Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Clean Air Act (CAA) directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants from stationary sources, such as refineries and factories, 42 U.S.C. 7412; it may regulate power plants under this program only if it concludes that “regulation is appropriate and necessary” after studying hazards to public health. EPA found power-plant regulation “appropriate” because power plant emissions pose risks to public health and the environment and because controls capable of reducing these emissions were available. It found regulation “necessary” because other CAA requirements did not eliminate those risks. EPA estimated that the cost of power plant regulation would be $9.6 billion a year, but that quantifiable benefits from the reduction in hazardous-air-pollutant emissions would be $4-$6 million a year. The D. C. Circuit upheld EPA’s refusal to consider costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. EPA interpreted section 7412(n)(1)(A) unreasonably when it deemed cost irrelevant to the decision to regulate power plants. “’Appropriate and necessary’ is a capacious phrase.” It is not rational, nor “appropriate,” to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits. That other CAA provisions expressly mention cost indicates that section 7412(n)(1)(A)’s broad reference to appropriateness encompasses multiple relevant factors, including cost. The possibility of considering cost at a later stage, when deciding how much to regulate power plants, does not establish its irrelevance at the earlier stage. Although the CAA makes cost irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate sources other than power plants, the point of having a separate provision for power plants was to treat power plants differently. EPA must decide how to account for cost. View "Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Under Arizona’s Constitution, voters may, by ballot initiative, adopt laws and constitutional amendments and may approve or disapprove measures passed by the legislature. Proposition 106 (2000), an initiative aimed preventing gerrymandering, amended Arizona’s Constitution, removing redistricting authority from the legislature and vesting it in an independent commission. After the 2010 census, the commission adopted redistricting maps for congressional and state legislative districts. The Arizona Legislature challenged the map for congressional districts, arguing violation of the Elections Clause of the U. S. Constitution, which provides:The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations. The district court held that the Arizona Legislature had standing to sue, but rejected its complaint on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Elections Clause and 2 U.S.C. 2a(c) permit the use of a commission to adopt congressional districts. Redistricting is a legislative function to be performed in accordance with state prescriptions for lawmaking, which may include referendum and the Governor’s veto. It is characteristic of the federal system that states retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes free from incursion by the federal government. The Framers may not have imagined the modern initiative process in which the people’s legislative power is coextensive with the state legislature’s authority, but the invention of the initiative was consistent with the Constitution’s conception of the people as the font of governmental power. Banning use of initiative to direct a state’s method of apportioning congressional districts would cast doubt on other time, place, and manner regulations governing federal elections that states have adopted by initiative without involvement by “the Legislature.” View "Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (42 U.S.C 18001) includes “guaranteed issue” and “community rating” requirements, which bar insurers from denying coverage or charging higher premiums based on health; requires individuals to maintain health insurance coverage or make a payment to the IRS, unless the cost of buying insurance would exceed eight percent of that individual’s income; and seeks to make insurance more affordable by giving refundable tax credits to individuals with household incomes between 100 per cent and 400 percent of the federal poverty line. The Act requires creation of an “Exchange” in each state— a marketplace to compare and purchase insurance plans; the federal government will establish “such Exchange” if the state does not. The Act provides that tax credits “shall be allowed” for any “applicable taxpayer,” only if the taxpayer has enrolled in an insurance plan through “an Exchange established by the State under [42 U.S.C. 18031],” An IRS regulation interprets that language as making credits available regardless of whether the exchange is established by a state or the federal government. Plaintiffs live in Virginia, which has a federal exchange. They argued Virginia’s Exchange does not qualify as “an Exchange established by the State,” so they should not receive any tax credits. That would make the cost of buying insurance more than eight percent of their income, exempting them from the coverage requirement. The district court dismissed their suit. The Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Tax credits are available to individuals in states that have a federal exchange. Given that the text is ambiguous, the Court looked to the broader structure of the Act and concluded that plaintiffs’ interpretation would destabilize the individual insurance market in any state with a federal exchange. It is implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in that manner. Congress made the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements applicable in every state, but those requirements only work when combined with the coverage requirement and tax credits. View "King v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Texas automobile owners can choose between general-issue and specialty license plates. People can propose a specialty plate design, with a slogan, a graphic, or both. If the Department of Motor Vehicles Board approves the design, the state makes it available. The Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) claimed that rejection of SCV’s proposal for a specialty plate design featuring a Confederate flag violated the Free Speech Clause. The Fifth Circuit held that Texas’s specialty license plate designs were private speech and that the Board engaged in constitutionally forbidden viewpoint discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed. Texas’s specialty license plate designs constitute government speech. When government speaks, it is not barred from determining the content of what it says; it is generally entitled to promote a program, espouse a policy, or take a position. States have long used license plates to convey government speech, e.g., slogans urging action and touting local industries and license plate designs are often closely identified in the public mind with the state. Plates serve the governmental purposes of vehicle registration and identification and are, essentially, government IDs. Texas maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty plates. Forum analysis, which applies to government restrictions on purely private speech occurring on government property, is not appropriate when the state is speaking on its own behalf. That private parties take part in the design and pay for specialty plates does not transform the government’s role into that of a mere forum provider. The Court acknowledged that the First Amendment stringently limits state authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. Just as Texas cannot require SCV to convey the state’s ideological message, SCV cannot dictate design. View "Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc." on Justia Law

Zivotofsky was born to U.S. citizens living in Jerusalem. Under the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2003, 116 Stat. 1350, his mother asked Embassy officials to list his place of birth as “Israel” on his passport. Section 214(d) of the Act states for “purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request … record the place of birth as Israel.” Embassy officials refused to list Zivotofsky’s place of birth as “Israel,” citing the Executive Branch’s position that the U.S. does not recognize any country as having sovereignty over Jerusalem. The D. C. Circuit held the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed. The President has the exclusive power to grant formal recognition to a foreign sovereign. The Court cited the Reception Clause, which directs that the President “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” and the President’s additional Article II powers, to negotiate treaties and to nominate the Nation’s ambassadors and dispatch other diplomatic agents. The Constitution assigns the President, not Congress, means to effect recognition on his own initiative. The Nation must “speak . . . with one voice” regarding which governments are legitimate in the eyes of the United States and which are not, and only the Executive has the characteristic of unity at all times. If Congress may not pass a law, speaking in its own voice, effecting formal recognition, then it may not force the President, through section 214(d), to contradict his prior recognition determination in an official document issued by the Secretary of State. View "Zivotofsky v. Kerry" on Justia Law

Before suing for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) must “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion,” 42 U. S. C. 2000e–5(b). Nothing said or done during conciliation may be “used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without written consent of the persons concerned.” After investigating a sex discrimination charge against Mach Mining, EEOC determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that the company had engaged in unlawful hiring practices and invited the parties to participate in informal conciliation. A year later, EEOC sent Mach another letter stating that conciliation efforts had been unsuccessful, then filed suit. Mach alleged that EEOC had not attempted to conciliate in good faith. The Seventh Circuit held that EEOC’s statutory conciliation obligation was unreviewable. The Supreme Court vacated, noting a “strong presumption” that Congress means to allow judicial review of administrative action. EEOC’s argument that review is limited to checking the facial validity of its two letters falls short of Title VII’s demands; the aim of judicial review is to verify that the EEOC actually tried to conciliate. The Court rejected Mach’s proposal for specific requirements or a code of conduct as conflicting with the wide latitude Congress gave EEOC and with Title VII’s confidentiality protections. A sworn affidavit from EEOC that it informed the employer about the specific discrimination allegation and tried to engage the employer in a discussion to give the employer a chance to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice should suffice. Should the employer present concrete evidence that the EEOC did not provide the requisite information or attempt to engage in conciliation, a court must conduct the fact-finding necessary to resolve that limited dispute. View "Mach Mining, LLC v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides that a tort claim against the United States “shall be forever barred” unless presented to the appropriate federal agency for review within two years after the claim accrues,” 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). If the agency denies the claim, the claimant may file suit in federal court within six months of the denial. Wong failed to file her FTCA claim in federal court within six months, but argued that the district court had not permitted her to file until after the period expired. June failed to present her FTCA claim to a federal agency within two years, but argued that her untimely filing should be excused because the government concealed facts vital to her claim. In each case, the district court dismissed the FTCA claim, holding that those time bars are jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded. Section 2401(b)’s time limits are subject to equitable tolling. Congress must do something special to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional and prohibit a court from tolling it, but did no such thing in section 2401(b). Separation of a filing deadline from a jurisdictional grant often indicates that the deadline is not jurisdictional; the FTCA’s jurisdictional grant appears in another section and is not expressly linked to the limitations periods. The phrase “shall be forever barred” was commonplace in statutes of limitations enacted around the time of the FTCA, and does not carry jurisdictional significance. View "United States v. Wong" on Justia Law

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) establishes procedures federal administrative agencies use for “formulating, amending, or repealing a rule,” 5 U.S.C. 551(5), and distinguishes between “legislative rules,” issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking and having the “force and effect of law,” and “interpretive rules.” Interpretive rules “advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administers,” do not require notice-and-comment, and do not have the force and effect of law. In 1999 and 2001, the DOL Wage and Hour Division issued opinions that mortgage-loan officers do not qualify for the administrative exemption to Fair Labor Standard Act overtime pay requirements. In 2004, DOL issued new regulations regarding the exemption. MBA requested a new interpretation. In 2006, the Division opined that mortgage-loan officers fell within the exemption under the 2004 regulations. In 2010, DOL again altered its interpretation of the exemption. Without notice or an opportunity for comment, it withdrew the 2006 opinion and issued an Administrator’s Interpretation concluding that mortgage-loan officers do not qualify for the exemption. MBA sued. The D.C. Circuit applied the “Paralyzed Veterans doctrine,” which required an agency to use notice-and-comment procedures to issue a new interpretation of a regulation that deviates significantly from a previous interpretation. The Supreme Court reversed. The doctrine is contrary to the text of the APA and improperly imposes on agencies an obligation beyond the APA’s maximum requirements. Because an agency is not required to use notice-and-comment procedures to issue an initial interpretive rule, it is not required to use those procedures to amend that rule. Regulated entities may be protected by the arbitrary and capricious standard or by safe-harbor provisions in legislation that shelter regulated entities from liability when they rely on previous agency interpretations. MBA has waived its argument that the 2010 Interpretation was a legislative rule. View "Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n" on Justia Law

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) has priority to use track systems owned by the freight railroads for passenger rail travel, at agreed rates or rates set by the Surface Transportation Board. In 2008, Congress gave Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) joint authority to issue “metrics and standards” addressing performance and scheduling of passenger railroad services, 122 Stat. 4907, including Amtrak’s on-time performance and delays caused by host railroads. The Association of American Railroads sued. The District of Columbia Circuit accepted a separation of powers claim, reasoning that Amtrak is a private corporation and cannot constitutionally be granted regulatory power. The Supreme Court vacated. For purposes of determining the validity of the standards, Amtrak is a governmental entity. The D.C. Circuit relied on the statutory command that Amtrak “is not a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States,” 49 U.S.C. 24301(a)(3), and “shall be operated and managed as a for profit corporation,” but independent inquiry reveals that the political branches control most of Amtrak’s stock and its Board of Directors, most of whom are appointed by the President. The political branches exercise substantial, statutorily mandated supervision over Amtrak’s priorities and operations: Amtrak is required to pursue broad public objectives; certain day-to-day operations are mandated by Congress; and Amtrak has been dependent on federal financial support during every year of its existence. Amtrak is not an autonomous private enterprise and, in jointly issuing the metrics and standards with the FRA, Amtrak acted as a governmental entity for separation of powers purposes. Treating Amtrak as governmental for these purposes is not an unbridled grant of authority to an unaccountable actor. On remand, the court may address any remaining issues respecting the lawfulness of the metrics and standards. View "Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads" on Justia Law

In 1943, Congress approved a Compact between Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado to apportion the “virgin water originating in” the Republican River Basin. In 1998, Kansas filed an original action in the Supreme Court contending that Nebraska’s increased groundwater pumping was subject to the Compact to the extent that it depleted stream flow in the Basin. The Court agreed. Negotiations resulted in a 2002 Settlement, which identified the Accounting Procedures by which the states would measure stream flow depletion, and thus consumption, due to groundwater pumping. The Settlement reaffirmed that “imported water,” brought into the Basin by human activity, would not count toward consumption. In 2007, Kansas claimed that Nebraska had exceeded its allocation. Nebraska responded that the Accounting Procedures improperly charged it for imported water and requested that the Accounting Procedures be modified. The Court appointed a Special Master, whose report concluded that Nebraska “knowingly failed” to comply, recommended that Nebraska disgorge part of its gains in addition to paying damages, and recommended denying an injunction and reforming the Accounting Procedures. The Supreme Court adopted the recommendations. Nebraska failed to establish adequate compliance mechanisms, given a known substantial risk that it would violate Kansas’s rights; Nebraska was warned each year that it had exceeded its allotment. Because of the higher value of water on Nebraska’s farmland than on Kansas’s, Nebraska could take Kansas’s water, pay damages, and still benefit. The disgorgement award is sufficient to deter future breaches. Kansas failed to demonstrate a “cognizable danger of recurrent violation” necessary to obtain an injunction. Amending the Accounting Procedures is necessary to prevent serious inaccuracies from distorting intended apportionment. View "Kansas v. Nebraska" on Justia Law