Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Philadelphia contracts with private agencies, which certify prospective foster families under state criteria. Based on its religious beliefs, Catholic Social Services (CSS) will not certify unmarried couples or same-sex married couples. Other Philadelphia agencies will certify same-sex couples. No same-sex couple sought certification from CSS. Philadelphia informed CSS that unless it agreed to certify same-sex couples it would no longer refer children to the agency, citing a non-discrimination provision in the agency’s contract and its Fair Practices Ordinance. CSS filed suit. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of preliminary relief.The Supreme Court reversed. The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS unless CSS agrees to certify same-sex couples violates the Free Exercise Clause by requiring CSS either to curtail its mission or to certify same-sex couples in violation of its religious beliefs. Philadelphia's policies are neither neutral nor generally applicable so they are subject to strict scrutiny. The contract's non-discrimination requirement is not generally applicable; it permits exceptions at the “sole discretion” of the Commissioner. The Ordinance forbids interfering with the public accommodations opportunities of an individual based on sexual orientation, defining a public accommodation to include a provider “whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.” Certification as a foster parent is not readily accessible to the public; the process involves a customized assessment that bears little resemblance to staying in a hotel or riding a bus.A government policy can survive strict scrutiny only if it advances compelling interests and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. Philadelphia has no compelling interest in denying CSS an exception to allow it to continue serving Philadelphia's children consistent with its religious beliefs; it does not seek to impose those beliefs on anyone. View "Fulton v. Philadelphia" on Justia Law

In its 2019 “Rehaif” decision, the Supreme Court clarified that for 18 U.S.C. 922(g) firearms-possession offenses, the prosecution must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. Before Rehaif, the petitioners were convicted under section 922(g)(1). The Eleventh Circuit rejected Greer's request for a new trial based on the court’s failure to instruct the jury that Greer had to know he was a felon to be found guilty. The Fourth Circuit agreed that Gary's guilty plea must be vacated because the court failed to advise him that, if he went to trial, a jury would have to find that he knew he was a felon.The Supreme Court affirmed Greer's conviction and reversed as to Gary. A Rehaif error is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant makes a sufficient argument that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not know he was a felon. A defendant who has “an opportunity to object” to an alleged error and fails to do so forfeits the claim of error. If a defendant later raises the forfeited claim, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)’s plain-error standard applies. Rehaif errors occurred during the underlying proceedings and the errors were plain but Greer must show that, if the court had correctly instructed the jury, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would have been acquitted; Gary must show that, if the court had correctly advised him, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would not have pled guilty. They have not carried that burden. Both had multiple prior felony convictions. The Court rejected arguments that Rehaif errors are “structural” and require automatic vacatur. View "Greer v. United States" on Justia Law

The 1986 mandatory-minimum penalties for possession with intent to distribute cocaine were based on drug quantity: a five-year mandatory minimum was triggered by either five grams of crack cocaine or 500 grams of powder cocaine; a 10-year mandatory minimum was triggered by either 50 grams of crack or five kilograms of powder. In 2008, Terry pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of crack. The district court determined that his offense involved about four grams of crack and sentenced Terry, as a career offender, to 188 months' imprisonment. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 subsequently increased the crack quantity thresholds from five grams to 28 for the five-year mandatory minimum and to 280 grams for the 10-year mandatory minimum. The change became retroactive in the 2018 First Step Act.The Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Terry’s motion for resentencing. An offender is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act only if convicted of a crack offense that triggered a mandatory minimum sentence. The Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties for offenses that triggered mandatory minimum penalties because a person charged with the same conduct today no longer would face the same statutory penalties that they would have faced before 2010; the Act did not modify the statutory penalties for Terry’s offense. Before 2010, a person charged with Terry’s offense—knowing or intentional possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of a schedule I or II drug—was subject to statutory penalties of imprisonment of 0-to-20 years. After 2010, a person charged with this conduct is subject to the same statutory penalties. View "Terry v. United States" on Justia Law

Borden pleaded guilty as a felon-in-possession. The prosecution sought an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for persons found guilty of illegally possessing a firearm who have three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony.” An offense qualifies as a violent felony under ACCA’s elements clause if it necessarily involves “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). One of Borden’s three predicate convictions was for reckless aggravated assault in violation of Tennessee law. Borden argued that this offense was not a violent felony under ACCA’s elements clause because a mental state of recklessness suffices for conviction and only purposeful or knowing conduct satisfies the requirement of the use of force “against the person of another.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed his enhanced sentence.The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, with four Justices concluding that a criminal offense with a mens rea of recklessness does not qualify as a “violent felony” under ACCA’s elements clause. The Justices found that the narrow “category of violent, active crimes” is best understood to involve a purposeful or knowing mental state—a deliberate choice of wreaking harm on another, rather than mere indifference to risk. Classifying reckless crimes as “violent felonies” would also conflict with ACCA’s purpose of addressing the special danger created when a particular type of offender, a violent criminal, possesses a gun. The “against” clause is not window dressing: It is the “critical” text for deciding the level of mens rea needed. View "Borden v. United States" on Justia Law

Sanchez, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. unlawfully in 1997 and obtained Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in 2001. TPS allows foreign nationals from countries designated by the government as having unusually bad or dangerous conditions to temporarily live and work in the U.S. In 2014, Sanchez unsuccessfully applied under 8 U.S.C. 1255 to obtain lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. Section 1255 provides a way for a “nonimmigrant”—a foreign national lawfully present in this country on a temporary basis—to obtain adjustment of status to LPR. The Third Circuit agreed that Sanchez’s unlawful entry precluded his eligibility for LPR status under section 1255, notwithstanding his TPS.A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. Section 1255 provides that eligibility for LPR status generally requires an “admission,” the lawful entry of the alien into the U.S. after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. Sanchez did not enter lawfully and his TPS does not eliminate the effect of that unlawful entry. Section 1254a(f)(4) provides that a TPS recipient who applies for permanent residency will be treated as having nonimmigrant status, the status traditionally and generally needed to invoke the section 1255 LPR process, but that provision does not address 1255’s separate admission requirement. Lawful status and admission are distinct concepts and establishing the former does not establish the latter. There are immigration categories in which individuals have nonimmigrant status without admission, so when Congress confers nonimmigrant status for purposes of 1255, but says nothing about admission, the Court has no basis for finding an unlawful entrant eligible to become an LPR. View "Sanchez v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Former Georgia police sergeant Van Buren used his credentials on a patrol-car computer to access a law enforcement database to retrieve license plate information in exchange for money. His conduct violated a department policy against obtaining database information for non-law-enforcement purposes. The Eleventh Circuit upheld Van Buren's conviction for a felony violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFAA), which covers anyone who “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,” 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2), defined to mean “to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”The Supreme Court reversed. An individual “exceeds authorized access” when he accesses a computer with authorization but then obtains information located in particular areas of the computer (files, folders, databases) that are off-limits to him. Van Buren “access[ed] a computer with authorization” and “obtain[ed] . . . information in the computer.” The phrase “is not entitled so to obtain” refers to information one is not allowed to obtain by using a computer that he is authorized to access.“Without authorization” protects computers themselves from outside hackers; the “exceeds authorized access” clause protects certain information within computers from "inside hackers." One either can or cannot access a computer system, and one either can or cannot access certain areas within the system. The Act’s precursor to the “exceeds authorized access” language covered any person who, “having accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend.” Congress removed any reference to “purpose” in the CFAA. On the government’s reading, an employee who sends a personal e-mail or reads the news using a work computer may have violated the CFAA. View "Van Buren v. United States" on Justia Law

Crow Police Officer Saylor approached a truck parked on U.S. Highway 212, a public right-of-way within the Crow Reservation in Montana. Saylor observed that the driver, Cooley, appeared to be non-native and had watery, bloodshot eyes. Saylor saw two semi-automatic rifles, a glass pipe, and a plastic bag that contained methamphetamine. Additional officers, including an officer with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, arrived. Saylor was directed to seize all contraband in plain view, leading Saylor to discover more methamphetamine. Cooley, charged with drug and gun offenses, successfully moved to suppress the drug evidence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court vacated. Tribal police officers have authority to detain temporarily and to search non-Indian persons traveling on public rights-of-way running through a reservation for potential violations of state or federal law; they are not required to first determine whether a suspect is non-Indian and, if so, to temporarily detain a non-Indian only for “apparent” legal violations. Generally, the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe, but a tribe retains inherent authority over the conduct of non-Indians on the reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the health or welfare of the tribe. When the jurisdiction to try and punish an offender rests outside the tribe, tribal officers may exercise their power to detain the offender and transport him to the proper authorities; the authority to search that individual before transport is ancillary to that authority. View "United States v. Cooley" on Justia Law

Alcaraz-Enriquez and Dai each appeared before an immigration judge (IJ), requesting that he not be returned to his country of origin. For Alcaraz-Enriquez, the IJ had to determine whether Alcaraz-Enriquez had committed a disqualifying “particularly serious crime” based on a California conviction. The IJ considered his probation report, which detailed a serious domestic violence incident, and Alcaraz-Enriquez’s own testimony, admitting that he hit his girlfriend, allegedly in defense of his daughter. The IJ found Alcaraz-Enriquez ineligible for relief. The BIA affirmed. Dai testified that he and his family had suffered past persecution by Chinese officials and expected future persecution upon return. Dai initially failed to disclose that his wife and daughter had returned voluntarily to China since accompanying him to the U.S. When confronted, Dai told the “real story.” The IJ denied relief. The BIA affirmed. In both cases the Ninth Circuit granted relief, noting that neither the IJ nor the BIA made an explicit “adverse credibility determination” under 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), 1231(b)(3)(C), 1229a(c)(4)(C). The Supreme Court vacated. A reviewing court must accept administrative findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” In neither case did the Ninth Circuit consider the possibility that the BIA implicitly found the presumption of credibility rebutted. The BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision, which noted that Alcaraz-Enriquez’s story had changed, a factor the statute specifically identifies as relevant to credibility. In Dai’s case, the BIA also adopted the IJ’s decision, which discussed specific problems with Dai’s demeanor, candor, and internal inconsistency. The statute requires the noncitizen to satisfy the trier of fact on credibility, persuasiveness, and the burden of proof. Even if the BIA treats a noncitizen’s testimony as credible, the agency need not find such evidence persuasive or sufficient to meet the burden of proof. View "Garland v. Dai" on Justia Law

A class of Texas municipalities was awarded a multi-million dollar judgment against online travel companies over the calculation of hotel occupancy taxes. To prevent execution on that judgment pending appeal, the companies obtained supersedeas bonds. The Fifth Circuit determined that the companies had not underpaid their taxes. The companies sought $2.3 million in costs, primarily for premiums paid on the supersedeas bonds.Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 establishes the procedure for assessing and taxing costs relating to appeals. Subdivision (e) lists categories of “costs on appeal” that “are taxable in the district court for the benefit of the party entitled to costs under this rule,” including premiums paid for a supersedeas bond.The Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed that the district court lacked the discretion to deny or reduce those costs. Rule 39 creates a cohesive scheme for taxing appellate costs, giving discretion over the allocation of appellate costs to courts of appeals. Rule 39(a) establishes default rules for cost allocation based on the outcome of an appeal; those apply unless the court “orders otherwise.” Rule 39(a)(4) suggests that a court of appeals may apportion costs based on each party’s relative success. A determination that a party is “entitled” to a certain percentage of costs would mean little if the district court could take a second look at the equities.Limiting a district court’s discretion to allocate appellate costs will not cause confusion with the equitable discretion district courts have over certain costs incurred in the district court, customarily taxed under Rule 54(d). It makes sense for Rule 39 costs to be taxed in the district court because they relate to events in that court, which can ensure that the amount is “correct,” 28 U.S.C. 1924. View "San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L. P." on Justia Law

Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national living in the U.S, was convicted in California state court of felony DUI in 1988. Lower courts then understood that conviction to be an “aggravated felony” subjecting a noncitizen to removal, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Palomar-Santiago was removed following a hearing and a waiver of his right to appeal. In 2017, Palomar-Santiago was found in the U.S and indicted for unlawful reentry after removal. Section 1326, criminalizing unlawful reentry, provides that a collateral challenge to the underlying deportation order may proceed only if the noncitizen first demonstrates that “any administrative remedies that may have been available” were exhausted, “the opportunity for judicial review” was lacking, and “the order was fundamentally unfair.” Palomar-Santiago argued that his prior removal order was invalid in light of the 2004 “Leocal” holding, that felony DUI is not an aggravated felony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the charges.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Each of the statutory requirements of section 1326(d) is mandatory; defendants charged with unlawful reentry “may not” challenge their underlying removal orders “unless” they “demonstrat[e]” each of three conditions. The first two requirements are not satisfied just because a noncitizen was removed for an offense that should not have rendered him removable. An immigration judge’s error on the merits does not excuse the noncitizen’s failure to comply with a mandatory exhaustion requirement if further administrative review, and then judicial review if necessary, could fix that error. Section 1326(d) unambiguously forecloses Palomar-Santiago’s interpretation. View "United States v. Palomar-Santiago" on Justia Law