Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When a business opted into its Name Screen Alert service, TransUnion would conduct its ordinary credit check of the consumer and would also use third-party software to compare the consumer’s name against the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control's list of terrorists, drug traffickers, and other serious criminals. If the consumer’s first and last name matched the first and last name of an individual on that list, TransUnion would note on the credit report that the consumer’s name was a “potential match.”A class of 8,185 individuals with such alerts in their credit files sued TransUnion under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681. for failing to use reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of their credit files. The parties stipulated that only 1,853 class members had their misleading credit reports containing alerts provided to third parties during the seven-month period specified in the class definition. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict, awarding each class member statutory and punitive damages.The Supreme Court reversed. Only plaintiffs concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation have Article III standing to seek damages in federal court. An injury-in-law is not an injury-in-fact. The asserted harm must have a close relationship to harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit. Physical or monetary harms and various intangible harms—like reputational harms--qualify as concrete injuries under Article III; 1,853 class members suffered harm with a “close relationship” to the harm associated with the tort of defamation. The credit files of the remaining 6,332 class members contained misleading alerts, but TransUnion did not provide that information to potential creditors. The mere existence of inaccurate information, absent dissemination, traditionally has not provided the basis for a lawsuit. Exposure to the risk that the misleading information would be disseminated in the future, without more, cannot qualify as concrete harm in a suit for damages. View "TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

B.L. failed to make her school’s varsity cheerleading squad. While visiting a store over the weekend, B.L. posted two images on Snapchat, a social media smartphone application that allows users to share temporary images with selected friends. B.L.’s posts expressed frustration with the school and the cheerleading squad; one contained vulgar language and gestures. When school officials learned of the posts, they suspended B.L. from the junior varsity cheerleading squad for the upcoming year.The Third Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed a district court injunction, ordering the school to reinstate B. L. to the cheerleading team. Schools have a special interest in regulating on-campus student speech that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.” When that speech takes place off-campus, circumstances that may implicate a school’s regulatory interests include serious bullying or harassment; threats aimed at teachers or other students; failure to follow rules concerning lessons and homework, the use of computers, or participation in online school activities; and breaches of school security devices. However, courts must be more skeptical of a school’s efforts to regulate off-campus speech.B.L.’s posts did not involve features that would place them outside the First Amendment’s ordinary protection; they appeared outside of school hours from a location outside the school and did not identify the school or target any member of the school community with vulgar or abusive language. Her audience consisted of her private circle of Snapchat friends. B.L. spoke under circumstances where the school did not stand in loco parentis. The school has presented no evidence of any general effort to prevent students from using vulgarity outside the classroom. The school’s interest in preventing disruption is not supported by the record. View "Mahanoy Area School District v. B. L." on Justia Law

Lange drove by a California highway patrol officer, playing loud music and honking his horn. The officer followed Lange and soon turned on his overhead lights to signal Lange to pull over. Rather than stopping, Lange drove a short distance to his driveway and entered his attached garage. Without obtaining a warrant, the officer followed Lange into the garage, questioned him, and, after observing signs of intoxication, put him through field sobriety tests. Charged with misdemeanor DUI, Lange moved to suppress the evidence obtained after the officer entered his garage. California courts rejected his Fourth Amendment arguments.The Supreme Court vacated. Under the Fourth Amendment, the pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home. Precedent favors a case-by-case assessment of exigency when deciding whether a suspected misdemeanant’s flight justifies a warrantless home entry. Such exigencies may exist when an officer must act to prevent imminent injury, the destruction of evidence, or a suspect’s escape. Misdemeanors may be minor. When a minor offense (and no flight) is involved, police officers do not usually face the kind of emergency that can justify a warrantless home entry. Adding a suspect’s flight does not change the situation enough to justify a categorical rule. When the totality of circumstances (including the flight itself) show an emergency—a need to act before it is possible to get a warrant—the police may act without waiting. Common law afforded the home strong protection from government intrusion and did not include a categorical rule allowing warrantless home entry when a suspected misdemeanant flees. View "Lange v. California" on Justia Law

A California regulation mandates that agricultural employers allow union organizers onto their property for up to three hours per day, 120 days per year. Union organizers sought access to property owned by two California growers, who sought to enjoin enforcement of the access regulation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit.The Supreme Court reversed. California’s access regulation constitutes a per se physical taking and the growers’ complaint states a claim for an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. When the government, rather than appropriating private property for itself or a third party, imposes regulations restricting an owner’s ability to use his own property, courts generally determine whether a taking has occurred by applying the “Penn Central” factors. When the government physically appropriates property, the flexible Penn Central analysis has no place. California’s access regulation appropriates a right to invade the growers’ property and therefore constitutes a per se physical taking. Rather than restraining the growers’ use of their own property, the regulation appropriates for the enjoyment of third parties (union organizers) the owners’ right to exclude. The right to exclude is “a fundamental element of the property right.” The duration of a physical appropriation bears only on the amount of compensation due. The California regulation is not transformed from a physical taking into a use restriction just because the access granted is restricted to union organizers, for a narrow purpose, and for a limited time.The Court distinguished restrictions on how a business generally open to the public may treat individuals on the premises; isolated physical invasions, not undertaken pursuant to a granted right of access; and requirements that property owners cede a right of access as a condition of receiving certain benefits. Government inspection regimes will generally not constitute takings. View "Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid" on Justia Law

When the housing bubble burst in 2008, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) suffered significant losses. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency tasked with regulating the companies and, if necessary, stepping in as their conservator, 12 U.S.C. 4501. Congress installed a single Director, removable by the President only “for cause.” The Director placed the companies into conservatorship and negotiated agreements with the Department of Treasury, which committed to providing each company with up to $100 billion in capital and in exchange received senior preferred shares and fixed-rate dividends. A subsequent amendment replaced the fixed-rate dividend with a variable formula, requiring the companies to make quarterly payments consisting of their entire net worth minus a small specified capital reserve. Shareholders challenged that amendment.The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in part, affirmed in part, and vacated in part.The shareholders’ statutory claim was properly dismissed. The Act's “anti-injunction clause” provides that unless review is specifically authorized by one of its provisions or is requested by the Director, “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.” Where, as here, the FHFA’s challenged actions did not exceed its “powers or functions” “as a conservator,” relief is prohibited.The Court first concluded the shareholders have standing to bring their constitutional claim because they retain an interest in retrospective relief, despite that the FHFA was led by an Acting Director, as opposed to a Senate-confirmed Director, at the time the amendment was adopted. The Act’s for-cause restriction on the President’s removal authority violates the separation of powers. The Court rejected arguments based on the facts that the FHFA’s authority is limited; that when the Agency steps into the shoes of a regulated entity as its conservator or receiver, it takes on the status of a private party and does not wield executive power; and that the entities FHFA regulates are government-sponsored enterprises. The President’s removal power serves important purposes regardless of whether the agency directly regulates ordinary Americans or takes actions that have a profound, indirect effect on their lives. The Constitution prohibits even “modest restrictions” on the President’s power to remove the head of an agency with a single top officer.The Court remanded for determination of a remedy. Although an unconstitutional provision is never really part of the body of governing law, it is still possible for an unconstitutional provision to inflict compensable harm. View "Collins v. Yellen" on Justia Law

Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) conduct adversarial proceedings for challenging the validity of an existing patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), 35 U.S.C. 6(a), (c). The Secretary of Commerce appoints PTAB members, including APJs, except the Director, who is nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. APJs concluded that Arthrex’s patent was invalid. The Federal Circuit concluded that the APJs were principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; their appointment was unconstitutional. To remedy this violation, the court invalidated the APJs’ tenure protections, making them removable at will by the Secretary.The Supreme Court vacated. The unreviewable authority wielded by APJs during patent review is incompatible with their appointment by the Secretary to an inferior office. Inferior officers must be “directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” While the Director has administrative oversight, neither he nor any other superior executive officer can directly review APJ decisions. A decision by the APJs under his charge compels the Director to “issue and publish a certificate” canceling or confirming patent claims he previously allowed. Given the insulation of PTAB decisions from executive review, APJs exercise power that conflicts with the Appointments Clause’s purpose “to preserve political accountability.”Four justices concluded that section 6(c) cannot constitutionally be enforced to prevent the Director from reviewing final APJ decisions. The Director may review final PTAB decisions and may issue decisions on behalf of the Board. Section 6(c) otherwise remains operative. Because the source of the constitutional violation is the restraint on the Director’s review authority not the appointment of APJs, Arthrex is not entitled to a hearing before a new panel. View "United States v. Arthrex, Inc." on Justia Law

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) limits how schools may compensate college-level “amateur” student-athletes. Current and former student-athletes brought suit under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits “contract[s], combination[s], or conspirac[ies] in restraint of trade or commerce,” 15 U.S.C. 1. The Ninth Circuit declined to disturb NCAA rules limiting undergraduate athletic scholarships and other compensation related to athletic performance but enjoined certain NCAA rules limiting the education-related benefits, such as scholarships for graduate or vocational school, payments for academic tutoring, or paid post-eligibility internships.The Supreme Court affirmed, considering only the enjoined subset of NCAA rules restricting education-related benefits. Because the NCAA enjoys monopoly control in the relevant market and is capable of depressing wages below competitive levels for student-athletes and thereby restricting the quantity of student-athlete labor, the Court applied “rule of reason” analysis. The Court rejected the NCAA’s argument for “an extremely deferential standard” because it is a joint venture among members who must collaborate to offer consumers a unique product.While a “least restrictive means” test would be erroneous, the district court nowhere expressly or effectively required the NCAA to meet that standard. Only after finding the NCAA’s restraints “patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary” did the court find the restraints unlawful. Judges must be sensitive to the possibility that the “continuing supervision of a highly detailed decree” could wind up impairing rather than enhancing competition but the district court enjoined only certain restraints—and only after finding both that relaxing these restrictions would not blur the distinction between college and professional sports and thus impair demand, and further that this course represented a significantly (not marginally) less restrictive means of achieving the same procompetitive benefits as the current rules. The injunction preserves considerable leeway for the NCAA. View "National Collegiate Athletic Association. v. Alston" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a securities-fraud class action alleging that Goldman violated securities laws prohibiting material misrepresentations and omissions in connection with the sale of securities, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b); 17 CFR 240.10b–5, and maintained an artificially inflated stock price by repeatedly making false and misleading generic statements about its ability to manage conflicts. Seeking to certify a class of Goldman shareholders, Plaintiffs invoked the “basic presumption” that investors rely on the market price of a company’s security, which in an efficient market will reflect all of the company’s public statements, including misrepresentations. The Second Circuit affirmed certification of the class.The Supreme Court vacated. The generic nature of a misrepresentation often is important evidence of price impact that courts should consider at class certification, including in inflation-maintenance cases, although the same evidence may be relevant to materiality, an inquiry reserved for the merits phase of a securities-fraud class action. The Second Circuit’s opinion leaves doubt as to whether it properly considered the generic nature of Goldman’s alleged misrepresentations. Defendants bear the burden of persuasion to prove a lack of price impact by a preponderance of the evidence at class certification and may rebut the presumption of reliance if they “show that the misrepresentation in fact did not lead to a distortion of price.” A defendant must do more than produce some evidence relevant to price impact and must “in fact” “seve[r] the link” between a misrepresentation and the price paid by the plaintiff. Assigning defendants the burden of persuasion to prove a lack of price impact by a preponderance of the evidence will be outcome-determinative only in the rare case in which the evidence is in perfect equipoise. View "Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System" on Justia Law

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act required most Americans to obtain minimum essential health insurance coverage and imposed a monetary penalty upon most individuals who failed to do so; 2017 amendments effectively nullified the penalty. Several states and two individuals sued, claiming that without the penalty, the Act’s minimum essential coverage provision, 26 U.S.C. 5000A(a), is unconstitutional and that the rest of the Act is not severable from section 5000A(a).The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge section 5000A(a) because they have not shown a past or future injury fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct enforcing that statutory provision. The individual plaintiffs cited past and future payments necessary to carry the minimum essential coverage; that injury is not “fairly traceable” to any “allegedly unlawful conduct” of which they complain, Without a penalty for noncompliance, section 5000A(a) is unenforceable. To find standing to attack an unenforceable statutory provision, seeking only declaratory relief, would allow a federal court to issue an impermissible advisory opinion.The states cited the indirect injury of increased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs but failed to show how that alleged harm is traceable to the government’s actual or possible enforcement of section 5000A(a). Where a standing theory rests on speculation about the decision of an independent third party (an individual’s decision to enroll in a program like Medicaid), the plaintiff must show at the least “that third parties will likely react in predictable ways.” Nothing suggests that an unenforceable mandate will cause state residents to enroll in benefits programs that they would otherwise forgo. An alleged increase in administrative and related expenses is not imposed by section 5000A(a) but by other provisions of the Act. View "California v. Texas" on Justia Law

Six individuals from Mali alleged that they were trafficked into Ivory Coast as child slaves to produce cocoa; they sued U.S.-based companies, Nestlé and Cargill, citing the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), which provides federal courts jurisdiction to hear claims brought “by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. 1350. The companies do not own or operate cocoa farms in Ivory Coast, but they buy cocoa from farms located there and provide those farms with technical and financial resources. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit.The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The plaintiffs improperly sought extraterritorial application of the ATS. Where a statute, like the ATS, does not apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish that “the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States . . . even if other conduct occurred abroad.” Nearly all the conduct that allegedly aided and abetted forced labor—providing training, equipment, and cash to overseas farmers—occurred in Ivory Coast. Pleading general corporate activity, like “mere corporate presence,” does not draw a sufficient connection between the cause of action and domestic conduct. To plead facts sufficient to support a domestic application of the ATS, plaintiffs must allege more domestic conduct than general corporate activity common to most corporations. View "Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe" on Justia Law