Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kentucky’s attorney general and its Secretary of Health and Family Services were defendants in a suit concerning House Bill 454, regulating abortion procedures. Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the attorney general, stipulating that the attorney general’s office reserved “all rights, claims, and defenses . . . in any appeals” and agreed to be bound by the judgment. The district court enjoined HB 454's enforcement.While an appeal was pending, Kentucky elected a new attorney general, Cameron. Former attorney general Beshear became Governor. Cameron entered an appearance as counsel for the new Secretary. A divided Sixth Circuit panel affirmed. The Secretary opted not to challenge the decision. The attorney general moved to withdraw as counsel for the Secretary and to intervene on the Commonwealth’s behalf, then filed a timely petition for rehearing en banc. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion to intervene.The Supreme Court reversed. Although the attorney general could have filed a notice of appeal, his failure to do so did not mean his motion for intervention should be treated as an untimely notice of appeal. The Sixth Circuit panel failed to account for the strength of the attorney general’s interest in defending HB 454 after the Secretary acquiesced. The attorney general sought to intervene “as soon as it became clear” that the Commonwealth’s interests “would no longer be protected” by the parties. While the rehearing petition pressed an issue (third-party standing) not raised in the Secretary’s appellate briefs, allowing intervention would not have necessitated resolution of that issue. The plaintiffs’ “loss of its claimed expectations around the election of a Governor with a history of declining to defend abortion restrictions is not cognizable as unfair prejudice.” View "Cameron v. EMW Women's Surgical Center, P. S. C." on Justia Law

Unicolors, the owner of fabric design copyrights, successfully sued H&M for copyright infringement, 17 U.S.C. 411(a). H&M argued that Unicolors knowingly included inaccurate information on its registration application, rendering its registration invalid; Unicolors had filed a single application seeking registration for 31 separate works despite a regulation that provides that a single application may cover multiple works only if they were “included in the same unit of publication.” H&M argued that Unicolors had made some of the designs available for sale exclusively to certain customers while offering the rest to the general public.The Ninth Circuit determined that it did not matter whether Unicolors was aware that it had failed to satisfy the single unit of publication requirement because the safe harbor excused only good-faith mistakes of fact, not law; Unicolors knew the relevant facts.The Supreme Court vacated. Section 411(b) does not distinguish between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact. Under the safe harbor, a certificate of registration is valid, even though it contains inaccurate information if the copyright holder lacked “knowledge that it was inaccurate.” If Unicolors was not aware of the legal requirement that rendered its application inaccurate, it could not have included the inaccurate information “with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” Legislative history indicates that Congress enacted section 411(b) to make it easier for nonlawyers to obtain valid copyright registrations by “eliminating loopholes” that allowed infringers to exploit mistakes in the application process. The Court noted that willful blindness may support a finding of actual knowledge and circumstantial evidence may demonstrate that an applicant was aware of, or willfully blind to, legally inaccurate information. View "Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L. P." on Justia Law

Northwestern’s defined contribution retirement plans, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, allowed participants to choose an individual investment mix from a menu of options selected by plan administrators. Participants claimed those administrators violated their duty of prudence by offering needlessly expensive investment options and paying excessive record-keeping fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of those claims, finding that the plaintiffs’ preferred type of low-cost investments were available as plan options.The Supreme Court vacated. A categorical rule is inconsistent with the context-specific inquiry that ERISA requires and fails to take into account the duty of plan fiduciaries to monitor all plan investments and remove any imprudent ones. The Seventh Circuit erroneously focused on another component of the duty of prudence: the obligation to assemble a diverse menu of options. Provision of an adequate array of investment choices, including the lower cost investments plaintiffs wanted, does not excuse the allegedly imprudent decisions. Even if participants choose their investments, plan fiduciaries must conduct their own independent evaluation to determine which investments may be prudently included in the plan’s menu of options. If the fiduciaries fail to remove an imprudent investment from the plan within a reasonable time, they breach their duty. The Court remanded, “so that the Seventh Circuit may reevaluate the allegations as a whole, considering whether petitioners have plausibly alleged a violation of the duty of prudence,” which turns on the circumstances prevailing when the fiduciary acts. View "Hughes v. Northwestern University" on Justia Law

A stray 9-millimeter bullet killed a child after a Bronx street fight. Eyewitnesses described the shooter as wearing a blue shirt or sweater. Police officers determined Gilliam was involved and that Morris was at the scene. A search of Morris’ apartment revealed a 9-millimeter cartridge and .357-caliber bullets. Gilliam initially identified Morris as the shooter but subsequently said that Hemphill was the shooter. Morris was charged with murder and possession of a 9-millimeter handgun. The prosecution agreed to dismiss the murder charges if Morris pleaded guilty to possession of a .357 revolver. Years later, Hemphill was indicted for the murder; his DNA matched a blue sweater found in Morris’ apartment shortly after the murder. Hemphill elicited testimony that police had recovered 9-millimeter ammunition from Morris’ apartment, pointing to Morris as the culprit. Morris was not available to testify. The court allowed the prosecution to introduce parts of Morris’ plea allocation transcript to rebut Hemphill’s theory, reasoning that although Morris’ out-of-court statements had not been subjected to cross-examination, Hemphill’s arguments had “opened the door” and admission of the statements was reasonably necessary to correct a misleading impression. Hemphill was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed. Admission of the plea allocution transcript violated Hemphill’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. While the Sixth Amendment permits reasonable procedural rules concerning the exercise of a defendant’s confrontation right, the “door-opening principle” is a substantive principle that dictates what material is relevant and admissible. It was not for the trial judge to determine whether Hemphill’s theory that Morris was the shooter was unreliable, incredible, or otherwise misleading in light of the state’s proffered, unconfronted plea evidence, nor whether this evidence was reasonably necessary to correct that misleading impression. View "Hemphill v. New York" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Labor, through OSHA, enacted a vaccine mandate, to be enforced by employers. The mandate preempted contrary state laws and covered virtually all employers with at least 100 employees, with exemptions for employees who exclusively work remotely or outdoors. It required that covered workers receive a COVID–19 vaccine or obtain a medical test each week at their own expense, on their own time, and also wear a mask at work. Challenges were consolidated before the Sixth Circuit, which allowed OSHA’s rule to take effect.The Supreme Court stayed the rule. Applicants are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Secretary lacked the authority to impose the mandate. The rule is “a significant encroachment into the lives—and health—of a vast number of employees,” not plainly authorized by statute; 29 U.S.C. 655(b) empowers the Secretary to set workplace safety standards, not broad public health measures. Although COVID–19 is a risk in many workplaces, it is not an occupational hazard in most. COVID–19 spreads everywhere that people gather. Permitting OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life would significantly expand OSHA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. The vaccine mandate is unlike typical OSHA workplace regulations. A vaccination “cannot be undone.” Where the virus poses a special danger because of the particular features of an employee’s job or workplace, targeted regulations are permissible but OSHA’s indiscriminate approach fails to distinguish between occupational risk and general risk. The equities do not justify withholding interim relief. States and employers allege that OSHA’s mandate will force them to incur billions of dollars in unrecoverable compliance costs and will cause hundreds of thousands of employees to leave their jobs. View "National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration" on Justia Law

In November 2021, the Secretary of HHS announced that, in order to receive Medicare and Medicaid funding, participating facilities must ensure that their staff—unless exempt for medical or religious reasons or teleworking full-time—are vaccinated against COVID–19. Two district courts enjoined enforcement of the rule. The Supreme Court stayed the injunctions pending appeals in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. The rule falls within the Secretary’s statutory authority to promulgate regulations “necessary to the efficient administration of the functions with which [he] is charged,” 42 U.S.C. 1302(a), including ensuring that the healthcare providers who care for Medicare and Medicaid patients protect their patients’ health and safety. Conditions with which facilities must comply to be eligible to receive Medicare and Medicaid funds have long included a requirement that certain providers maintain and enforce an “infection prevention and control program.” Vaccination requirements are a common feature of the provision of healthcare in America. The rule is not arbitrary. The Court noted the Secretary’s findings that in addition to the threat posed by in- facility transmission itself, “fear of exposure” to the virus “from unvaccinated health care staff can lead patients to themselves forgo seeking medically necessary care.” Nor did the Secretary fail to consider that the rule might cause staffing shortages. The Secretary’s finding of good cause to delay notice and comment was based on a finding that accelerated promulgation of the rule in advance of the winter flu season would significantly reduce COVID–19 infections, hospitalizations, and deaths. View "Biden v. Missouri" on Justia Law

Social Security retirement benefits are calculated using a formula based on past earnings, 42 U.S.C. 415(a)(1)(A). Under the “windfall elimination” provision, benefits are reduced when a retiree receives a separate pension payment based on employment not subject to Social Security taxes. Pension payments exempt from the windfall reduction include those "based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service.”A “military technician (dual status),” 10 U.S.C. 10216, is a “civilian employee” assisting the National Guard. Such technicians are required to maintain National Guard membership and must wear uniforms while working. For their work as full-time civilian technicians, they receive civil-service pay. If hired before 1984, they receive Civil Service Retirement System pension payments. As part-time National Guard members, they receive military pay and pension payments from a different arm of the government.The SSA applied the windfall elimination provision to the benefits calculation for Babcock, a dual-status technician. The district court and Sixth Circuit upheld that decision, declining to apply the uniformed-services exception.The Supreme Court affirmed. Civil Service Retirement System pensions generally trigger the windfall provision. Babcock’s technician work was not service “as” a National Guard member. A condition of employment is not the same as the capacity in which one serves. The statute states: “For purposes of this section and any other provision of law,” a technician “is” a “civilian employee,” “authorized and accounted for as” a “civilian.” While working in a civilian capacity, technicians are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. They possess characteristically civilian rights concerning employment discrimination, workers’ compensation, disability benefits, and overtime work; technicians hired before 1984 are “civil service” members, entitled to pensions as civil servants. Babcock’s civil-service pension payments are not based on his National Guard service, for which he received separate military pension payments. View "Babcock v. Kijakazi" on Justia Law

Texas Senate Bill 8, the 2021 Heartbeat Act, prohibits physicians from performing or inducing an abortion if the physician detected a fetal heartbeat. S.B. 8 does not allow state officials to enforce the law but directs enforcement through “private civil actions” seeking injunctions and damages awards against those who perform or assist with prohibited abortions. Abortion providers may defend themselves by showing that holding them liable would place an “undue burden” on women seeking abortions.Abortion providers (petitioners) sought pre-enforcement review of S.B. 8 and an injunction barring its enforcement. They sought to certify a class and request an order enjoining all state-court clerks from docketing S.B. 8 cases, and all state-court judges from hearing them. The district court denied motions to dismiss. The Fifth Circuit denied a request for an injunction barring enforcement pending appeal. The petitioners sought injunctive relief in the Supreme Court, which concluded that the filings failed to identify a basis for disturbing the Fifth Circuit’s decision.On certiorari, the Court held that a pre-enforcement challenge to S.B. 8 under the U.S. Constitution may proceed against certain defendants but not others, without addressing whether S.B. 8 is consistent with the Constitution.The Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity do not allow an action to prevent state-court clerks and judges from enforcing state laws that are contrary to federal law. No Article III “case or controversy” between “adverse litigants” exists between the petitioners and either the clerks or judges. Texas Attorney General Paxton should be dismissed as possessing no enforcement authority in connection with S.B. 8. Even if Paxton had enforcement power, a federal court cannot parlay that authority into an injunction against any unnamed private parties who might pursue S.B. 8 suits. No court may “enjoin the world at large” or purport to enjoin challenged “laws themselves.” Sovereign immunity does not shield executive licensing officials who may take action against the petitioners for violations of Texas’s Health and Safety Code, including S.B. 8. A single private party, Dickson, should be dismissed, given his sworn declarations that he has no intention to file an S.B. 8 suit. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Union City, California officer Rivas-Villegas responded to a 911 call reporting that a woman and her children were barricaded in a room for fear that Cortesluna, the woman’s boyfriend, was going to hurt them. After confirming that the family had no means of escape, Rivas-Villegas and other officers commanded Cortesluna outside and onto the ground. Officers saw a knife in Cortesluna’s pocket. While Rivas-Villegas and another officer were removing the knife and handcuffing Cortesluna, Rivas-Villegas briefly placed his knee on the side of Cortesluna’s back.Cortesluna sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law. Even assuming that controlling Circuit precedent clearly established the law for purposes of section 1983, Ninth Circuit precedent did not give Rivas-Villegas fair notice that he was using excessive force. This is not an obvious case. The officers, in this case, were responding to a serious alleged incident of domestic violence possibly involving a chainsaw and Cortesluna had a knife protruding from his pocket for which he had just previously appeared to reach. Cortesluna does not dispute, that Rivas-Villegas placed his knee on Cortesluna for no more than eight seconds and only on the side of his back near the knife that officers were in the process of retrieving. View "Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna" on Justia Law

Rollice’s ex-wife called 911. Rollice was in her garage, intoxicated, and would not leave. Three officers responded to the call and spoke with Rollice through the garage’s doorway. Rollice began fidgeting with something in his hands; he appeared nervous. Rollice refused a request for a pat-down. Police body-camera video captured Rollice conversing with the officers as he turned around and walked toward the back of the garage where his tools were hanging. No officer was within six feet of Rollice. The officers state that they ordered Rollice to stop. Rollice kept walking, grabbed a hammer, and turned toward the officers, grasping the hammer's handle with both hands and pulling it up to shoulder level. The officers backed up, drawing their guns. They yelled at Rollice to drop the hammer. Rollice took steps toward Officer Girdner, raised the hammer behind his head, and took a stance as if he was about to throw the hammer or charge at the officers. Two officers fired their weapons, killing Rollice. Rollice’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit. The officers did not violate any clearly established law and are shielded by qualified immunity. None of the decisions cited by the Tenth Circuit established that the officers’ conduct was unlawful. Officers engaged in a conversation with Rollice, followed him into a garage at a distance, and did not yell until after he picked up a hammer. Precedent did not “clearly establish” that their conduct was reckless or that their ultimate use of force was unlawful. View "City of Tahlequah v. Bond" on Justia Law