Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Former Georgia police sergeant Van Buren used his credentials on a patrol-car computer to access a law enforcement database to retrieve license plate information in exchange for money. His conduct violated a department policy against obtaining database information for non-law-enforcement purposes. The Eleventh Circuit upheld Van Buren's conviction for a felony violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA), which covers anyone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,” 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2), defined to mean “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”The Supreme Court reversed. An individual “exceeds authorized access” when he accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains information located in particular areas of the computer (files, folders, databases) that are off-limits to him. Van Buren “access[ed] a computer with authorization” and “obtain[ed] . . . information in the computer.” The phrase “is not entitled so to obtain” refers to information one is not allowed to obtain by using a computer that he is authorized to access.“Without authorization” protects computers themselves from outside hackers; the “exceeds authorized access” clause protects certain information within computers from "inside hackers." One either can or cannot access a computer system, and one either can or cannot access certain areas within the system. The Act’s precursor to the “exceeds authorized access” language covered any person who, “having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend.” Congress removed any reference to “purpose” in the CFAA. On the government’s reading, an employee who sends a personal e-mail or reads the news using a work computer may have violated the CFAA. View "Van Buren v. United States" on Justia Law

Crow Police Officer Saylor approached a truck parked on U.S. Highway 212, a public right-of-way within the Crow Reservation in Montana. Saylor observed that the driver, Cooley, appeared to be non-native and had watery, bloodshot eyes. Saylor saw two semi-automatic rifles, a glass pipe, and a plastic bag that contained methamphetamine. Additional officers, including an officer with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, arrived. Saylor was directed to seize all contraband in plain view, leading Saylor to discover more methamphetamine. Cooley, charged with drug and gun offenses, successfully moved to suppress the drug evidence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court vacated. Tribal police officers have authority to detain temporarily and to search non-Indian persons traveling on public rights-of-way running through a reservation for potential violations of state or federal law; they are not required to first determine whether a suspect is non-Indian and, if so, to temporarily detain a non-Indian only for “apparent” legal violations. Generally, the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe, but a tribe retains inherent authority over the conduct of non-Indians on the reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the health or welfare of the tribe. When the jurisdiction to try and punish an offender rests outside the tribe, tribal officers may exercise their power to detain the offender and transport him to the proper authorities; the authority to search that individual before transport is ancillary to that authority. View "United States v. Cooley" on Justia Law

Alcaraz-Enriquez and Dai each appeared before an immigration judge (IJ), requesting that he not be returned to his country of origin. For Alcaraz-Enriquez, the IJ had to determine whether Alcaraz-Enriquez had committed a disqualifying “particularly serious crime” based on a California conviction. The IJ considered his probation report, which detailed a serious domestic violence incident, and Alcaraz-Enriquez’s own testimony, admitting that he hit his girlfriend, allegedly in defense of his daughter. The IJ found Alcaraz-Enriquez ineligible for relief. The BIA affirmed. Dai testified that he and his family had suffered past persecution by Chinese officials and expected future persecution upon return. Dai initially failed to disclose that his wife and daughter had returned voluntarily to China since accompanying him to the U.S. When confronted, Dai told the “real story.” The IJ denied relief. The BIA affirmed. In both cases the Ninth Circuit granted relief, noting that neither the IJ nor the BIA made an explicit “adverse credibility determination” under 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C), 1229a(c)(4)(C). The Supreme Court vacated. A reviewing court must accept administrative findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” In neither case did the Ninth Circuit consider the possibility that the BIA implicitly found the presumption of credibility rebutted. The BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision, which noted that Alcaraz-Enriquez’s story had changed, a factor the statute specifically identifies as relevant to credibility. In Dai’s case, the BIA also adopted the IJ’s decision, which discussed specific problems with Dai’s demeanor, candor, and internal inconsistency. The statute requires the noncitizen to satisfy the trier of fact on credibility, persuasiveness, and the burden of proof. Even if the BIA treats a noncitizen’s testimony as credible, the agency need not find such evidence persuasive or sufficient to meet the burden of proof. View "Garland v. Dai" on Justia Law

A class of Texas municipalities was awarded a multi-million dollar judgment against online travel companies over the calculation of hotel occupancy taxes. To prevent execution on that judgment pending appeal, the companies obtained supersedeas bonds. The Fifth Circuit determined that the companies had not underpaid their taxes. The companies sought $2.3 million in costs, primarily for premiums paid on the supersedeas bonds.Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 establishes the procedure for assessing and taxing costs relating to appeals. Subdivision (e) lists categories of “costs on appeal” that “are taxable in the district court for the benefit of the party entitled to costs under this rule,” including premiums paid for a supersedeas bond.The Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed that the district court lacked the discretion to deny or reduce those costs. Rule 39 creates a cohesive scheme for taxing appellate costs, giving discretion over the allocation of appellate costs to courts of appeals. Rule 39(a) establishes default rules for cost allocation based on the outcome of an appeal; those apply unless the court “orders otherwise.” Rule 39(a)(4) suggests that a court of appeals may apportion costs based on each party’s relative success. A determination that a party is “entitled” to a certain percentage of costs would mean little if the district court could take a second look at the equities.Limiting a district court’s discretion to allocate appellate costs will not cause confusion with the equitable discretion district courts have over certain costs incurred in the district court, customarily taxed under Rule 54(d). It makes sense for Rule 39 costs to be taxed in the district court because they relate to events in that court, which can ensure that the amount is “correct,” 28 U.S.C. 1924. View "San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L. P." on Justia Law

Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national living in the U.S, was convicted in California state court of felony DUI in 1988. Lower courts then understood that conviction to be an “aggravated felony” subjecting a noncitizen to removal, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Palomar-Santiago was removed following a hearing and a waiver of his right to appeal. In 2017, Palomar-Santiago was found in the U.S and indicted for unlawful reentry after removal. Section 1326, criminalizing unlawful reentry, provides that a collateral challenge to the underlying deportation order may proceed only if the noncitizen first demonstrates that “any administrative remedies that may have been available” were exhausted, “the opportunity for judicial review” was lacking, and “the order was fundamentally unfair.” Palomar-Santiago argued that his prior removal order was invalid in light of the 2004 “Leocal” holding, that felony DUI is not an aggravated felony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the charges.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Each of the statutory requirements of section 1326(d) is mandatory; defendants charged with unlawful reentry “may not” challenge their underlying removal orders “unless” they “demonstrat[e]” each of three conditions. The first two requirements are not satisfied just because a noncitizen was removed for an offense that should not have rendered him removable. An immigration judge’s error on the merits does not excuse the noncitizen’s failure to comply with a mandatory exhaustion requirement if further administrative review, and then judicial review if necessary, could fix that error. Section 1326(d) unambiguously forecloses Palomar-Santiago’s interpretation. View "United States v. Palomar-Santiago" on Justia Law

The Ordot Dump was constructed on Guam by the Navy in the 1940s. Both the federal government and Guam allegedly deposited waste at Ordot. A 2004 consent decree between the EPA and Guam resolved litigation concerning Clean Water Act violations.About 13 years later, Guam sued the U.S. under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601. A section 107(a) action sought recovery of the costs of a “removal or remedial action” from the government based on its ownership or operation of the site at the time of the disposal of hazardous substances. A section 113(f) action sought "contribution," alleging that Guam “has resolved its liability to the United States…for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in [a] settlement." The D. C. Circuit held that cost recovery was not available if a party could have brought a contribution action and found the contribution claim untimely under a three-year limitations period in light of the 2004 settlement.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. A settlement of environmental liabilities must resolve a CERCLA-specific liability to give rise to a section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution action. That remedial measures under different environmental statutes might functionally overlap with a CERCLA response action does not justify reinterpreting section 113(f)(3)(B)’s phrase “resolved its liability . . . for some or all of a response action” to instead mean “settled an environmental liability that might have been actionable under CERCLA.” A party may seek CERCLA contribution only after settling CERCLA-specific claims, as opposed to resolving environmental liability under another law. View "Guam v. United States" on Justia Law

During an argument with his wife, Caniglia placed a handgun on a table and asked his wife to “shoot [him] and get it over with.” His wife left and spent the night at a hotel. The next morning, unable to reach her husband by phone, she called the police to request a welfare check. Officers encountered Caniglia on the porch of his home and called an ambulance, believing that Caniglia posed a risk to himself or others. Caniglia agreed to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation if the officers would not confiscate his firearms. After Caniglia left, the officers located and seized his weapons. Caniglia sued, claiming that the officers had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers, extrapolating from the Supreme Court’s “Cady” decision a theory that the officers’ removal of Caniglia and his firearms from his home was justified by a “community caretaking exception” to the warrant requirement.A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. Cady held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment in light of the officers’ “community caretaking functions.” Searches of vehicles and homes are constitutionally different; the core of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee is the right of a person to retreat into his home and “free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” View "Caniglia v. Strom" on Justia Law

IRS Notice 2016–66 requires taxpayers and “material advisors” to report information about "micro-captive" insurance agreements. The consequences for non-compliance include civil tax penalties and criminal prosecution. Before the first reporting deadline, CIC challenged the Notice as invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act and sought injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action, citing the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), which generally requires those contesting a tax’s validity to pay the tax before filing a legal challenge.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. A suit to enjoin Notice 2016–66 does not trigger the Anti-Injunction Act even though a violation may result in a tax penalty; it is not an action to restrain the “assessment or collection” of a tax, even if the information will help the IRS collect future tax revenue. CIC seeks to set aside the Notice itself, not the tax penalty that may follow its breach. CIC stands nowhere near the cusp of tax liability. The presence of criminal penalties forces CIC to bring an action in this form, with the requested relief framed in this manner. To disobey the Notice and pay the resulting penalty before suing for a refund would risk criminal punishment. Allowing CIC’s suit to proceed will not open the floodgates to pre-enforcement tax litigation. Because the IRS chose to address its concern about micro-captive agreements by imposing a reporting requirement rather than a tax, suits to enjoin that requirement are outside the Anti-Injunction Act. View "CIC Services., LLC v. Internal Revenue Service" on Justia Law

In 2007, a Louisiana jury found Edwards guilty of armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping. Louisiana law then permitted non-unanimous jury verdicts if at least 10 of the 12 jurors found the defendant guilty; 11 of 12 Edwards jurors returned a guilty verdict as to some crimes, and 10 of 12 jurors returned a guilty verdict as to others. After Edwards’s conviction became final, Edwards filed a federal habeas corpus petition. The district court rejected his argument that the non-unanimous jury verdict violated his constitutional rights as foreclosed by “Apodaca.” The Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability.While Edwards’s petition for a writ of certiorari was pending, the Supreme Court repudiated Apodoca and held (“Ramos”) that a state jury must be unanimous to convict a criminal defendant of a serious offense.The Supreme Court affirmed with respect to Edwards. The Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. New rules of criminal procedure apply to cases on direct review, even if the defendant’s trial has already concluded but, historically, did not apply retroactively on federal collateral review unless a new rule constituted a “watershed” rule of criminal procedure. The Supreme Court has never found that any new procedural rule actually satisfies the “watershed” exception and acknowledged that the exception is “moribund.” Continuing to articulate a theoretical exception that never actually applies "offers false hope to defendants, distorts the law, misleads judges, and wastes" resources. View "Edwards v. Vannoy" on Justia Law

Baltimore sued energy companies in Maryland state court, alleging that they concealed the environmental impacts of the fossil fuels they promoted. The companies removed the case to federal court invoking, among other grounds, the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442. The district court remanded. Although an order remanding a case to state court is ordinarily unreviewable on appeal, appellate review is available for orders “remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443,” 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) The Fourth Circuit concluded the provision authorized appellate review only for the part of a remand order deciding the section 1442 or 1443 removal ground and that it lacked jurisdiction to review the rejection of the other removal grounds.The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. The ordinary meaning of section 1447(d)’s text permits appellate review of the district court’s entire remand order when a defendant relies on section 1442 or 1443 as a ground for removal. It makes no difference that the defendants removed the case “pursuant to” multiple federal statutes. Section 1447(d) contains no language limiting appellate review to cases removed solely under 1442 or 1443. The Court focused on the statute’s use of the word “order.” Allowing full appellate review may actually help expedite some cases. Baltimore’s contention that this reading of 1447(d) will invite defendants to frivolously add 1442 or 1443 to their other grounds for removal has already been addressed by other statutes and rules, which provide for sanctions. View "BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law