Articles Posted in Personal Injury

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The Lewises, driving on a Connecticut interstate, were struck by a vehicle driven by Clarke, a Tribal Gaming Authority employee, who was transporting Mohegan Sun Casino patrons. The Lewises sued Clarke in his individual capacity. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit because Clarke was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred and did not consider whether Clarke should be entitled to sovereign immunity based on an indemnification statute. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. In a suit against a tribal employee in his individual capacity, the employee, not the tribe, is the real party in interest; tribal sovereign immunity is not implicated. The suit is based on Clarke's personal actions. Clarke, not the Gaming Authority, is the real party in interest. The Connecticut Supreme Court extended sovereign immunity for tribal employees beyond what common-law sovereign immunity principles would recognize for either state or federal employees. An indemnification provision cannot, as a matter of law, extend sovereign immunity to individual employees who would otherwise not fall under its protective cloak. Connecticut courts exercise no jurisdiction over the Tribe or Gaming Authority and indemnification is not a certainty, because Clarke will not be indemnified should the Gaming Authority determine that he engaged in “wanton, reckless, or malicious” activity. View "Lewis v. Clarke" on Justia Law

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The Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) authorizes the Office of Personnel Management to contract with private carriers for federal employees’ health insurance; 5 U.S.C. 8902(m)(1) states that the “terms of any contract under this chapter which relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits (including payments with respect to benefits) shall supersede and preempt any State or local law . . . which relates to health insurance.” OPM’s regulations make a carrier’s “right to pursue and receive subrogation and reimbursement recoveries" a condition of the provision of benefits under the plan’s coverage. In 2015, OPM confirmed that subrogation and reimbursement rights and responsibilities “relate to the nature, provision, and extent of coverage or benefits” under section 8902(m)(1). Nevils, insured under a FEHBA plan offered by Coventry, was injured in an automobile accident. Coventry paid his medical expenses and asserted a lien against the settlement Nevils recovered from the driver who caused his injuries. Nevils satisfied the lien, then filed a state court class action, citing Missouri law, which does not permit subrogation or reimbursement in this context. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in favor of Nevils. The Supreme Court reversed. Because contractual subrogation and reimbursement prescriptions plainly “relate to . . . payments with respect to benefits,” they override state laws barring subrogation and reimbursement. When a carrier exercises its right to reimbursement or subrogation, it receives from either the beneficiary or a third party “payment” respecting the benefits it previously paid. The carrier’s very provision of benefits triggers that right to payment. Strong and “distinctly federal interests are involved,” in uniform administration of the FEHBA program, free from state interference, particularly concerning coverage, benefits, and payments. The regime is compatible with the Supremacy Clause. The statute, not a contract, strips overrides state law View "Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils" on Justia Law

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The Haegers sued Goodyear, alleging that the failure of a Goodyear G159 tire caused their motorhome to swerve and flip over. After years of contentious discovery, marked by Goodyear’s slow response to repeated requests for internal G159 test results, the parties settled. Months later, the Haegers’ lawyer learned that, in another lawsuit involving the G159, Goodyear had disclosed test results indicating that the tire got unusually hot at highway speeds. Goodyear conceded withholding the information. The district court exercised its inherent power to sanction bad-faith behavior to award the Haegers $2.7 million—their legal fees and costs since the moment, early in the litigation, of Goodyear’s first dishonest discovery response. The court held that in cases of egregious behavior, a court can award all attorney’s fees incurred in a case, without any need to find a causal link between the expenses and the sanctionable conduct. The court made a contingent award of $2 million, to take effect if the Ninth Circuit reversed the larger award, deducting fees related to other defendants and to proving medical damages. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the $2.7 million award. The Supreme Court reversed. When a federal court exercises its inherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct by ordering a litigant to pay the other side’s legal fees, the award is limited to fees that the innocent party would not have incurred but for the bad faith. The sanction must be compensatory, not punitive. The Haegers did not show that this litigation would have settled as soon as Goodyear divulged the heat-test results and cannot demonstrate that Goodyear’s non-disclosure so permeated the suit as to make that misconduct a but-for cause of every subsequent legal expense. View "Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger" on Justia Law