Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Clean Water Act requires that National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits be secured before pollutants are discharged from any point source into navigable waters of the United States, 33 U. S. C. 1311(a), 1362(12). An Environmental Protection Agency implementing regulation, the Silvicultural Rule, specifies which types of logging-related discharges are point sources, requiring NPDES permits unless some other provision exempts them. One exemption covers “discharges composed entirely of stormwater,” 33 U. S. C. 1342(p)(1), unless the discharge is “associated with industrial activity.” Under the EPA’s Industrial Stormwater Rule, the term “associated with industrial activity” covers only discharges “from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying storm water and that is directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant.” A final version of a recent amendment to the Industrial Stormwater Rule clarifies that the NPDES permit requirement applies only to logging operations involving rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, and log storage facilities, which are all listed in the Silvicultural Rule. Georgia-Pacific has a contract to harvest timber from an Oregon forest. When it rains, water runs off its logging roads into ditches that discharge the water into rivers and streams, often with sediment, which may be harmful to fish and other aquatic organisms. NEDC sued Georgia-Pacific and state and local governments. The district court dismissed, concluding that NPDES permits were not required because the ditches were not point sources of pollution under the CWA and the Silvicultural Rule. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, first holding that section1369(b), did not bar the district court from hearing a citizen suit against an alleged violator and seeking to enforce an obligation imposed by the CWA. The recent amendment to the Industrial Stormwater Rule did not make the case moot. Past discharges might be the basis for penalties even if, in the future, those discharges will not require a permit. The pre-amendment Rule, as construed by the EPA, exempted discharges of channeled stormwater runoff from logging roads from the NPDES requirement. The regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory term “associated with industrial activity;” it was reasonable for the EPA to conclude that the conveyances at issue are “directly related” only to harvesting raw materials, rather than to “manufacturing, processing, or raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant.” The EPA has been consistent in its view that the types of discharges at issue do not require NPDES permits. View "Decker v. Nw Envtl Def. Ctr." on Justia Law

The Medicaid statute’s anti-lien provision, 42 U. S. C. 1396p(a)(1), pre-empts state efforts to take any portion of a tort judgment or settlement not “designated as payments for medical care.” A North Carolina statute requires that up to one-third of damages recovered by a beneficiary for a tortious injury be paid to the state to reimburse it for payments made for medical treatment on account of the injury. E. M. A. suffered serious birth injuries that require her to receive 12 to 18 hours of skilled nursing care per day and that will prevent her from working or living independently. North Carolina’s Medicaid program pays part of the cost of her ongoing care. E. M. A. and her parents filed a medical malpractice suit against the physician who delivered her and the hospital where she was born and settled for $2.8 million, due to insurance policy limits. The settlement did not allocate money among medical and nonmedical claims. The state court placed one-third of the recovery into escrow pending a judicial determination of the amount owed by E. M. A. to the state. While that litigation was pending, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in another case that the irrebuttable statutory one-third presumption was a reasonable method for determining the amount due the state for medical expenses. The federal district court, in E.M.A.’s case, agreed. The Fourth Circuit vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed. The federal anti-lien provision pre-empts North Carolina’s irrebuttable statutory presumption that one-third of a tort recovery is attributable to medical expenses. North Carolina’s irrebuttable, one-size-fits-all statutory presumption is incompatible with the Medicaid Act’s clear mandate View "Wos v. E. M. A." on Justia Law

Wiley, an academic publisher, often assigns to its foreign subsidiary (WileyAsia) rights to publish, print, and sell Wiley’s English language textbooks abroad. WileyAsia’s books state that they are not to be taken (without permission) into the U.S. When Kirtsaeng moved to the U.S., he asked friends to buy foreign edition English-language textbooks in Thai book shops, where they sold at low prices, and mail them to him. He sold the books at a profit. Wiley claimed that Kirtsaeng’s unauthorized importation and resale was an infringement of Wiley’s 17 U.S.C. 106(3) exclusive rights to distribute its copyrighted work and section 602’s import prohibition. Kirtsaeng cited section 109(a)’s “first sale” doctrine, which provides that “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title ... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.” The district court held that the defense did not apply to goods manufactured abroad. The jury found that Kirtsaeng had willfully infringed Wiley’s American copyrights and assessed damages. The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that section 109(a)’s “lawfully made under this title” language indicated that the “first sale” doctrine does not apply to copies of American copyrighted works manufactured abroad. The Supreme Court reversed; the “first sale” doctrine applies to copies of a copyrighted work lawfully made abroad. Section 109(a) says nothing about geography. A geographical interpretation of the first-sale doctrine could re¬quire libraries to obtain permission before circulating the many books in their collections that were printed overseas; potential practical problems are too serious, extensive, and likely to come about to be dismissed as insignificant—particularly in light of the ever-growing importance of foreign trade to America. View "Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc." on Justia Law

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) gives federal district courts original jurisdiction over class actions if the matter in controversy exceeds $5 million, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2),(5), and provides that to determine whether a matter exceeds that amount the “claims of the individual class members must be aggregated.” When Knowles filed a proposed class action in Arkansas state court against Standard Fire Insurance, he stipulated that he and the class would seek less than $5 million in damages. Following removal, the district court remanded to state court, concluding that the amount in controversy fell below the CAFA threshold in light of Knowles’ stipulation, although the amount would have fallen above the threshold absent the stipulation. The Eighth Circuit declined to hear an appeal. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Knowles’ stipulation does not defeat federal jurisdiction under CAFA. The stipulation does not speak for those Knowles purports to represent; a plaintiff who files a proposed class action cannot legally bind members of the proposed class before the class is certified. CAFA does not forbid a federal court to consider the possibility that a nonbinding, amount-limiting, stipulation may not survive the class certification process. The Court noted CAFA’s objective: ensuring “Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance.” View "Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles" on Justia Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity from tort suits, 28 U. S. C. 1346(b)(1), except for certain intentional torts, including battery; it originally afforded tort victims a remedy against the government, but did not preclude suit against the alleged tort-feasor. Agency-specific statutes postdating the FTCA immunized certain federal employees from personal liability for torts committed in the course of official duties. The Gonzalez Act makes the FTCA remedy against the U.S. preclusive of suit against armed forces medical personnel, 10 U. S. C. 1089(a), and provides that, “[f]or purposes of this section,” the FTCA intentional tort exception “shall not apply to any cause of action arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the performance of medical ... functions.” Congress subsequently enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, which makes the FTCA remedy against the government exclusive for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, 28 U. S. C. 2679(b)(1); federal employees are shielded without regard to agency or line of work. Levin, injured as a result of surgery performed at a U. S. Naval Hospital, sued the government and the surgeon, asserting battery, based on his alleged withdrawal of consent shortly before the surgery. Finding that the surgeon had acted within the scope of his employment, the district court released him and dismissed the battery claim. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Gonzalez Act served only to buttress the personal immunity granted military medical personnel and did not negate the FTCA intentional tort exception. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Gonzalez Act section 1089(e) abrogates the FTCA intentional tort exception, allowing Levin’s suit against the U.S. alleging medical battery by a Navy doctor acting within the scope of employment. The operative clause states, “in no uncertain terms,” that the FTCA intentional tort exception “shall not apply,” and confines the abrogation to medical personnel employed by listed agencies. View "Levin v. United States" on Justia Law

The Investment Advisers Act makes it illegal to defraud clients, 15 U.S.C. 10b–6(1),(2), and authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to bring enforcement actions against investment advisers and against individuals who aid and abet violations. If the SEC seeks civil penalties, it must file suit “within five years from the date when the claim first accrued,” 28 U. S. C. 2462. In 2008 the SEC sought civil penalties, alleging that individuals aided and abetted investment adviser fraud from 1999 until 2002. The district court dismissed the claim as time barred. The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that the underlying violations sounded in fraud, so the “discovery rule” applied, and the limitations period did not begin to run until the SEC discovered or reasonably could have discovered the fraud. The Supreme Court reversed. The limitation period begins to run when the fraud occurs, not when it is discovered. In common parlance a right accrues when it comes into existence. The discovery rule is an exception to the standard rule and has never been applied where the plaintiff is not a defrauded victim seeking recompense, but is the government bringing an enforcement action for civil penalties. The government is a different kind of plaintiff. The SEC’s very purpose is to root out fraud. The discovery rule helps to ensure that the injured receive recompense, but civil penalties go beyond compensation and are intended to punish. Deciding when the government knew or reasonably should have known of a fraud would also present particular challenges for the courts. View "Gabelli v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n" on Justia Law

To recover damages in a private securities-fraud action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b–5, a plaintiff must prove reliance on a material misrepresentation or omission made by the defendant. The Supreme Court has endorsed a “fraud-on-the-market” theory, which permits plaintiffs to invoke a rebuttable presumption of reliance on public, material misrepresentations regarding securities traded in an efficient market. The theory facilitates the certification of securities-fraud class actions by permitting reliance to be proved on a class-wide basis. Connecticut Retirement sought FRCP 23(b)(3) certification of a securities-fraud class action against a biotechnology company (Amgen). The district court certified the class. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Connecticut Retirement was required to prove materiality before class certification under Rule23(b)(3)’s requirement that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” The Supreme Court affirmed. Proof of materiality is not a prerequisite to certification of a securities-fraud class action. Materiality is judged by an objective standard and can be proved through evidence common to the class. Failure of proof of materiality would not result in individual questions predominating, but would end the case. A requirement that putative class representatives establish that they executed trades “between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was r¬vealed” relates primarily to typicality and adequacy of representation, not to the predominance inquiry. The Court rejected Amgen’s argument that, because of pressure to settle, materiality may never be addressed by a court if it is not evaluated at the class-certification stage. The potential immateriality of Amgen’s alleged misrepresentations and omissions was no barrier to finding that common questions predominate. View "Amgen Inc. v. CT Ret. Plans & Trust Funds" on Justia Law

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,50 U.S.C. 1881a,2008 amendments, permit the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing surveillance of individuals who are not "United States persons" and are reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. They normally must first obtain Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approval; 1881a surveillance is subject to statutory conditions, congressional supervision, and compliance with the Fourth Amendment. United States persons who claim to engage in sensitive international communications with individuals who they believe are likely targets of surveillance sought a declaration that 1881a is facially unconstitutional and a permanent injunction. The district court found that they lacked standing, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding that they showed an "objectively reasonable likelihood" that their communications will be intercepted in the future and that they suffer present injuries from costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications. The Supreme Court reversed. The plaintiffs do not have Article III standing, which require an injury that is "concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling." Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient. Plaintiffs’ standing theory rests on a speculative chain of possibilities. The Court stated that it is "reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how independent decision-makers will exercise their judgment." Plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending. View "Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA" on Justia Law

Marx alleged that GRC violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by harassing and falsely threatening her in order to collect on a debt. The district court ruled against Marx and awarded GRC costs under FRCP 54(d)(1), which gives courts discretion to award costs to prevailing defendants unless "a federal statute ... provides otherwise." Marx unsuccessfully argued that the court’s discretion under Rule 54(d)(1) was displaced by the FDCPA provision, 15 U.S.C. 1692k(a)(3), which provides that “[o]n a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.” The Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Section 1692k(a)(3) is not contrary to, and does not displace district court discretion to award costs under, Rule 54(d)(1); its allowance of costs does not create a negative implication that costs are unavailable in any other circumstances. The context of the statute indicates that Congress was simply confirming a background presumption that courts may award to defendants attorney’s fees and costs when the plaintiff brings an action in bad faith. Because Marx did not bring this suit in bad faith, the specific provision is not applicable. View "Marx v. General Revenue Corp." on Justia Law

A California jury convicted Williams of murder. On direct appeal she claimed that questioning and dismissal of a juror during deliberations violated the Sixth Amendment and California law. Holding that the juror had been properly dismissed for bias, the California Court of Appeal quoted a Supreme Court definition of “impartiality,” but did not expressly acknowledge that it was deciding a Sixth Amendment issue. The state’s highest court remanded in light of its intervening decision that a trial court abused its discretion by dismissing, for failure to deliberate, a juror who appeared to disagree with the rest of the jury. Reaffirming its prior decision, the court of appeal discussed that decision and again failed to expressly acknowledge the federal claim. Williams ought federal habeas relief. The district court applied the deferential standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act for claims already “adjudicated on the merits in State court,” 28 U. S. C. 2254(d). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the state court had not considered Williams’ Sixth Amendment claim, reviewed that claim de novo, and found violation of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed. When a state court rules against a defendant in an opinion that rejects some of the defendant’s claims but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits for purposes of AEDPA. Applying that rebuttable presumption, the Ninth Circuit erred. Several facts indicate that the state court did consider the Sixth Amendment claim. View "Johnson v. Williams" on Justia Law