal” to the state education agency.Perez, who is deaf, attended Sturgis public schools and was provided with aides to translate classroom instruction into sign language. Perez alleges that the aides were either unqualified or absent from the classroom. Sturgis allegedly promoted Perez regardless of his progress. Perez believed he was on track to graduate from high school. Months before graduation, Sturgis revealed that it would not award him a diploma.Perez filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Education. Before an administrative hearing, the parties settled. Sturgis promised to provide Perez with forward-looking equitable relief, including additional schooling at the Michigan School for the Deaf. Perez then sought compensatory damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court dismissed the suit based on Sixth Circuit precedent.The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that compensatory damages are unavailable under IDEA. Although Perez’s suit is premised on the denial of a FAPE, the administrative exhaustion requirement applies only to suits that “see[k] relief … also available under” IDEA. View "Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools" on Justia Law

Kennedy lost his job as a high school football coach after he knelt at midfield after games to offer a quiet personal prayer. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Kennedy’s claims against the school district. The Supreme Court reversed. The Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression. The district acted on a mistaken view that it has a duty to suppress religious observances even as it allows comparable secular speech.A plaintiff may demonstrate a free exercise violation by showing that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not “neutral” or “generally applicable,” triggering strict scrutiny. Kennedy seeks to engage in a sincerely motivated religious exercise that does not involve students; the district’s policies were neither neutral nor generally applicable. The district sought to restrict Kennedy’s actions at least in part because of their religious character.Kennedy established a Free Speech Clause violation. When an employee “speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern,” courts should engage in “a delicate balancing of the competing interests surrounding the speech and its consequences.” Kennedy was not engaged in speech “ordinarily within the scope” of his coaching duties. His prayers occurred during the postgame period when coaches were free to attend to personal matters and students were engaged in other activities.In place of the “Lemon” and “endorsement” tests, courts should look “to historical practices and understandings.” A rule that the only acceptable government role models for students are those who eschew any visible religious expression would undermine a long constitutional tradition of tolerating diverse expressive activities. View "Kennedy v. Bremerton School District" on Justia Law

Maine offers tuition assistance for parents who live in school districts that neither operate a secondary school nor contract with a school in another district. Parents designate the secondary school they would like their child to attend; the school district sends payments to that school to defray tuition costs. To be eligible for tuition payments, private schools had to be accredited by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges or approved by the Maine Department of Education. Since 1981, Maine has limited tuition assistance payments to “nonsectarian” schools. The First Circuit affirmed the rejection of constitutional challenges to the “nonsectarian” requirement.The Supreme Court reversed. Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause, which protects against “indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions.” A state need not subsidize private education but if it does so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious. A law that operates in that manner must be subjected to “the strictest scrutiny.” A neutral benefit program in which public funds flow to religious organizations through the independent choices of private benefit recipients does not offend the Establishment Clause; a state’s anti-establishment interest does not justify enactments that exclude some members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise. View "Carson v. Makin" on Justia Law

B.L. failed to make her school’s varsity cheerleading squad. While visiting a store over the weekend, B.L. posted two images on Snapchat, a social media smartphone application that allows users to share temporary images with selected friends. B.L.’s posts expressed frustration with the school and the cheerleading squad; one contained vulgar language and gestures. When school officials learned of the posts, they suspended B.L. from the junior varsity cheerleading squad for the upcoming year.The Third Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed a district court injunction, ordering the school to reinstate B. L. to the cheerleading team. Schools have a special interest in regulating on-campus student speech that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.” When that speech takes place off-campus, circumstances that may implicate a school’s regulatory interests include serious bullying or harassment; threats aimed at teachers or other students; failure to follow rules concerning lessons and homework, the use of computers, or participation in online school activities; and breaches of school security devices. However, courts must be more skeptical of a school’s efforts to regulate off-campus speech.B.L.’s posts did not involve features that would place them outside the First Amendment’s ordinary protection; they appeared outside of school hours from a location outside the school and did not identify the school or target any member of the school community with vulgar or abusive language. Her audience consisted of her private circle of Snapchat friends. B.L. spoke under circumstances where the school did not stand in loco parentis. The school has presented no evidence of any general effort to prevent students from using vulgarity outside the classroom. The school’s interest in preventing disruption is not supported by the record. View "Mahanoy Area School District v. B. L." on Justia Law

Two teachers at Roman Catholic elementary schools were employed under agreements that set out the schools’ mission to develop and promote a Catholic School faith community; imposed commitments regarding religious instruction, worship, and personal modeling of the faith; and explained that teachers’ performance would be reviewed on those bases. Each taught religion and worshipped with her students, prayed with her students. Each teacher sued after her employment was terminated. One claimed violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; the other claimed she was discharged because she requested a leave of absence to obtain breast cancer treatment. The Ninth Circuit declined to apply the Supreme Court's 2012 Hosanna-Tabor “ministerial exception” to laws governing the employment relationship between a religious institution and certain key employees.The Supreme Court reversed. The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses foreclose the adjudication of employment disputes involving those holding certain important positions with churches and other religious institutions. Several factors may be important in determining whether a particular position falls within the ministerial exception. What matters is what an employee does. Educating young people in their faith, inculcating its teachings, and training them to live their faith lie are the core of a private religious school’s mission. The plaintiff-teachers qualify for the exception; both performed vital religious duties, educating their students in the Catholic faith, and guiding their students to live their lives in accordance with that faith. Their titles did not include the term “minister” but their schools expressly saw them as playing a vital role in carrying out the church’s mission. A religious institution’s explanation of the role of its employees in the life of the religion is important. The Ninth Circuit mistakenly treated the Hosanna-Tabor decision as a checklist; that court invested undue significance in the facts that these teachers did not have clerical titles and that they had less formal religious schooling than the Hosanna-Tabor teacher. The Court rejected a suggestion that an employee can never come within the Hosanna-Tabor exception unless the employee is a “practicing” member of the religion with which the employer is associated. View "Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru" on Justia Law

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) offers states federal funds to provide every eligible child a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE), by means of an “individualized education program” (IEP). 20 U.S.C. 1401(9)(D), 1412(a)(1), “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” For children fully integrated in the regular classroom, this typically requires an IEP “reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.” Endrew, who has autism, received annual IEPs. By fourth grade, Endrew’s parents believed his academic and functional progress had stalled and enrolled him in a specialized private school, where he made significant progress. School district representatives later presented a new fifth grade IEP, but the parents considered it no better than the original plan. They sought reimbursement for tuition. The Colorado Department of Education denied the claim. The district court and Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated. A school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances. Focus on the particular child is the core of the IDEA. Precedent does not provide concrete guidance concerning a child who is not fully integrated in the regular classroom and not able to achieve on grade level. A child’s IEP need not aim for grade-level advancement if that is not a reasonable prospect, but every child should have the chance to meet challenging objectives. This standard is more demanding than the “merely more than de minimis” test applied by the Tenth Circuit. The Court declined to hold that the Act requires states to provide educational opportunities that are “substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children without disabilities.” The adequacy of an IEP turns on the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created. View "Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE–1" on Justia Law

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) provides federal funds to states for furnishing a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) to children with disabilities, 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(1)(A), and establishes administrative procedures for resolving disputes concerning the provision of a FAPE. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act also protect the rights of disabled children; under the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, a plaintiff bringing suit under those or similar laws “seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA]” must first exhaust IDEA administrative procedures. E. is a child with cerebral palsy; a trained service dog (Wonder) assists her with daily activities. Her school refused to allow Wonder to join E. in kindergarten, stating that the human aide provided as part of E.’s individualized education program rendered the dog superfluous. The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights found that the determination violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. School officials invited E. to return to school with Wonder. Her parents enrolled E. in a different school, then filed suit. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal for failure to exhaust IDEA administrative procedures. The Supreme Court vacated. Exhaustion of IDEA administrative procedures is unnecessary where the gravamen of the lawsuit is something other than denial of a FAPE. The IDEA focuses on ensuring a FAPE for children with disabilities; its administrative procedures test whether a school has met that obligation. Determining the gravamen of a complaint can come from asking whether the plaintiff could have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility other than a school and whether an adult at the school could have pressed essentially the same grievance. The parents’ complaint alleged only disability-based discrimination, without any reference to the adequacy of the special education services. View "Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools" on Justia Law

The University of Texas at Austin’s undergraduate admissions system offers admission to all students who graduate in the top 10% of their Texas high school class, as required by the Texas Top Ten Percent Law. It fills the remainder of its freshman class, about 25%, by combining an applicant’s “Academic Index” (SAT score and high school academic performance) with a “Personal Achievement Index,” a holistic review containing numerous factors, including race. The University adopted the system in 2004, after a year-long-study of its admissions process—undertaken following two Supreme Court decisions—led it to conclude that its prior race-neutral system did not reach its goal of providing the educational benefits of diversity. Fisher was denied admission to the 2008 freshman class. She alleged that the University’s consideration of race disadvantaged her and other Caucasian applicants, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. On remand for application of the strict scrutiny standard, the Fifth Circuit again affirmed summary judgment in the University’s favor. The Supreme Court affirmed. The race-conscious admissions program is lawful under the Equal Protection Clause. The compelling interest that justifies consideration of race in college admissions is not an interest in enrolling a certain number of minority students, but an interest in obtaining “the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity.” The University articulated concrete and precise goals—e.g., ending stereotypes, promoting “cross-racial understanding,” preparing students for “an increasingly diverse workforce and society,” and cultivating leaders with “legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry” and gave a “reasoned, principled explanation” for its decision. The University’s conclusion that race-neutral programs had not achieved its diversity goals was supported by significant statistical and anecdotal evidence, while consideration of race has had a meaningful, but limited, effect on freshman class diversity. That race consciousness played a role in a small portion of admissions decisions is a hallmark of narrow tailoring, not evidence of unconstitutionality. The Top Ten Percent Plan had more of an impact on Fisher’s chances of admission. The Court noted the University’s continuing obligation to satisfy the strict scrutiny burden by periodically reassessing the program and by tailoring it to ensure that race plays no greater role than necessary to meet its compelling interests. View "Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin" on Justia Law