Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Several major music copyright owners, including a leading entertainment company, sought to hold an Internet service provider responsible for copyright infringement committed by its subscribers. The service provider, which serves millions of customers, was notified by a monitoring company of over 160,000 instances where its subscribers’ IP addresses were linked to alleged copyright violations such as illegal music file sharing. Although the provider had policies prohibiting infringement and took steps such as issuing warnings and suspending service, the copyright holders argued these measures were inadequate and brought suit seeking to impose liability on the provider for continuing to serve known infringers.The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. There, the jury found in favor of the copyright owners on both contributory and vicarious liability, and determined the provider’s infringement was willful, awarding $1 billion in statutory damages. After the District Court denied the provider’s post-trial motion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding of contributory liability, reasoning that supplying a service with knowledge it would be used for infringement was sufficient. The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed as to vicarious liability and remanded for a new determination of damages.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case concerning contributory liability. The Court held that a service provider is contributorily liable for a user’s infringement only if it either induced the infringement or provided a service tailored for infringement. Because the provider neither encouraged infringement nor offered a service primarily designed for infringement—since Internet access has substantial lawful uses—the provider was not contributorily liable. The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment on contributory liability and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment" on Justia Law

Dewberry Engineers sued Dewberry Group for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, alleging that Dewberry Group's use of the "Dewberry" name violated their trademark rights. Dewberry Group, a real-estate development company, provides services to separately incorporated affiliates, which own commercial properties. The affiliates generate rental income, while Dewberry Group operates at a loss, surviving through cash infusions from its owner, John Dewberry.The District Court found Dewberry Group liable for trademark infringement and awarded Dewberry Engineers nearly $43 million in profits. The court treated Dewberry Group and its affiliates as a single corporate entity, totaling the affiliates' real-estate profits to calculate the award. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing with the District Court's approach to treat the companies as a single entity due to their economic reality.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that the District Court erred in treating Dewberry Group and its affiliates as a single corporate entity for calculating profits. The Court ruled that under the Lanham Act, only the profits of the named defendant, Dewberry Group, could be awarded. The affiliates' profits could not be considered as the defendant's profits since they were not named as defendants in the lawsuit. The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for a new award proceeding consistent with its opinion. View "Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc." on Justia Law

Steve Elster sought to register the trademark "Trump too small" for use on shirts and hats, drawing from a 2016 Presidential primary debate exchange. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) refused registration based on the "names clause" of the Lanham Act, which prohibits the registration of a mark that identifies a particular living individual without their written consent. Elster argued that this clause violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the PTO's decision, but the Federal Circuit reversed.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Federal Circuit's decision, holding that the Lanham Act's names clause does not violate the First Amendment. The Court found that while the names clause is content-based, it is not viewpoint-based, as it does not discriminate against any particular viewpoint. The Court also noted that the names clause is grounded in a historical tradition of restricting the trademarking of names, which has coexisted with the First Amendment. The Court concluded that this history and tradition are sufficient to demonstrate that the names clause does not violate the First Amendment. The Court emphasized that its decision is narrow and does not set forth a comprehensive framework for judging whether all content-based but viewpoint-neutral trademark restrictions are constitutional. View "Vidal v. Elster" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Sherman Nealy and Warner Chappell Music, Inc. Nealy, who co-founded Music Specialist, Inc. in 1983, alleged that he held the copyrights to the company's songs and that Warner Chappell's licensing activities infringed his rights. The infringing activity, according to Nealy, dated back to 2008, ten years before he brought suit. Nealy sought damages and profits for the alleged misconduct, as authorized by the Copyright Act. To proceed with his claims, Nealy had to show they were timely under the Copyright Act, which requires a plaintiff to file suit "within three years after the claim accrued." Nealy argued that all his claims were timely under the discovery rule because he did not learn of Warner Chappell’s infringing conduct until 2016, less than three years before he sued.In the District Court, Warner Chappell accepted that the discovery rule governed the timeliness of Nealy’s claims. However, it argued that even if Nealy could sue under that rule for infringements going back ten years, he could recover damages or profits for only those occurring in the last three. The District Court agreed, and Nealy appealed. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision, rejecting the notion of a three-year damages bar on a timely claim.The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision. The Court held that the Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringement occurred. The Act’s statute of limitations establishes a three-year period for filing suit, which begins to run when a claim accrues. That provision establishes no separate three-year limit on recovering damages. If any time limit on damages exists, it must come from the Act’s remedial sections. But those provisions merely state that an infringer is liable either for statutory damages or for the owner’s actual damages and the infringer’s profits. There is no time limit on monetary recovery. So a copyright owner possessing a timely claim is entitled to damages for infringement, no matter when the infringement occurred. View "Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy" on Justia Law

VIP makes a chewable dog toy that looks like a Jack Daniel’s whiskey bottle; the words “Jack Daniel’s” become “Bad Spaniels.” “Old No. 7 Brand Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey” turns into “The Old No. 2 On Your Tennessee Carpet.” Jack Daniel’s demanded that VIP stop selling the toy.VIP sought a declaratory judgment that Bad Spaniels neither infringed nor diluted Jack Daniel’s trademarks. Jack Daniel’s counterclaimed. The Lanham Act defines a trademark by its primary function: identifying a product’s source and distinguishing that source from others. A typical infringement case examines whether the defendant’s use of a mark is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,” 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(A), 1125(a)(1)(A). A typical dilution case considers whether the defendant “harm[ed] the reputation” of a trademark. VIP cited the “Rogers test,” which requires dismissal of an infringement claim when “expressive works” are involved unless the complainant can show either that the challenged use of a mark “has no artistic relevance to the underlying work” or that it “explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of VIP.The Supreme Court vacated. When an alleged infringer uses a trademark as a designation of source for the infringer’s own goods, the Rogers test does not apply. Consumer confusion about source is most likely to arise when someone uses another’s trademark as a trademark. Bad Spaniels was not automatically entitled to Rogers’ protection because it “communicate[d] a humorous message.” VIP used the Bad Spaniels trademark and trade dress as source identifiers. Although VIP’s effort to parody Jack Daniel’s does not justify the application of the Rogers test, it may make a difference in the standard trademark analysis on remand. View "Jack Daniel's™ Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC" on Justia Law

In 1984, Goldsmith, a portrait artist, granted Vanity Fair a one-time license to use a Prince photograph to illustrate a story about the musician. Vanity Fair hired Andy Warhol, who made a silkscreen using Goldsmith’s photo. Vanity Fair published the resulting image, crediting Goldsmith for the “source photograph,” and paying her $400. Warhol used Goldsmith’s photograph to derive 15 additional works. In 2016, the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF) licensed one of those works, “Orange Prince,” to Condé Nast to illustrate a magazine story about Prince. AWF received $10,000. Goldsmith received nothing. When Goldsmith asserted copyright infringement, AWF sued her. The district court granted AWF summary judgment on its assertion of “fair use,” 17 U.S.C. 107. The Second Circuit reversed.The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that the first fair use factor, “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes,” weighs against AWF’s commercial licensing to Condé Nast. Both the 1984 and the 2016 publications are portraits of Prince used in magazines to illustrate stories about Prince; the “environment[s]” are not “distinct and different.” The 2016 use also is of a commercial nature. Orange Prince reasonably can be perceived to portray Prince as iconic, whereas Goldsmith’s portrayal is photorealistic but the purpose of that use is still to illustrate a magazine about Prince. The degree of difference is not enough for the first factor to favor AWF. To hold otherwise would potentially authorize a range of commercial copying of photographs, to be used for purposes that are substantially the same as those of the originals. AWF offers no independent justification for copying the photograph. View "Andy Warhol Foundation for Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith" on Justia Law

LDL cholesterol can lead to cardiovascular disease, heart attacks, and strokes. PCSK9 is a naturally occurring protein that degrades LDL receptors responsible for extracting LDL cholesterol from the bloodstream. In 2011, Amgen and Sanofi each obtained a patent for the antibody employed in a PCSK9-inhibiting drug, describing the relevant antibody by its unique amino acid sequence. Amgen obtained two additional patents in 2014 that relate back to its 2011 patent and purport to claim “the entire genus” of antibodies that “bind to specific amino acid residues on PCSK9,” and “block PCSK9 from binding.” Amgen identified the amino acid sequences of 26 antibodies that perform those functions and described “roadmap” and “conservative substitution” methods for making other antibodies that perform the described functions.Amgen sued Sanofi for infringement. Sanofi argued that Amgen’s relevant claims were invalid under the “enablement” requirement, which requires a patent applicant to describe the invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art” to make and use the invention,” 35 U.S.C. 112(a), characterizing the methods Amgen outlined for generating additional antibodies as a trial-and-error process.The district court, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court sided with Sanofi. If a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, its specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. The claimed class of antibodies does not include just the 26 that Amgen described by their amino acid sequences, but many additional antibodies. The “roadmap” and “conservative substitution” approaches are little more than research assignments. View "Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi" on Justia Law

Unicolors, the owner of fabric design copyrights, successfully sued H&M for copyright infringement, 17 U.S.C. 411(a). H&M argued that Unicolors knowingly included inaccurate information on its registration application, rendering its registration invalid; Unicolors had filed a single application seeking registration for 31 separate works despite a regulation that provides that a single application may cover multiple works only if they were “included in the same unit of publication.” H&M argued that Unicolors had made some of the designs available for sale exclusively to certain customers while offering the rest to the general public.The Ninth Circuit determined that it did not matter whether Unicolors was aware that it had failed to satisfy the single unit of publication requirement because the safe harbor excused only good-faith mistakes of fact, not law; Unicolors knew the relevant facts.The Supreme Court vacated. Section 411(b) does not distinguish between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact. Under the safe harbor, a certificate of registration is valid, even though it contains inaccurate information if the copyright holder lacked “knowledge that it was inaccurate.” If Unicolors was not aware of the legal requirement that rendered its application inaccurate, it could not have included the inaccurate information “with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” Legislative history indicates that Congress enacted section 411(b) to make it easier for nonlawyers to obtain valid copyright registrations by “eliminating loopholes” that allowed infringers to exploit mistakes in the application process. The Court noted that willful blindness may support a finding of actual knowledge and circumstantial evidence may demonstrate that an applicant was aware of, or willfully blind to, legally inaccurate information. View "Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L. P." on Justia Law

Truckai invented NovaSure to treat abnormal uterine bleeding using a moisture-permeable applicator head to destroy targeted cells. Truckai filed a patent application and assigned the application and future continuation applications, to his company, Novacept. Novacept and its patents and patent applications were acquired by Hologic. Truckai founded Minerva and developed a supposedly improved device to treat abnormal uterine bleeding, using a moisture-impermeable applicator head to remove cells. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued a patent; the FDA approved the device for sale. Hologic filed a continuation application, seeking to add claims to its NovaSure patent--one claim encompassed applicator heads generally, without regard to whether they are moisture permeable. The PTO issued the altered patent.Hologic sued Minerva for infringement. Minerva argued that Hologic’s patent was invalid because the new claim did not match the written description. Hologic invoked the assignor estoppel doctrine: Because Truckai had assigned the original application, he and Minerva could not impeach the patent’s validity. The Federal Circuit agreed.The Supreme Court vacated. Assignor estoppel is a valid defense, based on the need for consistency in business dealings, but applies only when the assignor’s claim of invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations made in assigning the patent. Concerns with the assignor taking contradictory positions do not arise when an assignment occurs before an inventor can make a warranty as to specific claims, such as when an employee assigns to his employer patent rights in future inventions; when a later legal development renders irrelevant the warranty given at the time of assignment; and when a post-assignment change in patent claims can remove the rationale for applying assignor estoppel. The Federal Circuit failed to recognize these boundaries, deeming “irrelevant” the question of whether Hologic had expanded the assigned claims. If Hologic’s new claim is materially broader than what Truckai assigned, Truckai could not have warranted its validity. View "Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc." on Justia Law

Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) conduct adversarial proceedings for challenging the validity of an existing patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), 35 U.S.C. 6(a), (c). The Secretary of Commerce appoints PTAB members, including APJs, except the Director, who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. APJs concluded that Arthrex’s patent was invalid. The Federal Circuit concluded that the APJs were principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; their appointment was unconstitutional. To remedy this violation, the court invalidated the APJs’ tenure protections, making them removable at will by the Secretary.The Supreme Court vacated. The unreviewable authority wielded by APJs during patent review is incompatible with their appointment by the Secretary to an inferior office. Inferior officers must be “directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” While the Director has administrative oversight, neither he nor any other superior executive officer can directly review APJ decisions. A decision by the APJs under his charge compels the Director to “issue and publish a certificate” canceling or confirming patent claims he previously allowed. Given the insulation of PTAB decisions from executive review, APJs exercise power that conflicts with the Appointments Clause’s purpose “to preserve political accountability.”Four justices concluded that section 6(c) cannot constitutionally be enforced to prevent the Director from reviewing final APJ decisions. The Director may review final PTAB decisions and may issue decisions on behalf of the Board. Section 6(c) otherwise remains operative. Because the source of the constitutional violation is the restraint on the Director’s review authority not the appointment of APJs, Arthrex is not entitled to a hearing before a new panel. View "United States v. Arthrex, Inc." on Justia Law