Justia U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Securities Law
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Trevor Murray worked as a research strategist at UBS, a securities firm. His job involved reporting on commercial mortgage-backed securities markets to current and future customers. Under SEC regulations, Murray was required to certify that his reports were produced independently and reflected his own views. When two leaders of the CMBS trading desk pressured him to make his reports more supportive of their business strategies, Murray told his supervisor about it. The supervisor told Murray not to alienate the trading desk and to write what the business line wanted. He eventually recommended that Murray be removed from his position, despite having recently given him a strong performance review. When the CMBS trading desk did not accept Murray as a transfer, he was fired.Murray argued that he was terminated in violation of the whistleblower protection provision in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act because UBS fired him in response to his internal reporting about fraud on shareholders. He prevailed at trial, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the jury’s verdict and remanded for a new trial. It found that the whistleblower protection provision requires an employee to prove retaliatory intent, which a clarifying jury instruction had not properly indicated.The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, instead agreeing with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that the whistleblower protection provision does not impose this type of requirement. The Court acknowledged that a whistleblower must prove that his protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action against him, but it noted that the text of the statute does not include or refer to a requirement of proving retaliatory intent, which it treated as similar to “animus.” The Court noted that the statute contains a burden-shifting framework, requiring the whistleblower to show that their protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action, after which the employer must show that it would have taken the same action anyway. It found that a requirement of proving retaliatory intent would be incompatible with the burden-shifting framework. View "Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC" on Justia Law

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Slack, a technology company, conducted a direct listing to sell its shares to the public on the New York Stock Exchange. Pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, Slack filed a registration statement, containing information about its business and financial health, with the SEC, 15 U.S.C. 77, for a specified number of shares. Under the direct listing process, holders of preexisting unregistered shares were free to sell them to the public immediately. Slack’s direct listing offered 118 million registered shares and 165 million unregistered shares. Pirani bought 250,000 Slack shares. When the stock price dropped, Pirani filed a class action alleging violations of the Act, Section 11, by filing a materially misleading registration statement. Slack argued that Pirani had not alleged that he purchased shares traceable to the allegedly misleading registration statement, leaving open the possibility that he purchased shares unconnected to the registration statement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Section 11 requires a plaintiff to plead and prove that he purchased securities registered under a materially misleading registration statement. It authorizes an individual to sue for a material misstatement or omission in a registration statement when the individual has acquired “such security.” Contextual clues indicate that section 11(a) liability extends only to shares that are traceable to an allegedly defective registration, not “other securities that bear some sort of minimal relationship to a defective registration statement.” View "Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani" on Justia Law

Posted in: Securities Law
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Plaintiffs filed a securities-fraud class action alleging that Goldman violated securities laws prohibiting material misrepresentations and omissions in connection with the sale of securities, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b); 17 CFR 240.10b–5, and maintained an artificially inflated stock price by repeatedly making false and misleading generic statements about its ability to manage conflicts. Seeking to certify a class of Goldman shareholders, Plaintiffs invoked the “basic presumption” that investors rely on the market price of a company’s security, which in an efficient market will reflect all of the company’s public statements, including misrepresentations. The Second Circuit affirmed certification of the class.The Supreme Court vacated. The generic nature of a misrepresentation often is important evidence of price impact that courts should consider at class certification, including in inflation-maintenance cases, although the same evidence may be relevant to materiality, an inquiry reserved for the merits phase of a securities-fraud class action. The Second Circuit’s opinion leaves doubt as to whether it properly considered the generic nature of Goldman’s alleged misrepresentations. Defendants bear the burden of persuasion to prove a lack of price impact by a preponderance of the evidence at class certification and may rebut the presumption of reliance if they “show that the misrepresentation in fact did not lead to a distortion of price.” A defendant must do more than produce some evidence relevant to price impact and must “in fact” “seve[r] the link” between a misrepresentation and the price paid by the plaintiff. Assigning defendants the burden of persuasion to prove a lack of price impact by a preponderance of the evidence will be outcome-determinative only in the rare case in which the evidence is in perfect equipoise. View "Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System" on Justia Law

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Petitioners solicited foreign nationals to invest in a cancer-treatment center. A Securities and Exchange Commission investigation revealed they misappropriated the funds. The SEC may seek “equitable relief” in civil proceedings, 15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(5). The SEC brought a civil action for disgorgement equal to the amount raised from investors. Petitioners argued that the remedy failed to account for their legitimate business expenses. The Ninth Circuit affirmed an order holding Petitioners jointly and severally liable for the full amount.The Supreme Court vacated A disgorgement award that does not exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits and is awarded for victims is equitable relief authorized under section 78u(d)(5). Equity practice has long authorized courts to strip wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains; to avoid transforming that remedy into a punitive sanction, courts restrict it to an individual wrongdoer’s net profits to be awarded for victims. These long-standing equitable principles were incorporated into section 78u(d)(5).If on remand the court orders the deposit of the profits with the Treasury, the court should evaluate whether that order would be for the benefit of investors, consistent with equitable principles. Imposing disgorgement liability on a wrongdoer for benefits that accrue to his affiliates through joint-and-several liability runs against the rule in favor of holding defendants individually liable but the common law permitted liability for partners engaged in concerted wrongdoing. On remand, the court may determine whether Petitioners can, consistent with equitable principles, be found liable for profits as partners in wrongdoing or whether individual liability is required. The court must deduct legitimate expenses before awarding disgorgement. View "Liu v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

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In 2014, the Supreme Court held that a claim for breach of the duty of prudence imposed on plan fiduciaries by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) on the basis of inside information, must plausibly allege an alternative action that would have been consistent with securities laws and that a prudent fiduciary would not have viewed as more likely to harm the fund than to help it. The ERISA duty of prudence does not require a fiduciary to break the law and cannot require the fiduciary of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) “to perform an action—such as divesting the fund’s holdings of the employer’s stock on the basis of inside information—that would violate the securities laws.”In 2018, the Second Circuit reinstated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA brought by participants in IBM’s 401(k) plan who suffered losses from their investment in IBM stock. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, characterizing the question as what it takes to plausibly allege an alternative action “that a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have viewed as more likely to harm the fund than to help it” and whether that pleading standard can be satisfied by generalized allegations that the harm of an inevitable disclosure of an alleged fraud generally increases over time.” The Court concluded that the Second Circuit did not address those questions and noted that the views of the Securities and Exchange Commission might “well be relevant” to discerning the content of ERISA’s duty of prudence in this context. View "Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander" on Justia Law

Posted in: ERISA, Securities Law
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SEC Rule 10b–5 makes it unlawful to (a) “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” (b) “make any untrue statement of a material fact,” or (c) “engage in any act, practice, or course of business” that “operates . . . as a fraud or deceit” in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. The Supreme Court has held that to be a “maker” of a statement under subsection (b), one must have “ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.” Lorenzo, a brokerage firm's director of investment banking, sent e-mails to prospective investors. The content, supplied by Lorenzo’s boss, described a potential investment in a company with “confirmed assets” of $10 million. Lorenzo knew that the company had recently disclosed that its total assets were worth less than $400,000. The SEC found that Lorenzo had violated Rule 10b–5, 17 CFR 240.10b–5; section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b); and section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a)(1).The Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit in holding that Lorenzo could not be held liable as a “maker” under Rule 10b-5(b) but affirmed with respect to subsections (a) and (c) and statutory sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1). Dissemination of false or misleading statements with intent to defraud can fall within the scope of Rules 10b–5(a) and (c), and the statutory provisions, even if the disseminator did not “make” the statements under Rule 10b–5(b). By sending e-mails he understood to contain material untruths, Lorenzo “employ[ed]” a “device,” “scheme,” and “artifice to defraud” under subsection (a) and section 17(a)(1); he “engage[d] in a[n] act, practice, or course of business” that “operate[d] . . . as a fraud or deceit” under subsection (c). There is considerable overlap among the Rule's subsections and related statutory provisions. The "plainly fraudulent behavior" at issue might otherwise fall outside the Rule’s scope. The Court rejected Lorenzo’s claim that imposing primary liability upon his conduct would erase or weaken the distinction between primary and secondary liability under the statute’s “aiding and abetting” provision. View "Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

Posted in: Securities Law
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has authority to enforce securities laws by instituting an administrative proceeding against an alleged wrongdoer, typically overseen by an administrative law judge (ALJ). Other staff members, rather than the Commission, selected all of the five current ALJs, who have “authority to do all things necessary and appropriate” to ensure a “fair and orderly” adversarial proceeding, 17 CFR 201.111, 200.14(a). After a hearing, the ALJ issues an initial decision. The Commission can review that decision, but if it opts against review, it issues an order that the initial decision is “deemed the action of the Commission,” 15 U.S.C. 78d–1(c). The SEC charged Lucia and assigned ALJ Elliot to adjudicate the case. Following a hearing, Elliot issued an initial decision concluding that Lucia had violated the law and imposing sanctions. Lucia argued that the proceeding was invalid because SEC ALJs are “Officers of the United States,” subject to the Appointments Clause. Under that Clause, only the President, “Courts of Law,” or “Heads of Departments” can appoint “Officers.” The SEC and the D. C. Circuit rejected Lucia’s argument. The Supreme Court reversed. SEC ALJs are subject to the Appointments Clause. To qualify as an officer, rather than an employee, an individual must occupy a “continuing” position established by law, and must “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,” SEC ALJs hold a continuing office established 5 U.S.C. 556–557, 5372, 3105, and exercise “significant discretion." The ALJs have nearly all the tools of federal trial judges: they take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, can enforce compliance with discovery orders, and prepare proposed findings and an opinion including remedies. Judge Elliot heard and decided Lucia’s case without a constitutional appointment. View "Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

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The Securities Act of 1933 creates private rights of action pertaining to securities offerings, grants both federal and state courts jurisdiction over those suits, and bars their removal from state to federal court. The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act includes substantive reforms, applicable in all courts, and procedural reforms, applicable only in federal court. To avoid the new obstacles, plaintiffs began filing securities class actions under state law. The 1998 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), 15 U.S.C. 77p, disallows, in state and federal courts, “covered class actions,” in which damages are sought under state law on behalf of more than 50 persons,” alleging dishonest practices in the purchase or sale of a "covered security,” listed on a national stock exchange. Section 77v(a) (the “except clause”) now provides that state and federal courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over 1933 Act cases, “except as provided in section 77p . . . with respect to covered class actions.” Investors brought a class action in state court, alleging 1933 Act violations. A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss, rejecting arguments that SLUSA’s “except clause” stripped state courts of jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims in “covered class actions.” The “except clause” ensures that in any case in which sections 77v(a) and 77p conflict, 77p controls. Section 77p bars certain state law securities class actions but does not deprive state courts of jurisdiction over federal law class actions. The alternative construction would prevent state courts from deciding any 1933 Act large class suits, even suits raising no particular national interest, which would be inconsistent with SLUSA’s "purpose to preclude certain vexing state-law class actions.” Wherever 1933 Act class suits proceed, the substantive protections necessarily apply. SLUSA does not permit defendants to remove class actions alleging only 1933 Act claims from state to federal court. View "Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund" on Justia Law

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In 2007-2008, Lehman Brothers raised capital through public securities offerings. Petitioner, the largest public pension fund in the country, purchased some of those securities. A 2008 putative class action claimed that financial firms were liable under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77k(a), for their participation as underwriters in the transactions, alleging that certain registration statements for Lehman’s offerings included material misstatements or omissions. More than three years after the relevant offerings, petitioner filed a separate complaint with the same allegations. A proposed settlement was reached in the putative class action, but petitioner opted out. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of the individual suit, citing the three-year bar in Section 13 of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed. Section 13’s first sentence states a one-year limitations period; the three-year time limit is a statute of repose, not subject to equitable tolling. Its instruction that “[i]n no event” shall an action be brought more than three years after the relevant securities offering admits of no exception. The statute runs from the defendant’s last culpable act (the securities offering), not from the accrual of the claim (the plaintiff’s discovery of the defect). Tolling is permissible only where there is a particular indication that the legislature did not intend the statute to provide complete repose but instead anticipated the extension of the statutory period under certain circumstances. The timely filing of a class-action complaint does not fulfill the purposes of a statutory time limit for later-filed suits by individual class members. View "California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc." on Justia Law

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Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b–5 prohibit undisclosed trading on inside corporate information by persons bound by a duty not to exploit that information for their personal advantage. These persons are also forbidden from tipping inside information to others for trading. The Supreme Court has held (Dirks) that tippee liability hinges on whether the tipper disclosed the information for a personal benefit; personal benefit may be inferred where the tipper receives something of value in exchange for the tip or “makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.” Salman was convicted for trading on inside information he received from Kara, who had received the information from his brother, Maher, a former investment banker at Citigroup. Maher testified that he expected his brother to trade on the information. Kara testified that Salman knew the information was from Maher. While Salman’s appeal was pending, the Second Circuit decided that personal benefit to the tipper may not be inferred from a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend, unless there is “proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship … that generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.” The Ninth Circuit declined to follow the Second Circuit. A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. When an insider gives a trading relative or friend confidential information, the situation resembles trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient. Maher breached his duty to Citigroup and its clients—a duty acquired and breached by Salman when he traded on the information, knowing that it had been improperly disclosed. View "Salman v. United States" on Justia Law