Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Smith claimed that drug conspiracy charges under 21 U. S. C.846 and 18 U. S. C. 1962(d), were barred by 18 U. S. C.3282’s five-year statute of limitations. The district court instructed the jury to convict Smith if the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracies existed, that Smith was a member, and that the conspiracies continued within the limitations period. As to the affirmative defense of withdrawal, the court instructed the jury that Smith had the burden to prove withdrawal outside the limitations period by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith was convicted. The D. C. Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed. Allocating to the defendant the burden of proving withdrawal does not violate the Due Process Clause. Unless an affirmative defense negates an element of the crime, the government has no constitutional duty to overcome the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Withdrawal does not negate an element of conspiracy but only terminates a defendant’s liability for co-conspirators’ post-withdrawal acts. Withdrawal that occurs beyond the limitations period provides a complete defense to prosecution, but that does not give the prosecution a constitutional responsibility to prove that he did not withdraw. Because the statutes do not address the burden of proof for withdrawal, it is presumed that the common law rule applies.. A conspiracy continues until it is terminated or, as to a particular defendant, until that defendant withdraws and the burden of establishing withdrawal rests upon the defendant. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

Nike alleged that Already’s athletic shoes violated Nike’s Air Force 1 trademark; Already challenged the trademark. While the suit was pending, Nike agreed not to raise any trademark or unfair competition claims against Already or any affiliated entity based on Already’s existing footwear designs, or any future designs that constituted a “colorable imitation” of Already’s current products. Nike moved to dismiss its claims with prejudice and to dismiss Already’s counterclaim without prejudice. Already opposed dismissal of its counterclaim, indicating that Already planned to introduce new versions of its lines, that potential investors would not consider investing until Nike’s trademark was invalidated, and that Nike had intimidated retailers into refusing to carry Already’s shoes. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the case moot. The breadth of the covenant suffices to meet the burden imposed by the “voluntary cessation doctrine.” The covenant is unconditional and irrevocable. Already did not establish that it engages in or has concrete plans to engage in activities that would arguably infringe Nike’s trademark yet not be covered by the covenant. The fact that some individuals may base decisions on hypothetical speculation does not give rise to the sort of injury necessary to establish standing. The Court rejected the “sweeping argument” that, as one of Nike’s competitors, Already inherently has standing because no covenant can eradicate the effects of a registered but invalid trademark. View "Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc." on Justia Law

Los Angeles County Flood Control District operates a “municipal separate storm sewer system” (MS4) drainage system that collects, transports, and discharges storm water. Because storm water is often heavily polluted, the Clean Water Act (CWA) and regulations require certain MS4 operators to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit before discharging storm water into navigable waters. The District has such a permit for its MS4. Environmental groups filed a citizen suit under the CWA, 33 U. S. C.1365, alleging that water-quality measurements from monitoring stations within the Los Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers demonstrated that the District was violating its permit. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that the record was insufficient to warrant a finding that the MS4 had discharged storm water containing the standards-exceeding pollutants detected at the downstream monitoring stations. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the District was liable for discharge of pollutants that occurred when the polluted water detected at the monitoring stations flowed out of the concrete-lined portions of the rivers, where the monitoring stations are located, into lower, unlined portions of the same rivers. The Supreme Court reversed. The flow of water from an improved portion of a navigable waterway into an unimproved portion of the same waterway does not qualify as a “discharge of a pollutant” under the CWA. View "Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc." on Justia Law

Gonzales, an Arizona death row inmate, sought federal habeas relief. Counsel sought a stay, contending that mental incompetence prevented Gonzales from rationally communicating with or assisting counsel, and that 18 U. S. C.3599(a)(2) requires a stay when a petitioner is adjudged incompetent. The district court denied a stay, finding that Gonzales’ claims were record based or resolvable as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit held that Gonzales had a right to a stay pending a competency determination. Carter, an Ohio death row inmate, initiated federal habeas proceedings but later moved for a competency determination and stay. The district court granted the motion, found Carter incompetent, dismissed his petition without prejudice, and prospectively tolled the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit identified a right to competence in 18 U. S. C. 4241 and ordered indefinite stay with respect to claims requiring assistance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 3599 does not provide a state prisoner a right to suspension of federal habeas proceedings when he is adjudged incompetent and that Section 4241 does not provide a right to competence during federal habeas proceedings. Review of record-based claims, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), is limited to the record before the state court that heard the case on the merits and extra-record evidence concerning such claims is inadmissible. View "Ryan v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

Lefemine and members of CCL demonstrate, carrying pictures of aborted fetuses, to protest abortions. In 2005, Lefemine and about 20 other CCL members demonstrated at a busy intersection in Greenwood County, South Carolina. Citing complaints about the signs, a police officer informed Lefemine that if the signs were not discarded, he would be ticketed for breach of the peace. Lefemine objected, but disbanded the protest. A year later, Lefemine’s attorney sent a letter to the sheriff, informing him that the group intended to return to the same site with the disputed signs. The department responded that the police had not violated Lefemine’s rights and warned that “should we observe any protester or demonstrator committing the same act, we will again order the person(s) to stop or face criminal sanctions.” Fearing sanctions, the group did not protest in the county for two years. Lefemine filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court permanently enjoined content-based restrictions on Lefemine’s display of graphic signs under similar circumstances, but refused Lefemine’s requests for nominal damages, based on qualified immunity, and attorney fees. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court vacated, holding that the injunction, which altered the legal relationship between the parties, made Lefemine a “prevailing party” under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 42 U. S.C. 1988. View "Lefemine v. Wideman" on Justia Law

Attorney Bormes alleged that the electronic receipt he received when paying his client’s federal-court filing fee on Pay.gov included the last four digits of his credit card number and the card’s expiration date, in willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U. S. C.1681. He sought damages and asserted jurisdiction under 1681p, and under the Little Tucker Act, which grants district courts jurisdiction for claims “against the United States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded ... upon ... any Act of Congress,” 28 U. S. C. 1346(a)(2). The district court dismissed, holding that FCRA did not explicitly waive sovereign immunity. The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the Little Tucker Act provided consent to suit because the underlying statute. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. The Little Tucker Act does not waive sovereign immunity with respect to FCRA damages actions, but, with its companion statute, the Tucker Act, provides the government’s consent to suit for certain money-damages claims “premised on other sources of law,” Those general terms are displaced when a law imposing monetary liability has its own judicial remedies. Because FCRA enables claimants to pursue monetary relief in court without resort to the Tucker Act, only its own text can determine whether Congress unequivocally intended to impose the statute’s damages liability on the government. View "United States v. Bormes" on Justia Law

Nitro-Lift contracts with operators of oil and gas wells to provide services. Howard and Schneider entered a confidentiality-noncompetition agreement with Nitro-Lift that contained an arbitration clause” After working for Nitro-Lift on wells in Oklahoma, Texas, and Arkansas, they quit and began working for one of Nitro-Lift’s competitors. Nitro-Lift served them with a demand for arbitration. The former employees filed suit Oklahoma, asking the court to declare the agreements void and enjoin enforcement. The court dismissed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered the parties to show cause why the matter should not be resolved by application of Okla. Stat., Tit. 15, 219A, which limits the enforceability of noncompetition agreements. Nitro-Lift argued that any dispute as to the contracts’ enforceability was a question for the arbitrator. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the existence of an arbitration agreement in an employment contract does not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated, holding that the state court misconstrued the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, which favors arbitration. View "Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard" on Justia Law

Arkansas Game and Fish Commission owns and manages the Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area, 23,000 acres with multiple hardwood species and used for recreation and hunting. In 1948, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructed Clearwater Dam upstream from the Area and adopted the Water Control Manual, setting seasonally varying rates for release of water from the Dam. From 1993-2000, the Corps, at the request of farmers, authorized deviations from the Manual that extended flooding into peak timber growing season. The Commission objected that deviations adversely impacted the Area, and opposed a proposal to make deviations part of the permanent water-release plan. After testing, the Corps abandoned the proposed Manual revision and ceased temporary deviations. The Commission sued, alleging that the deviations caused sustained flooding during growing season and that the cumulative impact of the flooding caused destruction of Area timber and substantial change in the terrain, necessitating costly reclamation. The Claims Court judgment ($5,778,757) in favor of the Commission was reversed by the Federal Circuit, which held that government-induced flooding can support a taking claim only if “permanent or inevitably recurring.” The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Government-induced flooding of limited duration may be compensable. There is no blanket temporary-flooding exception to Takings Clause jurisprudence and no reason to treat flooding differently than other government intrusions. While the public interests are important, they are not categorically different from interests at stake in other takings cases. When regulation or temporary physical invasion by government interferes with private property, time is a factor in determining the existence of a compensable taking, as are the degree to which the invasion is intended or the foreseeable result of authorized government action, the character of the land, the owner’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations,” and the severity of the interference. View "AR Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States" on Justia Law

The Civil Service Reform Act permits federal employees, subjected to serious personnel actions, to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U. S. C. 7701. “Mixed cases,” based on discrimination, are governed by the CSRA and MSPB and EEOC regulations. An employee may initiate a mixed case with the agency-employer or directly with the MSPB. The CSRA provides that review of MSPB decisions “shall be filed in the ... Federal Circuit,” except that discrimination cases may be filed in district court. Kloeckner, a Department of Labor employee, filed a hostile work environment complaint with the DOL civil rights office. Following EEOC regulations, DOL completed an internal investigation; Kloeckner requested an EEOC hearing. While the EEOC case was pending, Kloeckner was fired and brought her mixed case directly to the MSPB. Concerned about duplicative expenses, she successfully moved to amend her EEOC complaint to include her claim of discriminatory removal and asked the MSPB to dismiss without prejudice. The MSPB granted a right to refile by January 18, 2007. The EEOC case continued until April 2007, when it was terminated as a sanction for Kloeckner’s discovery conduct and returned to DOL, which ruled against Kloeckner. The MSPB dismissed Kloeckner’s appeal as untimely. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the only discrimination cases that could go to district court under 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(2) were those the MSPB had decided on the merits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Each referenced enforcement provision authorizes action in federal district court. Regardless of whether the MSPB dismissed on the merits or threw it out as untimely, Kloeckner brought the kind of case that the CSRA routes to district court. View "Kloeckner v. Solis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed that West Virginia's 2011 congressional redistricting plan violated the "one person, one vote" principle that the Court held to be embodied in Article I, section 2, of the United States Constitution. A three-judge District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia agreed, declaring the plan "null and void" and enjoining West Virginia's Secretary of State from implementing it. The state defendants appealed directly to the Court. Because the District Court misapplied the standard for evaluating such challenges set out in Karcher v. Daggett, and failed to afford appropriate deference to West Virginia's reasonable exercise of its political judgment, the Court reversed. View "Tennant v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law