Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, specifically 18 U.S.C. §1512(c)(2), which imposes criminal liability on anyone who corruptly obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so. The petitioner, Joseph Fischer, was charged with violating this provision for his actions during the Capitol breach on January 6, 2021. Fischer moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the provision only criminalizes attempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence. The District Court granted his motion, but a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the United States held that to prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so. The Court reasoned that the "otherwise" provision of §1512(c)(2) is limited by the list of specific criminal violations that precede it in (c)(1). The Court also considered the broader context of §1512 in the criminal code and found that an unbounded interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would render superfluous the careful delineation of different types of obstructive conduct in §1512 itself. The Court vacated the judgment of the D.C. Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Fischer v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and investment adviser George Jarkesy, Jr., and his firm, Patriot28, LLC. The SEC initiated an enforcement action for civil penalties against Jarkesy and Patriot28 for alleged violations of the "antifraud provisions" contained in the federal securities laws. The SEC opted to adjudicate the matter in-house. The final order determined that Jarkesy and Patriot28 had committed securities violations and levied a civil penalty of $300,000. Jarkesy and Patriot28 petitioned for judicial review. The Fifth Circuit vacated the order on the ground that adjudicating the matter in-house violated the defendants’ Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the in-house adjudication by the SEC violated the defendants' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The court applied a two-part test from Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, determining that the SEC's antifraud claims were akin to traditional actions at common law, and thus required a jury trial. The court also concluded that the "public rights" exception did not apply, as the claims were not closely intertwined with the bankruptcy process.The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Court held that when the SEC seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial. The Court found that the SEC's antifraud provisions replicate common law fraud, and thus implicate the Seventh Amendment. The Court also concluded that the "public rights" exception to Article III jurisdiction did not apply, as the action did not fall within any of the distinctive areas involving governmental prerogatives where a matter may be resolved outside of an Article III court, without a jury. The Court did not reach the remaining constitutional issues and affirmed the ruling of the Fifth Circuit on the Seventh Amendment ground alone. View "SEC v. Jarkesy" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Macquarie Infrastructure Corporation and its subsidiary's business of storing liquid commodities, including No. 6 fuel oil. In 2016, the United Nations' International Maritime Organization adopted a regulation, IMO 2020, which capped the sulfur content of fuel oil used in shipping at 0.5% by 2020. No. 6 fuel oil typically has a sulfur content closer to 3%. Macquarie did not discuss IMO 2020 in its public offering documents. In 2018, Macquarie announced a drop in the amount of storage capacity contracted for use by its subsidiary's customers, partly due to the decline in the No. 6 fuel oil market, leading to a 41% fall in Macquarie's stock price.Moab Partners, L.P. sued Macquarie and various officer defendants, alleging a violation of §10(b) and Rule 10b–5. Moab argued that Macquarie's public statements were misleading as it concealed the impact of IMO 2020 on its subsidiary's business. The District Court dismissed Moab's complaint, but the Second Circuit reversed the decision, stating that Macquarie had a duty to disclose under Item 303 and that its violation could sustain Moab’s §10(b) and Rule 10b–5 claim.The Supreme Court of the United States held that the failure to disclose information required by Item 303 cannot support a private action under Rule 10b–5(b) if the failure does not render any "statements made" misleading. The Court clarified that Rule 10b–5(b) does not proscribe pure omissions, but only covers half-truths. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L. P." on Justia Law

Trevor Murray worked as a research strategist at UBS, a securities firm. His job involved reporting on commercial mortgage-backed securities markets to current and future customers. Under SEC regulations, Murray was required to certify that his reports were produced independently and reflected his own views. When two leaders of the CMBS trading desk pressured him to make his reports more supportive of their business strategies, Murray told his supervisor about it. The supervisor told Murray not to alienate the trading desk and to write what the business line wanted. He eventually recommended that Murray be removed from his position, despite having recently given him a strong performance review. When the CMBS trading desk did not accept Murray as a transfer, he was fired.Murray argued that he was terminated in violation of the whistleblower protection provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because UBS fired him in response to his internal reporting about fraud on shareholders. He prevailed at trial, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the jury’s verdict and remanded for a new trial. It found that the whistleblower protection provision requires an employee to prove retaliatory intent, which a clarifying jury instruction had not properly indicated.The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, instead agreeing with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that the whistleblower protection provision does not impose this type of requirement. The Court acknowledged that a whistleblower must prove that his protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action against him, but it noted that the text of the statute does not include or refer to a requirement of proving retaliatory intent, which it treated as similar to “animus.” The Court noted that the statute contains a burden-shifting framework, requiring the whistleblower to show that their protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action, after which the employer must show that it would have taken the same action anyway. It found that a requirement of proving retaliatory intent would be incompatible with the burden-shifting framework. View "Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC" on Justia Law

Slack, a technology company, conducted a direct listing to sell its shares to the public on the New York Stock Exchange. Pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, Slack filed a registration statement, containing information about its business and financial health, with the SEC, 15 U.S.C. 77, for a specified number of shares. Under the direct listing process, holders of preexisting unregistered shares were free to sell them to the public immediately. Slack’s direct listing offered 118 million registered shares and 165 million unregistered shares. Pirani bought 250,000 Slack shares. When the stock price dropped, Pirani filed a class action alleging violations of the Act, Section 11, by filing a materially misleading registration statement. Slack argued that Pirani had not alleged that he purchased shares traceable to the allegedly misleading registration statement, leaving open the possibility that he purchased shares unconnected to the registration statement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Section 11 requires a plaintiff to plead and prove that he purchased securities registered under a materially misleading registration statement. It authorizes an individual to sue for a material misstatement or omission in a registration statement when the individual has acquired “such security.” Contextual clues indicate that section 11(a) liability extends only to shares that are traceable to an allegedly defective registration, not “other securities that bear some sort of minimal relationship to a defective registration statement.” View "Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a securities-fraud class action alleging that Goldman violated securities laws prohibiting material misrepresentations and omissions in connection with the sale of securities, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b); 17 CFR 240.10b–5, and maintained an artificially inflated stock price by repeatedly making false and misleading generic statements about its ability to manage conflicts. Seeking to certify a class of Goldman shareholders, Plaintiffs invoked the “basic presumption” that investors rely on the market price of a company’s security, which in an efficient market will reflect all of the company’s public statements, including misrepresentations. The Second Circuit affirmed certification of the class.The Supreme Court vacated. The generic nature of a misrepresentation often is important evidence of price impact that courts should consider at class certification, including in inflation-maintenance cases, although the same evidence may be relevant to materiality, an inquiry reserved for the merits phase of a securities-fraud class action. The Second Circuit’s opinion leaves doubt as to whether it properly considered the generic nature of Goldman’s alleged misrepresentations. Defendants bear the burden of persuasion to prove a lack of price impact by a preponderance of the evidence at class certification and may rebut the presumption of reliance if they “show that the misrepresentation in fact did not lead to a distortion of price.” A defendant must do more than produce some evidence relevant to price impact and must “in fact” “seve[r] the link” between a misrepresentation and the price paid by the plaintiff. Assigning defendants the burden of persuasion to prove a lack of price impact by a preponderance of the evidence will be outcome-determinative only in the rare case in which the evidence is in perfect equipoise. View "Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System" on Justia Law

Petitioners solicited foreign nationals to invest in a cancer-treatment center. A Securities and Exchange Commission investigation revealed they misappropriated the funds. The SEC may seek “equitable relief” in civil proceedings, 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(5). The SEC brought a civil action for disgorgement equal to the amount raised from investors. Petitioners argued that the remedy failed to account for their legitimate business expenses. The Ninth Circuit affirmed an order holding Petitioners jointly and severally liable for the full amount.The Supreme Court vacated A disgorgement award that does not exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits and is awarded for victims is equitable relief authorized under section 78u(d)(5). Equity practice has long authorized courts to strip wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains; to avoid transforming that remedy into a punitive sanction, courts restrict it to an individual wrongdoer’s net profits to be awarded for victims. These long-standing equitable principles were incorporated into section 78u(d)(5).If on remand the court orders the deposit of the profits with the Treasury, the court should evaluate whether that order would be for the benefit of investors, consistent with equitable principles. Imposing disgorgement liability on a wrongdoer for benefits that accrue to his affiliates through joint-and-several liability runs against the rule in favor of holding defendants individually liable but the common law permitted liability for partners engaged in concerted wrongdoing. On remand, the court may determine whether Petitioners can, consistent with equitable principles, be found liable for profits as partners in wrongdoing or whether individual liability is required. The court must deduct legitimate expenses before awarding disgorgement. View "Liu v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Supreme Court held that a claim for breach of the duty of prudence imposed on plan fiduciaries by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) on the basis of inside information, must plausibly allege an alternative action that would have been consistent with securities laws and that a prudent fiduciary would not have viewed as more likely to harm the fund than to help it. The ERISA duty of prudence does not require a fiduciary to break the law and cannot require the fiduciary of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) “to perform an action—such as divesting the fund’s holdings of the employer’s stock on the basis of inside information—that would violate the securities laws.”In 2018, the Second Circuit reinstated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA brought by participants in IBM’s 401(k) plan who suffered losses from their investment in IBM stock. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, characterizing the question as what it takes to plausibly allege an alternative action “that a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have viewed as more likely to harm the fund than to help it” and whether that pleading standard can be satisfied by generalized allegations that the harm of an inevitable disclosure of an alleged fraud generally increases over time.” The Court concluded that the Second Circuit did not address those questions and noted that the views of the Securities and Exchange Commission might “well be relevant” to discerning the content of ERISA’s duty of prudence in this context. View "Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander" on Justia Law

SEC Rule 10b–5 makes it unlawful to (a) “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” (b) “make any untrue statement of a material fact,” or (c) “engage in any act, practice, or course of business” that “operates . . . as a fraud or deceit” in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. The Supreme Court has held that to be a “maker” of a statement under subsection (b), one must have “ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.” Lorenzo, a brokerage firm's director of investment banking, sent e-mails to prospective investors. The content, supplied by Lorenzo’s boss, described a potential investment in a company with “confirmed assets” of $10 million. Lorenzo knew that the company had recently disclosed that its total assets were worth less than $400,000. The SEC found that Lorenzo had violated Rule 10b–5, 17 CFR 240.10b–5; section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b); and section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a)(1).The Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit in holding that Lorenzo could not be held liable as a “maker” under Rule 10b-5(b) but affirmed with respect to subsections (a) and (c) and statutory sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1). Dissemination of false or misleading statements with intent to defraud can fall within the scope of Rules 10b–5(a) and (c), and the statutory provisions, even if the disseminator did not “make” the statements under Rule 10b–5(b). By sending e-mails he understood to contain material untruths, Lorenzo “employ[ed]” a “device,” “scheme,” and “artifice to defraud” under subsection (a) and section 17(a)(1); he “engage[d] in a[n] act, practice, or course of business” that “operate[d] . . . as a fraud or deceit” under subsection (c). There is considerable overlap among the Rule's subsections and related statutory provisions. The "plainly fraudulent behavior" at issue might otherwise fall outside the Rule’s scope. The Court rejected Lorenzo’s claim that imposing primary liability upon his conduct would erase or weaken the distinction between primary and secondary liability under the statute’s “aiding and abetting” provision. View "Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has authority to enforce securities laws by instituting an administrative proceeding against an alleged wrongdoer, typically overseen by an administrative law judge (ALJ). Other staff members, rather than the Commission, selected all of the five current ALJs, who have “authority to do all things necessary and appropriate” to ensure a “fair and orderly” adversarial proceeding, 17 CFR 201.111, 200.14(a). After a hearing, the ALJ issues an initial decision. The Commission can review that decision, but if it opts against review, it issues an order that the initial decision is “deemed the action of the Commission,” 15 U.S.C. 78d–1(c). The SEC charged Lucia and assigned ALJ Elliot to adjudicate the case. Following a hearing, Elliot issued an initial decision concluding that Lucia had violated the law and imposing sanctions. Lucia argued that the proceeding was invalid because SEC ALJs are “Officers of the United States,” subject to the Appointments Clause. Under that Clause, only the President, “Courts of Law,” or “Heads of Departments” can appoint “Officers.” The SEC and the D. C. Circuit rejected Lucia’s argument. The Supreme Court reversed. SEC ALJs are subject to the Appointments Clause. To qualify as an officer, rather than an employee, an individual must occupy a “continuing” position established by law, and must “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,” SEC ALJs hold a continuing office established 5 U.S.C. 556–557, 5372, 3105, and exercise “significant discretion." The ALJs have nearly all the tools of federal trial judges: they take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, can enforce compliance with discovery orders, and prepare proposed findings and an opinion including remedies. Judge Elliot heard and decided Lucia’s case without a constitutional appointment. View "Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law