Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,50 U.S.C. 1881a,2008 amendments, permit the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing surveillance of individuals who are not "United States persons" and are reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. They normally must first obtain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approval; 1881a surveillance is subject to statutory conditions, congressional supervision, and compliance with the Fourth Amendment. United States persons who claim to engage in sensitive international communications with individuals who they believe are likely targets of surveillance sought a declaration that 1881a is facially unconstitutional and a permanent injunction. The district court found that they lacked standing, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that they showed an "objectively reasonable likelihood" that their communications will be intercepted in the future and that they suffer present injuries from costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications. The Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiffs do not have Article III standing, which require an injury that is "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling." Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient. Plaintiffs’ standing theory rests on a speculative chain of possibilities. The Court stated that it is "reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how independent decision-makers will exercise their judgment." Plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending. View "Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA" on Justia Law

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction requires contracting states to order a child returned to her country of habitual residence upon finding that the child has been wrongfully removed to or retained in the contracting state. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U. S. C. 11601, implements the Convention. Chafin, a U.S. citizen, married a United Kingdom citizen (mother), in Germany, where they had a daughter, E. C. When Chafin was deployed with the military to Afghanistan, mother took E. C. to Scotland. When Chafin was transferred to Alabama, mother traveled there with E. C. Chafin filed for divorce and custody. Mother filed a petition under the Convention and ICARA. The district court concluded that E. C.’s country of habitual residence was Scotland. In Scotland, mother was granted interim custody and a preliminary injunction prohibiting Chafin from removing E. C. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Chafin’s appeal as moot. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Return of a child to a foreign country does not render appeal of a return order moot. The Chafins continue to contest where their daughter will be raised. Chafin’s claim for re-return cannot be dismissed as so implausible that it is insufficient to preserve jurisdiction; his prospects of success are not pertinent to mootness. Even if Scotland were to ignore a re-return order, U. S. courts would continue to have personal jurisdiction over mother and could command her to take action under threat of sanctions. Enforcement of the order may be uncertain, but that does not typically render cases moot. If cases were to become moot upon return of a child, courts would be more likely to routinely grant stays, to prevent loss of any right to appeal, conflicting with the Convention’s mandate of prompt return. View "Chafin v. Chafin" on Justia Law

Petitioners sued the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Liberation Organization under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), which authorized a cause of action against "[a]n individual" for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing committed under authority or color of law of any foreign nation. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that the TVPA's authorization of suit against "[a]n individual" extended liability only to natural persons. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed. The Court held that, as used in the TVPA, the term "individual" encompassed only natural persons. Consequently, the TVPA did not impose liability against organizations. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the lower courts. View "Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican national, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a Texas court. Petitioner sought a stay of execution on the ground that his conviction was obtained in violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention), and relied on Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Avena). The Court held that petitioner's argument was foreclosed by Medellin v. Texas, in which the Court held that neither the Avena decision nor the President's Memorandum purporting to implement that decision constituted directly enforceable federal law. The Court declined to stay the execution so that Congress could consider whether to enact legislation implementing the Avena decision where the Due Process Clause did not prevent a State from carrying out a lawful judgment in light of unenacted legislation that might someday authorize a collateral attack on that judgment. The Court also declined the United State's request that the Court stay the execution until January 2012 in support of "future jurisdiction to review the judgment in a proceeding." Accordingly, the applications for stay of execution was denied and petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "Leal Garcia v. Texas" on Justia Law