Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Alcaraz-Enriquez and Dai each appeared before an immigration judge (IJ), requesting that he not be returned to his country of origin. For Alcaraz-Enriquez, the IJ had to determine whether Alcaraz-Enriquez had committed a disqualifying “particularly serious crime” based on a California conviction. The IJ considered his probation report, which detailed a serious domestic violence incident, and Alcaraz-Enriquez’s own testimony, admitting that he hit his girlfriend, allegedly in defense of his daughter. The IJ found Alcaraz-Enriquez ineligible for relief. The BIA affirmed. Dai testified that he and his family had suffered past persecution by Chinese officials and expected future persecution upon return. Dai initially failed to disclose that his wife and daughter had returned voluntarily to China since accompanying him to the U.S. When confronted, Dai told the “real story.” The IJ denied relief. The BIA affirmed. In both cases the Ninth Circuit granted relief, noting that neither the IJ nor the BIA made an explicit “adverse credibility determination” under 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C), 1229a(c)(4)(C). The Supreme Court vacated. A reviewing court must accept administrative findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” In neither case did the Ninth Circuit consider the possibility that the BIA implicitly found the presumption of credibility rebutted. The BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision, which noted that Alcaraz-Enriquez’s story had changed, a factor the statute specifically identifies as relevant to credibility. In Dai’s case, the BIA also adopted the IJ’s decision, which discussed specific problems with Dai’s demeanor, candor, and internal inconsistency. The statute requires the noncitizen to satisfy the trier of fact on credibility, persuasiveness, and the burden of proof. Even if the BIA treats a noncitizen’s testimony as credible, the agency need not find such evidence persuasive or sufficient to meet the burden of proof. View "Garland v. Dai" on Justia Law

A class of Texas municipalities was awarded a multi-million dollar judgment against online travel companies over the calculation of hotel occupancy taxes. To prevent execution on that judgment pending appeal, the companies obtained supersedeas bonds. The Fifth Circuit determined that the companies had not underpaid their taxes. The companies sought $2.3 million in costs, primarily for premiums paid on the supersedeas bonds.Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 establishes the procedure for assessing and taxing costs relating to appeals. Subdivision (e) lists categories of “costs on appeal” that “are taxable in the district court for the benefit of the party entitled to costs under this rule,” including premiums paid for a supersedeas bond.The Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed that the district court lacked the discretion to deny or reduce those costs. Rule 39 creates a cohesive scheme for taxing appellate costs, giving discretion over the allocation of appellate costs to courts of appeals. Rule 39(a) establishes default rules for cost allocation based on the outcome of an appeal; those apply unless the court “orders otherwise.” Rule 39(a)(4) suggests that a court of appeals may apportion costs based on each party’s relative success. A determination that a party is “entitled” to a certain percentage of costs would mean little if the district court could take a second look at the equities.Limiting a district court’s discretion to allocate appellate costs will not cause confusion with the equitable discretion district courts have over certain costs incurred in the district court, customarily taxed under Rule 54(d). It makes sense for Rule 39 costs to be taxed in the district court because they relate to events in that court, which can ensure that the amount is “correct,” 28 U.S.C. 1924. View "San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L. P." on Justia Law

Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national living in the U.S, was convicted in California state court of felony DUI in 1988. Lower courts then understood that conviction to be an “aggravated felony” subjecting a noncitizen to removal, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Palomar-Santiago was removed following a hearing and a waiver of his right to appeal. In 2017, Palomar-Santiago was found in the U.S and indicted for unlawful reentry after removal. Section 1326, criminalizing unlawful reentry, provides that a collateral challenge to the underlying deportation order may proceed only if the noncitizen first demonstrates that “any administrative remedies that may have been available” were exhausted, “the opportunity for judicial review” was lacking, and “the order was fundamentally unfair.” Palomar-Santiago argued that his prior removal order was invalid in light of the 2004 “Leocal” holding, that felony DUI is not an aggravated felony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the charges.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Each of the statutory requirements of section 1326(d) is mandatory; defendants charged with unlawful reentry “may not” challenge their underlying removal orders “unless” they “demonstrat[e]” each of three conditions. The first two requirements are not satisfied just because a noncitizen was removed for an offense that should not have rendered him removable. An immigration judge’s error on the merits does not excuse the noncitizen’s failure to comply with a mandatory exhaustion requirement if further administrative review, and then judicial review if necessary, could fix that error. Section 1326(d) unambiguously forecloses Palomar-Santiago’s interpretation. View "United States v. Palomar-Santiago" on Justia Law

The Ordot Dump was constructed on Guam by the Navy in the 1940s. Both the federal government and Guam allegedly deposited waste at Ordot. A 2004 consent decree between the EPA and Guam resolved litigation concerning Clean Water Act violations.About 13 years later, Guam sued the U.S. under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601. A section 107(a) action sought recovery of the costs of a “removal or remedial action” from the government based on its ownership or operation of the site at the time of the disposal of hazardous substances. A section 113(f) action sought "contribution," alleging that Guam “has resolved its liability to the United States…for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in [a] settlement." The D. C. Circuit held that cost recovery was not available if a party could have brought a contribution action and found the contribution claim untimely under a three-year limitations period in light of the 2004 settlement.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. A settlement of environmental liabilities must resolve a CERCLA-specific liability to give rise to a section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution action. That remedial measures under different environmental statutes might functionally overlap with a CERCLA response action does not justify reinterpreting section 113(f)(3)(B)’s phrase “resolved its liability . . . for some or all of a response action” to instead mean “settled an environmental liability that might have been actionable under CERCLA.” A party may seek CERCLA contribution only after settling CERCLA-specific claims, as opposed to resolving environmental liability under another law. View "Guam v. United States" on Justia Law

During an argument with his wife, Caniglia placed a handgun on a table and asked his wife to “shoot [him] and get it over with.” His wife left and spent the night at a hotel. The next morning, unable to reach her husband by phone, she called the police to request a welfare check. Officers encountered Caniglia on the porch of his home and called an ambulance, believing that Caniglia posed a risk to himself or others. Caniglia agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation if the officers would not confiscate his firearms. After Caniglia left, the officers located and seized his weapons. Caniglia sued, claiming that the officers had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers, extrapolating from the Supreme Court’s “Cady” decision a theory that the officers’ removal of Caniglia and his firearms from his home was justified by a “community caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement.A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. Cady held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment in light of the officers’ “community caretaking functions.” Searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different; the core of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee is the right of a person to retreat into his home and “free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” View "Caniglia v. Strom" on Justia Law

IRS Notice 2016–66 requires taxpayers and “material advisors” to report information about "micro-captive" insurance agreements. The consequences for non-compliance include civil tax penalties and criminal prosecution. Before the first reporting deadline, CIC challenged the Notice as invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act and sought injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action, citing the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), which generally requires those contesting a tax’s validity to pay the tax before filing a legal challenge.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. A suit to enjoin Notice 2016–66 does not trigger the Anti-Injunction Act even though a violation may result in a tax penalty; it is not an action to restrain the “assessment or collection” of a tax, even if the information will help the IRS collect future tax revenue. CIC seeks to set aside the Notice itself, not the tax penalty that may follow its breach. CIC stands nowhere near the cusp of tax liability. The presence of criminal penalties forces CIC to bring an action in this form, with the requested relief framed in this manner. To disobey the Notice and pay the resulting penalty before suing for a refund would risk criminal punishment. Allowing CIC’s suit to proceed will not open the floodgates to pre-enforcement tax litigation. Because the IRS chose to address its concern about micro-captive agreements by imposing a reporting requirement rather than a tax, suits to enjoin that requirement are outside the Anti-Injunction Act. View "CIC Services., LLC v. Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law

In 2007, a Louisiana jury found Edwards guilty of armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping. Louisiana law then permitted non-unanimous jury verdicts if at least 10 of the 12 jurors found the defendant guilty; 11 of 12 Edwards jurors returned a guilty verdict as to some crimes, and 10 of 12 jurors returned a guilty verdict as to others. After Edwards’s conviction became final, Edwards filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The district court rejected his argument that the non-unanimous jury verdict violated his constitutional rights as foreclosed by “Apodaca.” The Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.While Edwards’s petition for a writ of certiorari was pending, the Supreme Court repudiated Apodoca and held (“Ramos”) that a state jury must be unanimous to convict a criminal defendant of a serious offense.The Supreme Court affirmed with respect to Edwards. The Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. New rules of criminal procedure apply to cases on direct review, even if the defendant’s trial has already concluded but, historically, did not apply retroactively on federal collateral review unless a new rule constituted a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure. The Supreme Court has never found that any new procedural rule actually satisfies the “watershed” exception and acknowledged that the exception is “moribund.” Continuing to articulate a theoretical exception that never actually applies "offers false hope to defendants, distorts the law, misleads judges, and wastes" resources. View "Edwards v. Vannoy" on Justia Law

Baltimore sued energy companies in Maryland state court, alleging that they concealed the environmental impacts of the fossil fuels they promoted. The companies removed the case to federal court invoking, among other grounds, the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442. The district court remanded. Although an order remanding a case to state court is ordinarily unreviewable on appeal, appellate review is available for orders “remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443,” 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) The Fourth Circuit concluded the provision authorized appellate review only for the part of a remand order deciding the section 1442 or 1443 removal ground and that it lacked jurisdiction to review the rejection of the other removal grounds.The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. The ordinary meaning of section 1447(d)’s text permits appellate review of the district court’s entire remand order when a defendant relies on section 1442 or 1443 as a ground for removal. It makes no difference that the defendants removed the case “pursuant to” multiple federal statutes. Section 1447(d) contains no language limiting appellate review to cases removed solely under 1442 or 1443. The Court focused on the statute’s use of the word “order.” Allowing full appellate review may actually help expedite some cases. Baltimore’s contention that this reading of 1447(d) will invite defendants to frivolously add 1442 or 1443 to their other grounds for removal has already been addressed by other statutes and rules, which provide for sanctions. View "BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Nonpermanent resident aliens ordered removed from the U.S. may obtain discretionary relief if, among other things, they can establish their continuous presence in the country for at least 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). The “stop-time rule” included in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) provides that the period of continuous presence “shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear” in removal proceedings; “notice to appear” is defined as “written notice . . . specifying” certain information, such as the charges and the time and place at which the removal proceedings will be held. A notice that omits any required information does not trigger the stop-time rule.The government ordered the removal of Niz-Chavez and sent him a document containing the charges against him. Weeks later, it sent another document, providing the time and place of his hearing. The government argued that because the documents collectively specified all statutorily required information for “a notice to appear,” Niz-Chavez’s continuous presence in the country stopped when he was served with the second document.The Supreme Court held that a notice to appear sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule is a single document containing all the information about an individual’s removal hearing specified in section 1229(a)(1). In addition to the statute’s use of the article, “a” and the singular noun, “notice,” its structure and history support requiring the government to issue a single notice containing all the required information. Administrative inconvenience never justifies departing from a statute’s clear text. View "Niz-Chavez v. Garland" on Justia Law

An Alaska jury convicted Wright of 13 counts of sexual abuse of a minor. Wright finished serving his sentence and moved to Tennessee. Once there, he failed to register as a sex offender as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. 20913. Wright pleaded guilty to failure to register and received a sentence of time served plus supervised release. During those federal proceedings, Wright filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Alaska under 28 U.S.C. 2241 and 2254, arguing that the Alaska Supreme Court had unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when it denied his Sixth Amendment claims and affirmed his 2009 state conviction and sentence. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that Wright was not in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Wright’s state conviction was “ ‘a necessary predicate’ ” to his federal conviction. The Supreme Court vacated. Section 2254(a) permits a federal court to entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” A habeas petitioner does not remain “in custody” under a conviction “after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because of the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes.” That Wright’s state conviction served as a predicate for his federal conviction did not render him “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” If Wright’s second conviction had been for a state crime, he independently could have satisfied section 2254(a)’s “in custody” requirement, though his ability to attack the first conviction would have been limited. View "Alaska v. Wright" on Justia Law